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Introduction
A.

Work to date on this topic

1.
At its sixty-sixth session in July 2014, the International Law Commission
placed the topic “Crimes against humanity” on its current programme of work and
appointed a Special Rapporteur. 1 At its sixty-seventh session in May 2015, the
Commission held a general debate concerning the Special Rapporteur ’s first report
and in July 2015 provisionally adopted four draft articles with commentary. 2

B.

Debate in 2015 in the Sixth Committee

2.
During the debate in the Sixth Committee in 2015, 38 States 3 addressed this
topic with reactions that generally favoured the Commission’s work, stressing the
importance of the topic, 4 welcoming the four draft articles 5 and viewing them as
largely reflecting existing State practice and jurisprudence. 6 Among other things,
States expressed appreciation that the topic was proceeding in a manner that was
complementary to the system of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court 7 and underscored the need to avoid establishing new obligations that would
conflict with obligations existing under the Statute or other treaties. 8 A large number
of States agreed with the Commission’s approach of using, in draft article 3, the
definition of crimes against humanity that appears in article 7 of the Rome Statute

__________________
1

See the report of the Commission on the work of its sixty-sixth session, Yearbook … 2014,
vol. II (Part Two), para. 266.
2
See the report of the Commission on the work of its sixty-seventh session, Yearbook … 2015,
vol. II (Part Two), para. 113.
3
Presentations to the Sixth Committee were made by: Argentina; Austria; Belarus; Chile; China;
Croatia; the Czech Republic; El Salvador; France; Germany; Greece; Hungary; India; Indonesia;
the Islamic Republic of Iran; Israel; Italy; Japan; the Republic of Korea; Malaysia; Mexico; New
Zealand; the Netherlands; Peru; Poland; Portugal; Romania; the Russian Federation; Singapore;
Slovakia; Slovenia; South Africa; Spain; Sweden (on behalf of the Nordic countries);
Switzerland; Turkey; the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; and the United
States of America.
4
See, for example, China, Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventieth Session,
Sixth Committee, 22nd meeting (A/C.6/70/SR.22), para. 63; Israel, ibid., 21st meeting
(A/C.6/70/SR.21), para. 73; Japan, ibid., 22nd meeting (A/C.6/70/SR.22), para. 129; and
Malaysia, ibid., 23rd meeting (A/C.6/70/SR.23), para. 46.
5
See, for example, Slovakia, ibid., 23rd meeting (A/C.6/70/SR.23), para. 12; and South Africa,
ibid., para. 13.
6
See, for example, Czech Republic, ibid., 20th meeting (A/C.6/70/SR.20), para. 59; Spain, ibid.,
22nd meeting (A/C.6/70/SR.22), para. 94; Slovenia, ibid., 23rd meeting (A/C.6/70/SR.23),
para. 4; and Switzerland, ibid., 22nd meeting (A/C.6/70/SR.22), paras. 18–19.
7
See, for example, Italy, ibid., 17th meeting (A/C.6/70/SR.17), para. 59; and Mexico, ibid.,
21 st meeting (A/C.6/70/SR.21), para. 51.
8
See, for example, Hungary, ibid., para. 83; India, ibid., para. 65; Italy, ibid., 17th meeting
(A/C.6/70/SR.17), para. 58; Japan, ibid., 22nd meeting (A/C.6/70/SR.22), para. 130; Malaysia,
ibid., 23rd meeting (A/C.6/70/SR.23), para. 47; Portugal, ibid., 22nd meeting (A/C.6/70/SR.22),
para. 61; Sweden (on behalf of the Nordic countries), ibid., 20th meeting (A/C.6/70/SR.20),
para. 62015; and the United Kingdom, ibid., 23rd meeting (A/C.6/70/SR.23), para. 36.

16-00720

13/106

A/CN.4/690

of the International Criminal Court, 9 while two States indicated a desire to improve
upon that definition. 10
3.
Several States noted the value in focusing this project on issues such as the
prevention of crimes against humanity, 11 the adoption and harmonization of national
laws, 12 aut dedere aut judicare, 13 offences by not just States but also non-State
actors 14 and the promotion of inter-State cooperation, including through extradition
and mutual legal assistance. 15 At the same time, some States called for greater
clarity in what is meant by an obligation to prevent, 16 called for different
terminology (such as referring to crimes against humanity as “the most serious
crimes of international concern” or as “international crimes” rather than as “crimes
under international law” 17), pressed for addressing certain issues (for example, the
inapplicability of statutes of limitations, 18 immunity, 19 reparations for victims 20 or
the need for national courts to take into account international jurisprudence 21) or
urged avoiding certain issues (such as civil jurisdiction, 22 immunity 23 or the creation
of an institutional structure to monitor a new convention 24).
4.
Many States indicated that they supported the drafting of these articles for the
purpose of a new convention. 25 Some States noted the existence of a different
__________________
9

Argentina, ibid., 23rd meeting (A/C.6/70/SR.23), para. 72; Austria, ibid., 20th meeting
(A/C.6/70/SR.20), para. 32; the Czech Republic, ibid., para. 59; France, ibid., para. 20;
Germany, ibid., 22nd meeting (A/C.6/70/SR.22), para. 15; Japan, ibid., para. 130; the Republic
of Korea, ibid., 23rd meeting (A/C.6/70/SR.23), para. 56; New Zealand, ibid., 22nd meeting
(A/C.6/70/SR.22), para. 31; Poland, ibid., 21st meeting (A/C.6/70/SR.21), para. 68; Portugal,
ibid., 22nd meeting (A/C.6/70/SR.22), para. 61; Romania, ibid., 21st meeting (A/C.6/70/SR.21),
para. 79; the Russian Federation, ibid., 23rd meeting (A/C.6/70/SR.23), para. 18; Slovakia,
ibid., para. 12; Slovenia, ibid., para. 4; South Africa, ibid., para. 14; Sweden (on behalf of the
Nordic countries), ibid., 20th meeting (A/C.6/70/SR.20), para. 6; Switzerland, ibid.,
22nd meeting (A/C.6/70/SR.22), para. 18; and the United Kingdom, ibid., 23rd meeting
(A/C.6/70/SR.23), para. 36.
10
Croatia, ibid., 22nd meeting (A/C.6/70/SR.22), para. 78; and Mexico, ibid., 21st meeting
(A/C.6/70/SR.21), paras. 52–54.
11
New Zealand, ibid., 22nd meeting (A/C.6/70/SR.22), para. 31; Slovenia, ibid., 23rd meeting
(A/C.6/70/SR.23), para. 5; and South Africa, ibid., para. 13.
12
Peru, ibid., 21st meeting (A/C.6/70/SR.21), para. 93; and the Russian Federation, ibid.,
23rd meeting (A/C.6/70/SR.23), para. 18.
13
Sweden (on behalf of the Nordic countries), ibid., 20th meeting (A/C.6/70/SR.20), para. 6; and
the United Kingdom, ibid., 23rd meeting (A/C.6/70/SR.23), para. 36.
14
Israel, ibid., 21st meeting (A/C.6/70/SR.21), para. 74.
15
See, for example, Germany, ibid., 22nd meeting (A/C.6/70/SR.22), para. 14; Portugal, ibid.,
para. 61; and Switzerland, ibid., para. 20.
16
Indonesia, ibid., 23rd meeting (A/C.6/70/SR.23), para. 29.
17
Austria, ibid., 20th meeting (A/C.6/70/SR.20), para. 31; and France, ibid., para. 20.
18
Switzerland, ibid., 22nd meeting (A/C.6/70/SR.22), para. 20.
19
Malaysia, ibid., 23rd meeting (A/C.6/70/SR.23), para. 48; and Switzerland, ibid., 22nd meeting
(A/C.6/70/SR.22), para. 20.
20
El Salvador, ibid., para. 105; and Poland, ibid., 21st meeting (A/C.6/70/SR.21), para. 68.
21
Germany, ibid., 22nd meeting (A/C.6/70/SR.22), para. 15.
22
The United Kingdom, ibid., 23rd meeting (A/C.6/70/SR.23), para. 37.
23
Ibid.
24
France, ibid., 20th meeting (A/C.6/70/SR.20), para. 21.
25
See Austria, ibid., 20th meeting (A/C.6/70/SR.20), para. 30 (welcoming the Special
Rapporteur’s conclusions regarding a future convention on the topic); Chile, ibid., 22nd meeting
(A/C.6/70/SR.22), para. 86 (stating that the Commission’s contribution to developing a new
treaty in this area was vital); Croatia, ibid., para. 75 (strongly supporting all efforts aimed at
developing a global international instrument); El Salvador, ibid., para. 103 (agreeing on the
importance of elaborating a new draft convention devoted to such crimes, so as to fill existing
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initiative to develop a new convention focused just on mutual legal assistance and
extradition, and relating not just to crimes against humanity but to the most serious
international crimes. 26 Three States expressed doubts as to the desirability and
necessity of a new convention on crimes against humanity, viewing the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court and other existing instruments as sufficient, 27
while two States suggested that outcomes other than a new treaty might be more
appropriate. 28
5.
In addition to the debate in the Sixth Committee, this report has benefited from
written comments received from States in response to the request made by the
Commission in 2014 29 (reiterated in 2015 30) for information on existing national
laws and jurisprudence with respect to crimes against humanity.

C.

Purpose and structure of the present report

6.
The purpose of the present report is to address various actions to be taken by
States under their national laws with respect to crimes against humanity, which are
among the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a
whole. The issues addressed herein are: establishment of national laws that identify
offences relating to crimes against humanity; establishment of national jurisdiction
so as to address such offences when they occur; general investigation and
cooperation for identifying alleged offenders; exercise of national jurisdiction when
an alleged offender is present in a State’s territory; submission of the alleged
offender to prosecution or extradition or surrender (aut dedere aut judicare); and
fair treatment of the alleged offender at all stages of the process.
7.
Chapter I of this report addresses the obligation of a State to establish national
laws that identify offences relating to crimes against humanity. An obligation of this
__________________

gaps); Germany, ibid., para. 14 (finding that a new convention would not only complement
treaty law on the core crimes, but also foster inter-State cooperation); Hungary, ibid.,
21 st meeting (A/C.6/70/SR.21), para. 83 (indicating that there was no unified treaty basis for
prosecuting crimes against humanity, such as exists for war crimes and genocide, and therefore
a legal gap needs to be addressed); Indonesia, ibid., 23rd meeting (A/C.6/70/SR.23), para. 29
(asserting that a new convention was an essential part of the international community’s effort to
combat impunity and a key missing piece in the current framework) ; Israel, ibid., 21st meeting
(A/C.6/70/SR.21), para. 74 (indicating that it would be honoured to contribute to the drafting of
a new treaty); Italy, ibid., 17th meeting (A/C.6/70/SR.17), para. 58 (convinced of the potential
benefits of developing a convention on the subject); Peru, ibid., 21st meeting (A/C.6/70/SR.21),
para. 93 (welcoming work towards development of a possible future convention); Portugal,
ibid., 22nd meeting (A/C.6/70/SR.22), para. 61 (finding that a new convention could help fight
impunity and ensure accountability); Slovakia, ibid., 23rd meeting (A/C.6/70/SR.23), para. 12
(finding wise the decision to approach the topic by drafting a new convention, since that was the
only viable option); Switzerland, ibid., 22nd meeting (A/C.6/70/SR.22), paras. 18 and 20
(favouring a concise convention); and the United States, ibid., para. 41 (finding that developing
draft articles for a convention could prove valuable).
26
Argentina, ibid., 23rd meeting (A/C.6/70/SR.23), para. 71; Greece, ibid., 20th meeting
(A/C.6/70/SR.20), para. 48; the Netherlands, ibid., 21st meeting (A/C.6/70/SR.21), paras. 41–43;
and Slovenia, ibid., 23rd meeting (A/C.6/70/SR.23), para. 6.
27
Belarus, ibid., 21st meeting (A/C.6/70/SR.21), para. 30; Greece, ibid., 20th meeting
(A/C.6/70/SR.20), paras. 47–48; and the Islamic Republic of Iran, ibid., 23rd meeting
(A/C.6/70/SR.23), para. 67.
28
Malaysia, ibid., para. 48 (suggesting draft guidelines); and Singapore, ibid., 21st meeting
(A/C.6/70/SR.21), para. 59 (suggesting unspecified other outcomes).
29
Yearbook … 2014, vol. II (Part Two), para. 34.
30
Yearbook … 2015, vol. II (Part Two), para. 24.

16-00720

15/106

A/CN.4/690

kind typically exists in treaties addressing crimes and, in doing so, provides that the
State’s national criminal law shall establish criminal responsibility when the offender
“commits” the act (sometimes referred to in national law as “direct” commission,
“perpetration” of the act or being a “principal” in the commission of the act), attempts
to commit the act, or participates in the act or attempt in some other way (sometimes
referred to in national law by terms such “soliciting”, “aiding” or “inciting” the act, or
as the person being an “accessory” or “accomplice” to the act). Further, relevant
international instruments, as well as many national laws, provide that commanders
and other superiors are criminally responsible for the acts of subordinates in certain
circumstances. Such instruments and laws also provide that the fact that an offence
was committed by a subordinate pursuant to an order of a superior is not, by itself, a
ground for excluding criminal responsibility of the subordinate, and sometimes
provide that no statute of limitations shall be applied for such offences. Finally, such
instruments and laws typically provide that penalties shall sufficiently take into
account the grave nature of the offence. Chapter I concludes by proposing a draft
article addressing these points for crimes against humanity.
8.
Chapter II of this report addresses issues relating to the establishment of
national jurisdiction so as to address such offences when they occur. To ensure that
there is no safe haven for those who commit such crimes against humanity, this
chapter identifies the various types of State jurisdiction that treaties addressing
crimes typically require States parties to establish. Such jurisdiction normally must
be established not just by the State where the offence is committed, but by other
States as well, based on connections such as the nationality or presence of the
alleged offender. These treaties also typically provide that, while they obligate a
State to establish specific forms of jurisdiction, they do not exclude the
establishment of other criminal jurisdiction by the State. Chapter II concludes by
proposing a draft article addressing these points for crimes against humanity.
9.
Chapter III of this report addresses the obligation of a State to investigate
promptly and impartially whenever there is a reason to believe that a crime agains t
humanity has occurred or is occurring in any territory under its jurisdiction or
control. Some treaties addressing crimes have included an obligation to investigate
whenever there are reasons to believe that the relevant crime has been committed in
the State’s territory, though many treaties have not done so. Ideally, a State that
determines that such a crime has occurred or is occurring would notify other States
if it is believed that their nationals are involved in the crime, thereby allowing those
other States to investigate the matter also. In any event, if it is determined that a
crime against humanity has occurred or is occurring, all States should cooperate, as
appropriate, in an effort to identify and locate persons who have committed the
offences relating to that crime. Given the importance of investigating and
cooperating so as to identify alleged offenders, chapter III concludes by proposing a
draft article addressing such an obligation.
10. Chapter IV of this report discusses the exercise of national jurisdiction over an
alleged offender whenever he or she is present in a State ’s territory. Such an
obligation typically exists in treaties addressing crimes and, in doing so, often
addresses three requirements: that the State conduct a preliminary i nvestigation; that
the State, if necessary, take steps to ensure the availability of the alleged offender
for criminal proceedings, extradition or surrender, which may require taking the
individual into custody; and that the State notify other States havin g jurisdiction
over the matter of the actions that the State has taken and whether it intends to
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submit the matter to its competent authorities for prosecution. Chapter IV concludes
by proposing a draft article addressing these points for crimes against hu manity.
11. Chapter V of this report addresses the obligation to submit the alleged offender
to prosecution or to extradite or surrender him or her to another State or competent
international tribunal. Treaties addressing crimes typically contain such an aut dedere
aut judicare obligation. Moreover, recent treaties have also acknowledged the
possibility for the State to satisfy such an obligation by surrendering the alleged
offender to an international criminal court or tribunal for the purpose of prosecuti on.
Chapter V concludes by proposing a draft article addressing these points for crimes
against humanity.
12. Chapter VI of this report discusses the obligation to accord “fair treatment” to
an alleged offender at all stages of the proceedings against him or her, an obligation
typically recognized in treaties addressing crimes. Such an obligation includes
according a fair trial to the alleged offender. Furthermore, States, as always, are
obligated more generally to protect the person’s human rights, including during any
period of detention. In the event that the alleged offender ’s nationality is not that of
the State, the State is also obligated to permit the person to communicate and
receive visits from a representative of his or her State. Chapter VI concludes by
proposing a draft article addressing these points for crimes against humanity.
13. Chapter VII addresses a possible future programme of work. Annex I to this
report contains the four draft articles provisionally adopted by the Commission at its
sixty-seventh session, in 2015. Annex II contains the draft articles proposed in this
report.

CHAPTER I

Criminalization under national law
14. The International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nürnberg recognized the
importance of punishing individuals for, inter alia, crimes against humanity when it
stated that “[c]rimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract
entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the
provisions of international law be enforced”.31 Pursuant to this judgment, the
Commission’s Principles of International Law recognized in the Charter of the
Nürnberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal provided that “[a]ny person
who commits an act which constitutes a crime under international law is responsible
therefor and liable to punishment”.32 Similarly, the 1968 Convention on the
non-applicability of statutory limitations to war crimes and crimes against humanity
asserted in its preamble that “the effective punishment of … crimes against humanity
is an important element in the prevention of such crimes, the protection of human
rights and fundamental freedoms, the encouragement of confidence, the furtherance of
cooperation among peoples and the promotion of international peace and security”. 33
15. Prosecution and punishment of persons for crimes against humanity may be
possible before international criminal courts and tribunals, but must also operate at the
national level to be fully effective. The preamble of the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court affirms “that the most serious crimes of concern to the
__________________
31

“Judicial decisions: International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg) …”, p. 221.
Principle I, Yearbook … 1950, vol. II, p. 374.
33
As of 2015, this Convention has 55 parties.
32
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international community as a whole must not go unpunished and that their effective
prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the national level and by
enhancing international cooperation”. Indeed, given the limited capacity and, in some
instances, limited jurisdiction of international courts and tribunals, some writers argue
that, “[i]n most cases, the only way to enforce international criminal law is through
the use of national courts”.34 Furthermore, some writers assert that “[n]ational
prosecutions are not only the primary vehicle for the enforcement of international
crimes, they are also often considered a preferable option — in political, sociological,
practical and legitimacy terms — to international prosecutions”.35
16. This chapter discusses the establishment of criminal responsibility under
national law for persons who have committed crimes against humanity. It first
discusses the current situation with respect to the adoption of national laws on
crimes against humanity, demonstrating that many States have not done so. Next, it
discusses various treaties that have obligated States to adopt national laws with
respect to other crimes, which can help provide guidance fo r a draft article relating
to crimes against humanity. This chapter then analyses different types (or modes) of
liability that typically exist in national laws addressing crimes against humanity and
in treaties addressing crimes, notably offences for commi tting the crime, attempting
to commit the crime, and participating in committing or attempting to commit the
crime. This chapter then considers offences that can arise due to command or other
superior responsibility. An inability to avoid the offence on gr ounds of superior
orders is considered, as well as the application of a statute of limitations to the
crime. Consideration is then given to a requirement that appropriate penalties be
issued. This chapter concludes with a proposed draft article consisting of three
paragraphs, entitled “Criminalization under national law”.

A.

Crimes against humanity in national law

17. In their national laws, many States address, in some fashion, crimes against
humanity and provide for national prosecution to address those crimes. 36 The Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, in particular, has led to a number of
national laws providing for crimes against humanity in terms identical to or very
similar to the offence as defined in article 7 of that Statute. Indeed, of those States
who responded as of 2015 to the Commission’s request for information about their
national laws, Austria, 37 Belgium, 38 the Czech Republic, 39 Finland, 40 France, 41
Germany, 42 the Republic of Korea, 43 the Netherlands, 44 Switzerland 45 and the United
__________________
34

Brown, p. 16.
Cryer, p. 70. See also ibid., p. 587 (“The site of most international criminal law enforcement is
intended to be national systems, not international courts”); and Saul, p. 59.
36
See Yearbook … 2014, vol. II (Part One), document A/CN.4/680, paras. 53–56. See also Eser et al.;
Bergsmo, Harlem and Hayashi; García Falconí, p. 453; and van der Wolf. For country-specific
studies, see, for example, Ferstman, p. 857; and van den Herik, p. 303.
37
Written comments to the International Law Commission (2015), Austria (“a draft bill for the
incorporation of specific international crimes under the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court into the Austrian Criminal Code”).
38
Ibid., Belgium, citing article 136ter of its Criminal Code (“Conformément au Statut de la Cour
pénale internationale, le crime contre l’humanité”).
39
Ibid., the Czech Republic.
40
Ibid., Finland.
41
Ibid., France.
42
Ibid., Germany.
43
Ibid., the Republic of Korea.
44
Ibid., the Netherlands.
35
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Kingdom 46 all indicated that their national laws on crimes against humanity
essentially align with the definition in the Statute. Cuba 47 and Spain 48 also
criminalize crimes against humanity, although not in a manner identical to that of
the Statute.
18. At the same time, many States have not adopted national laws on crimes
against humanity. As indicated in the first report on this topic, 49 a study conducted
in 2013 concluded that, based on a review of earlier studies, at best 54 per cent of
the Member States of the United Nations (104 of 193) had some form of national
law expressly on crimes against humanity. 50 The remaining Member States (89 of
193) apparently had no national law relating to crimes against humanity.
Furthermore, the 2013 study found that earlier stud ies indicated that, at best,
66 per cent of parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (80 of
121) had some form of national law relating to crimes against humanity, leaving
34 per cent of parties to the Statute (41 of 121) without any such law. 51
Consequently, it does not appear that States regard themselves as bound under
customary international law to adopt a national law expressly criminalizing crimes
against humanity.
19. States that have not adopted a national law on crimes against humanity
typically do have national criminal laws that allow for punishment in some fashion
of many of the individual acts that, under certain circumstances, may constitute
crimes against humanity, such as murder, torture or rape. 52 These States, however,
have not criminalized crimes against humanity as such and this failure may preclude
prosecution and punishment of the conduct in terms commensurate with the gravity
of the offence. In the context of the crime of torture under international law, the
Committee against Torture 53 has expressed concern at the failure to adopt a national
__________________
45

Ibid., Switzerland.
Ibid., the United Kingdom (“The definition [of crimes against humanity] is based on the
definition in the ICC Statute”).
47
Ibid., Cuba.
48
Ibid., Spain.
49
Yearbook … 2014, vol. II (Part One), document A/CN.4/680, paras. 58–61.
50
International Human Rights Clinic, p. 8; see also The Law Library of Congress.
51
International Human Rights Clinic, p. 8.
52
Written comments to the International Law Commission (2015), the United States of America).
See also Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire in the case of the Prosecutor v. Simone Gbagbo,
Case No. ICC-02/11-01/12 OA, Judgment of 27 May 2015 on the Appeal of Côte d’Ivoire against
the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 11 December 2014 entitled “Decision on Côte d’Ivoire’s
Challenge to the Admissibility of the Case against Simone Gbagbo” , International Criminal Court,
Appeals Chamber, para. 99 (finding that a national prosecution for the ordinary domestic crimes of
disturbing the peace, organizing armed gangs and undermining state security was not based on
substantially the same conduct at issue for alleged crimes against humanity of murder, rape, other
inhumane acts and persecution).
53
See, for example, Conclusions and recommendations of the Committee against Torture, Slovenia
(CAT/C/CR/30/4), paragraphs 5(a) and 6(a) (expressing concern that the “[s]ubstantive criminal
law does not contain a specific crime of torture, which, although referred to in the Criminal
Code, remains undefined” and recommending that the State party “[p]roceed promptly with
plans to adopt a definition of torture which covers all the elements of that contained in article 1
of the Convention and amend its domestic penal law accordingly”); and Conclusions and
recommendations of the Committee against Torture, Belgium ( CAT/C/CR/30/6), paragraph 6
(recommending “that the Belgian authorities should ensure that all elements of the definition
contained in article 1 of the Convention are included in the general definition provided by
Belgian criminal law”). See also ibid., Guatemala (CAT/C/GTM/CO/4 and Add.1), para. 10;
ibid., Saudi Arabia (CAT/C/CR/28/5), paragraphs 4(a) and 8(a); ibid., France
(CAT/C/FRA/CO/3 and Add.1), paragraph 5; and ibid., Bosnia and Herzegovina
46
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law that criminalizes torture in accordance with the definition of torture contained
in the 1984 Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment. In its General Comment No. 2, the Committee asserted:
Serious discrepancies between the Convention’s definition and that incorporated into domestic law
create actual or potential loopholes for impunity. In some cases, although similar language may be
used, its meaning may be qualified by domestic law or by judicial interpretation and thus the
Committee calls upon each State party to ensure that all parts of its Government adhere to the
definition set forth in the Convention for the purpose of defini ng the obligations of the State. At
the same time, the Committee recognizes that broader domestic definitions also advance the object
and purpose of this Convention so long as they contain and are applied in accordance with the
standards of the Convention, at a minimum. 54

Even though a verbatim national adoption of the definition contained in the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment is not required, some writers maintain that it must at least adequately
cover the Convention definition and must be adopted into national legislation and in
particular in the penal code. 55

B.

Existing treaties obligating States to criminalize conduct in
national law

20. Many States have ratified or acceded to treaties in the areas of international
humanitarian law, human rights or international criminal law, which require
criminalization of specific types of conduct. 56 For example, the 1948 Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide provides that “the
Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance with their respective
Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present
Convention and, in particular, to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of
genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III” of the Convention
(art. V). States parties to the Convention have implemented this obligation through
the adoption of national laws, such as the Netherlands Act of 2 July 1964
Implementing the Convention on Genocide 57 or the Act to Give Effect to the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide by
Tonga. 58 Other States with laws implementing the Convention include Albania, 59
__________________

(CAT/C/BIH/CO/1 and Add.1–2), paragraph 9. For comments by Governments on this issue see,
for example, the report of the Committee against Torture, Official Records of the General
Assembly, Fifty-Seventh Session, Supplement No. 44 (A/57/44), paras. 30–35 (Benin), and ibid.,
Fifty-Fifth Session, Supplement No. 44 (A/55/44), para. 49(a) (Austria), para. 54(a) (Finland),
para. 68(a) (Azerbaijan), para. 74(a) (Kyrgyzstan), para. 80(a) (Uzbekistan), para. 87 (Poland),
para. 150(b) (Paraguay), para. 160 (El Salvador) and para. 179(a) (United States of America).
54
Committee against Torture, General Comment No. 2 (CAT/C/GC/2/CRP.1/Rev.4), para. 9. For
an assessment of the Committee’s practice with respect to article 2, see Nowak and McArthur,
pp. 94–107.
55
Nowak and McArthur, p. 239 (citing CAT/C/CR/30/6 (see footnote 53 above), para. 6; and
Conclusions and recommendations of the Committee against Torture, Estonia ( CAT/C/CR/29/5),
para. 6(a)). See also Ingelse, p. 222.
56
See, generally, Ambos, Treatise on International Criminal Law, pp. 93–95; and Dupuy and
Kerbrat, pp. 587–588.
57
Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 2 July 1964, available from wetten.overheid.nl/
BWBR0002453/geldigheidsdatum_wijkt_af_van_zoekvraag/geldigheidsdatum_01-05-2002.
58
Laws of Tonga, chapter 19, Act 8 of 1969, an Act to Give Effect to the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, available from
www.paclii.org/to/legis/consol_act/ga75.rtf.
59
Criminal Code of the Republic of Albania, Law No. 7895 of 27 January 1995 (revised 2013),
art. 73, available from www.legislationline.org/documents/section/criminal-codes.
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Armenia, 60 Austria, 61 Brazil, 62 Bulgaria, 63 Croatia, 64 Cuba, 65 the Czech Republic, 66
Fiji, 67 Germany, 68 Ghana, 69 Hungary, 70 Israel, 71 Italy, 72 Liechtenstein, 73 Mexico, 74
Portugal, 75 Romania, 76 the Russian Federation, 77 Slovenia, 78 Spain, 79 Sweden 80 and
the United States. 81 Instead of adopting a detailed national law on the crime of
genocide, some States simply incorporate the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in their national law by cross -reference. 82
21. Similarly, each of the 1949 Geneva Conventions for the protection of war
victims provides that “[t]he High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any
legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for the persons
committing … any of the grave breaches of the present Convention” as defined in

__________________
60

Criminal Code of the Republic of Armenia of 18 April 2003 (revised 2013), art. 393, ibid.
Written comments to the International Law Commission (2015), Austria.
62
Brazil, Act No. 2889 of 1 October 1956, available from
www.preventgenocide.org/pt/direito/codigos/brasil.htm.
63
Bulgaria, Criminal Code, No. 26/02.04.1968 (amended 2010), art. 416, available from
www.legislationline.org/documents/section/criminal-codes.
64
Croatia, Criminal Code, Official Gazette No. 110 of 21 October 1997 (revised 2003), art. 156, ibid.
65
Cuba, Criminal Code, Law No. 62/87 of 29 December 1987, art. 116, para. 1, available from
www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=242550.
66
The Czech Republic, Criminal Code, Act No. 140/1961, provision 259, available from
www.coe.int/t/dlapil/codexter/Source/country_profiles/legislation/CT%20Legislation%20%20Czech%20Republic%20Criminal%20Code.pdf.
67
Fiji Islands, Criminal Code, art. 69 (inserted by ordinance No. 25 of 1969, amended by Order
13 November 1970 and Ordinance No. 15 of 1973), available from
www.preventgenocide.org/law/domestic/fiji.htm.
68
Germany, Act to Introduce the Code of Crimes Against International Law of 26 June 2002,
part 2, ch. 1, sect. 6, available from www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/VoeStGB.pdf.
69
Ghana, Criminal Code of 1960, Act 29 (as amended up to 2003), sect. 49A, available from
www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=1787.
70
Hungary, Criminal Code, Act C of 2012 (promulgated on 13 July 2012), sect. 142, available
from www.legislationline.org/documents/section/criminal-codes.
71
Israel, Crime of Genocide (Prevention and Punishment) Law No. 5710 -1950 of 29 March 1950,
available from preventgenocide.org/il/law1950.htm.
72
Italy, Law No. 962 of 9 October 1967, available from preventgenocide.org/it/legge.htm.
73
Liechtenstein, Criminal Code of 24 June 1987, sect. 321, available from
www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=10181.
74
Mexico, Federal Criminal Code of 14 August 1931, art. 149 bis (updated 14 July 2014),
available from www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=14542.
75
Portugal, Criminal Code, Decree-Law No. 48/95 of 15 March 1995, art. 239, available from
www.preventgenocide.org/pt/direito/codigos/portugal.htm.
76
Romania, Criminal Code, Law No. 286 of 17 July 2009 (amended 2012), art. 438, available
from www.legislationline.org/documents/section/criminal-codes.
77
The Russian Federation, Criminal Code, No. 63-Fz of 13 June 1996 (amended 2012), art. 357, ibid.
78
Slovenia, Criminal Code (KZ-1), art. 100 (2008), ibid.
79
Spain, Criminal Code, Organic Act No. 10/1995, art. 607 (23 November 1995), ibid.
80
Sweden, Criminal Code, Act No. 1964:169, available from preventgenocide.org/se/lag169.htm.
81
United States Code, Title 18, sect. 1091 (2012), available from www.gpo.gov/fdsys/granule/
USCODE-2011-title18/USCODE-2011-title18-partI-chap50A-sec1091.
82
See, for example, Laws of Antigua and Barbuda, chapter 191, Genocide Act, section 3, available
from www.laws.gov.ag/acts/chapters/cap-191.pdf; Laws of Barbados, Genocide Act, chap. 133A
(1980-18), sect. 4, available from 208.109.177.6/en/ShowPdf/133A.pdf; Ireland, Genocide Act
No. 28/1973, sect. 2(1), available from www.preventgenocide.org/law/domestic/ireland.htm; and
Seychelles, Genocide Act 1969 (Overseas Territories), 1970, sect. 1(1), available from
www.seylii.org/sc/legislation/consolidated-act/88.
61
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those Conventions. 83 According to a comprehensive analysis of national laws
conducted by the International Committee of the Red Cross, 98 States have adopted
national laws to implement this provision of the Geneva Conventions for the
protection of war victims, while at least 30 States address the matter i n their
military manuals. 84
22. Indeed, obligations to “criminalize” certain acts in national law exist in a
range of international conventions, including the 1970 Convention on the
suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft; 85 the 1973 Convention on the prevention
and punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons, including
diplomatic agents; 86 the 1979 International Convention against the taking of
hostages; 87 the 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment; 88 the 1985 Inter-American Convention to
Prevent and Punish Torture; 89 the 1994 Convention on the Safety of United Nations
and Associated Personnel; 90 the 1994 Inter-American Convention on Forced
Disappearance of Persons; 91 the 1997 International Convention for the Suppression
of Terrorist Bombings; 92 the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of
the Financing of Terrorism; 93 the OAU [Organization of African Unity] Convention
on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, 1999; 94 the Protocol to Prevent,
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children,
__________________
83

Geneva Convention relative to the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field (Convention I), art. 49; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of
the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (Geneva
Convention II), art. 50; Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
(Geneva Convention III), art. 129; and Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War (Geneva Convention IV), art. 146.
84
See the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Customary IHL Database,
“Chapter 43: Practice relating to Rule 151. Individual responsibility” (see sections on national
laws and on military manuals), available from www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/
v2_cha_chapter43_rule151.
85
Art. 2 (“Each Contracting State undertakes to make the offence punishable by severe penalties”).
86
Art. 2, para. 2 (“Each State party shall make these crimes punishable by appropriate penalties
which take into account their grave nature”).
87
Art. 2 (“Each State party shall make the offences set forth in [this Convention] punishable by
appropriate penalties which take into account the grave nature of those offences”).
88
Art. 4 (“Each State party shall ensure that all acts of torture are offences under its criminal law. …
Each State party shall make these offences punishable by appropriate penalties which take into
account their grave nature”).
89
Art. 6 (“The States Parties shall ensure that all acts of torture and attempts to commit torture are
offences under their criminal law and shall make such acts punishable by severe penalties that
take into account their serious nature”).
90
Art. 9, para. 2 (“Each State party shall make the crimes set out in [this Convention] punishable
by appropriate penalties which shall take into account their grave nature”).
91
Art. III (“The States Parties undertake to adopt … the legislative measures th at may be needed
to define the forced disappearance of persons as an offence and to impose an appropriate
punishment commensurate with its extreme gravity”).
92
Art. 4 (“Each State party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary: ( a) To establish as
criminal offences under its domestic law the offences set forth in … this Convention;
(b) To make those offences punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account the
grave nature of those offences”).
93
Art. 4 (“Each State party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary: (a) To establish as
criminal offences under its domestic law the offences set forth in [this Convention]; ( b) To make
those offences punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account the grave natu re of
the offences”).
94
Art. 2(a) (“States Parties undertake to … review their national laws and establish criminal
offences for terrorist acts as defined in this Convention and make such acts punishable by
appropriate penalties that take into account the grave nature of such offences”).
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supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized
Crime; 95 the 2006 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearance; 96 and the 2007 ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian
Nations] Convention on Counter Terrorism. 97
23. Reflecting on the acceptance of such obligations in treaties, and in particular
within the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), in the case
concerning Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v.
Senegal), stated:
The obligation for the State to criminalize torture and to establish its jurisdiction over it finds its
equivalent in the provisions of many international conventions for the combating of international
crimes. This obligation, which has to be implemented by the State concerned as so on as it is
bound by the Convention, has in particular a preventive and deterrent character, since by
equipping themselves with the necessary legal tools to prosecute this type of offence, the States
parties ensure that their legal systems will operate to that effect and commit themselves to
coordinating their efforts to eliminate any risk of impunity. This preventive character is all the
more pronounced as the number of States parties increases. 98

C.

Commission of, attempt to commit, or participation in the crime

24. In the context of crimes against humanity, a survey of both international
instruments and national laws suggests that various types (or modes) of individual
criminal responsibility are addressed. First, all jurisdictions that have criminalized
crimes against humanity impose criminal responsibility upon a person who
“commits” the offence (sometimes referred to in national law as “direct”
commission, as “perpetration” of the act or as being a “principal” in the commission
of the act). For example, the Agreement for the prosecution and punishment of the
major war criminals of the European Axis, Charter of the International Military
Tribunal (“Nürnberg Charter”) provided jurisdiction for the IMT over “persons who,
acting in the interests of the European Axis countries, whether as individuals or as
members of organizations, committed any of the following crimes ” (art. 6).
Likewise, the Statutes of both the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 99
and the International Tribunal for Rwanda 100 provide that a person who “committed”
crimes against humanity “shall be individually responsible for the crime”. The
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court provides that “[a] person who
commits a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court shall be individually
responsible and liable for punishment” and that “a person shall be criminally
responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the
__________________
95

Art. 5 para. 1 (“Each State party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be
necessary to establish as criminal offences the conduct set forth in … this Protocol”).
96
Art. 7, para. 1 (“Each State party shall make the offence of enforced disappearance punishable
by appropriate penalties which take into account its extreme seriousness”).
97
Art. IX, para. 1 (“The Parties shall adopt such measures as may be necessary, including, where
appropriate, national legislation, to ensure that offences covered in Article II of this Convention,
especially when it is intended to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an
international organisation to do or to abstain from doing any act, are under no circumstan ces
justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or
other similar nature”).
98
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 442, at p. 451, para. 75.
99
Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, adopted by
Security Council resolution 827 (1993) of 25 May 1993, art. 7, para. 1.
100
Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, adopted by the Security Council in its
resolution 955 (1994) of 8 November 1994, annex, art. 6, para . 1.
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Court if that person … [c]ommits such a crime, whether as an individual [or] jointly
with another” (art. 25, paras. 2 and 3(a)). Similarly, the instruments regulating the
Special Court for Sierra Leone, 101 the Special Panels for Serious Crimes in East
Timor, 102 the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, 103 the Iraqi
Supreme Criminal Tribunal 104 and the Extraordinary African Chambers within the
Senegalese Judicial System 105 all provide for the criminal responsibility of a person
who “commits” crimes against humanity.
25. National laws that address crimes against humanity invariably criminalize the
“commission” of such crimes. Virtually all of the States that responded to the
Commission’s request for information about their national legislation (Australia, 106
Austria, 107 Belgium, 108 Cuba, 109 the Czech Republic, 110 Finland, 111 France, 112
Germany, 113 the Netherlands, 114 Spain, 115 Switzerland, 116 the Republic of Korea 117
and the United Kingdom 118) indicated that they criminalize “commission” of crimes
against humanity. 119
26. Although crimes against humanity are undertaken pursuant to a State or
organizational policy, suggesting complicity at potentially the highest levels, persons
at lower levels committing the offence are nevertheless criminally responsible.
According to some writers, criminal responsibility for participation in the offence by
__________________
101

Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, available from www.rscsl.org/documents.html, art. 6,
para. 1.
102
United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, Regulation 2000/15 on the
establishment of Panels with exclusive jurisdiction over serious criminal offences
(UNTAET/REG/2000/15), sect. 5.
103
Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the
Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, art. 5. See also
the Agreement between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia concerning
the prosecution under Cambodian law of crimes committed during the period of Democratic
Kampuchea (General Assembly resolution 57/228B of 22 May 2003).
104
Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, ILM, vol. 43, p. 236, art. 10(b). The Iraqi interim
administration enacted a new statute in 2005, built upon the earlier statute, which changed the
tribunal’s name to “Iraqi Supreme Criminal Tribunal”. See Law of the Supreme Iraqi Criminal
Tribunal, Resolution No. 10, Official Gazette of the Republic of Iraq, vol. 47, No. 4006
(18 October 2005).
105
Statute of the Extraordinary African Chambers within the courts of Senegal created to prosecute
international crimes committed in Chad between 7 June 1982 and 1 December 1990, ILM, vol. 52,
No. 4 (2013), pp. 1028–1029, arts. 4(b) and 6.
106
Written comments to the International Law Commission (2016), Australia, citing division 268 of
its Criminal Code.
107
Written comments to the International Law Commission (2015), Austria, citing section 321 of
its Criminal Code.
108
Ibid., Belgium, citing article 136sexies of its Criminal Code.
109
Ibid., Cuba, citing article 18 of its Criminal Code.
110
Ibid., Czech Republic, citing section 401 of its Criminal Code.
111
Ibid., Finland, citing chapter 11, section 3 of its Criminal Code.
112
Ibid., France, citing article 212-1 of its Criminal Code.
113
Ibid., Germany, citing section 7 of its Criminal Code.
114
Ibid., the Netherlands, citing article 4 of its Criminal Code.
115
Ibid., Spain, citing article 451 of its Criminal Code.
116
Ibid., Switzerland, citing article 264a of its Criminal Code.
117
Ibid., the Republic of Korea, citing article 9 of its Criminal Code.
118
Ibid., the United Kingdom, referencing the International Criminal Court Act 2001.
119
Treaties addressing other types of crimes also invariably call upon States parties to adopt
national laws proscribing direct commission of the offence. Thus, the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide provides for individual criminal
responsibility for the commission of genocide (art. III(a)).
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such persons is necessary because large-scale international crimes “require not just
planners and perpetrators, but numerous actors who participate — sometimes simply
by doing their ‘job’ or because they want to get along or are unwilling to object to
those more powerful — and who together make it possible for the crime to occur on a
massive level”.120 Further, “commission” of the offence also “may involve an
omission to perform prescribed conduct (that is, the failure to do obligatory acts)”.121
27. Second, all such jurisdictions, to one degree or another, also impose criminal
responsibility upon a person who participates in the offence in some way other than
“commission” of the offence. Such conduct may take the form of an “attempt” to
commit the offence, or acting as an “accessory” or “accomplice” to the offence or an
attempted offence. With respect to an “attempt” to commit the crime, the Statutes of
the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 122 the International Tribunal for
Rwanda and the Special Court for Sierra Leone contain no provision for this type of
responsibility. In contrast, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
provides for the criminal responsibility of a person who attempts to commit the crime,
unless he or she abandons the effort or otherwise prevents completion of the crime
(art. 25, para. 3(f)). In the Banda and Jerbo case, the Pre-Trial Chamber asserted that
criminal responsibility for attempt “requires that, in the ordinary course of events, the
perpetrator’s conduct [would] have resulted in the crime being completed, had the
circumstances outside the perpetrator ’s control not intervened”.123 With respect to
“accessorial” responsibility, such a concept is addressed in international instruments
through various terms, such as “ordering”, “soliciting”, “inducing”, “instigating”,
“inciting”, “aiding and abetting”, “conspiracy to commit”, “being an accomplice to”,
“participating in” or “joint criminal enterprise”.124
28. Thus, the Nürnberg Charter provides that “[l]eaders, organisers, instigators and
accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a common plan or
conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts
performed by any persons in execution of such plan” (art. 6). In its Principles of
International Law recognized in the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal and in the
Judgment of the Tribunal, the Commission noted in principle VII that “complicity” in
the commission of a crime against humanity “is a crime under international law”.125
29. Similarly, the Convention on the non-applicability of statutory limitations to
war crimes and crimes against humanity provided in its article II that
If any of the crimes mentioned in article I is committed, the provisions of this Convention shall
apply to representatives of the State authority and private individuals who, as principals or
accomplices, participate in or who directly incite others to the commission of any of those crimes,
or who conspire to commit them, irrespective of the degree of completion, and to representatives
of the State authority who tolerate their commission.
__________________
120

Cassese et al., p. 381. See also Bantekas, International Criminal Law, pp. 51–75.
O’Keefe, p. 169.
122
Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (see footnote 99
above).
123
Prosecutor v. Banda and Jerbo, Case No. ICC-02/05-03/09, corrigendum of the Decision on the
Confirmation of Charges of 7 March 2011, International Criminal Court, Pre-Trial Chamber I,
para. 96.
124
See, generally, van Sliedregt and Jain. Some aspects of criminalizing such participation in the
offence have elicited criticism. See, for example, Ohlin. For an argument that all of these types
of liability may be viewed as falling within a unitary theory of perpetration, see Stewart ,
“The end of ‘modes of liability’ for international crimes”.
125
Yearbook … 1950, vol. II, p. 377.
121
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30. The Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia provides that
“[a] person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and
abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in articles 2
to 5 of the present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the crime”,126 and the
Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda uses virtually identical language. 127
Both tribunals have convicted defendants for participation in the offences within their
respective jurisdiction. 128 Similarly, the instruments regulating the Special Court for
Sierra Leone, 129 the Special Panels for Serious Crimes in East Timor, 130 the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, 131 the Iraqi Supreme Criminal
Tribunal 132 and the Extraordinary African Chambers within the Senegalese Judicial
System 133 all provide for the criminal responsibility of a person who, in one form or
another, participates in the commission of crimes against humanity.
31. In article 2 of its 1996 draft code of crimes against the peace and security of
mankind, the Commission provided for several types of individual criminal
responsibility relating inter alia to crimes against humanity, specifically when a
perpetrator:
(a)

Intentionally commits such a crime;

(b)

Orders the commission of such a crime which in fact occurs or is attempted;

(c)
Fails to prevent or repress the commission of such a crime [when in a superior or
command relationship to the offender];
(d)
Knowingly aids, abets or otherwise assists, directly and substantially, in the
commission of such a crime, including providing the means for its commission;
(e)
Directly participates in planning or conspiring to commit such a crime which in fact
occurs;
(f)
Directly and publicly incites another individual to commit such a crime which in fact
occurs;
(g)
Attempts to commit such a crime by taking action commencing the execution of a
crime which does not in fact occur because of circumstances independent of his
intentions. 134

__________________
126

Art. 7, para. 1. Various decisions of the Tribunal have analysed such criminal responsibility.
See, for example, Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment of 15 July 1999,
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber, para. 220 (finding “that the
notion of common design as a form of accomplice liability is firmly established in customary
international law”).
127
Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda (see footnote 100 above), art. 6, para. 1.
128
See, for example, Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment of
10 December 1998, Trial Chamber II, and ILM, vol. 38, No. 2 (March 1999), para. 246 (finding
that “[i]f he is aware that one of a number of crimes will probably be committed, and one of
those crimes is in fact committed, he has intended to facilitate the commission of that crime, and
is guilty as an aider and an abettor”).
129
Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (see footnote 101 above), art. 6, para. 1.
130
UNTAET/REG/2000/15 (see footnote 102 above), sect. 14.
131
Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the
Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea (see
footnote 103 above), art 29.
132
Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal (see footnote 104 above), art. 15.
133
Statute of the Extraordinary African Chambers within the courts of Senegal created to prosecute
international crimes committed in Chad between 7 June 1982 and 1 December 1990 (see
footnote 105 above), art. 10.
134
Yearbook … 1996, vol. II (Part Two), pp. 18–19.
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32. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court provides for criminal
responsibility if the person commits “such a crime … through another person”, if
the person “[o]rders, solicits or induces the commission of the crime which in fact
occurs or is attempted”, if the person “[f]or the purpose of facilitating the
commission of such a crime, aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its
attempted commission, including providing the means for its commission ” or if the
person “[i]n any other way contributes to the commission or attempted commission
of such a crime by a group of persons acting with common purpose ” subject to
certain conditions. 135
33. The concept in these various instruments of “ordering” the crime differs from
(and complements) the concept of “command” or other superior responsibility,
which the next subsection addresses. Here, “ordering” concerns the criminal
responsibility of the superior for affirmatively instructing that action be committed
that constitutes an offence. By contrast, command or other superior responsibility
concerns the criminal responsibility of the superior for a failure to act; specifically,
in situations where the superior knew or had reason to know that subordinates were
about to commit such acts or had done so, and the superior failed to take the
necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the
perpetrators. Further, in these various instruments the allied concepts of “soliciting”,
“inducing”, aiding” and “abetting” the crime include encouraging, requesting or
inciting another person to engage in the action that constitutes the offence; these
concepts do not require any superior/subordinate relationship. 136
34. In addressing the breadth of criminal responsibility for “accessorial”
participation in the offence, the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
explained in the Tadić case that:
all those who have engaged in serious violations of international humanitarian law, whatever the
manner in which they may have perpetrated, or participated in th e perpetration of those violations,
must be brought to justice. If this is so, it is fair to conclude that the Statute does not confine itself
to providing for jurisdiction over those persons who plan, instigate, order, physically perpetrate a
crime or otherwise aid and abet in its planning, preparation or execution. … It does not exclude
those modes of participating in the commission of crimes which occur where several persons
having a common purpose embark on criminal activity that is then carried out eit her jointly or by
some members of this plurality of persons. Whoever contributes to the commission of crimes by
the group of persons or some members of the group, in execution of a common criminal purpose,
may be held to be criminally liable, subject to certain conditions. 137

35. Many national laws also provide criminal responsibility for such involvement
in the commission of crimes against humanity, using somewhat different
terminology and formulations. For example, the Criminal Code of Cuba sets forth
various modes of liability for crimes against humanity that extend beyond
“commission” of the act, by addressing:
a)

Persons who commit the offence themselves

b)

Persons who plan an offence and its execution

c)

Persons who cause another criminally responsible person to commit an offence

__________________
135

Art. 25, para. 3(a)–(d). For commentary, see Finnin.
See, generally, Ambos, “Article 25 …”, pp. 743–770; and O’Keefe, pp. 188–192.
137
Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić (see footnote 126 above), para. 190. See also Prosecutor v. Radoslav
Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Judgment of 3 April 2007, International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber; and Prosecutor v. Milan Martić, Case No. IT-95-11-A, Judgment
of 8 October 2008, International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber.
136
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ch) Persons who participate in the execution of a criminal act by carrying out actions
without which the act could not have been committed
d)
Persons who commit an offence through the agency of another person who is not a
perpetrator or who is not subject to penalty, or who is not criminally responsible for the
offence because they acted as a result of violence, coercion or deception. 138

36. Indeed, Cuba asserts that “[i]n the case of offences against humanity, human
dignity … and offences specified in international treaties, all criminally responsible
persons shall be considered perpetrators, whatever the nature of their
involvement”. 139 Other States also address attempt or participation in the
commission of crimes against humanity. For example, Finland, allows that “[a]n
attempt is punishable” within the section of its legal code applicable to crimes
against humanity. 140 The Republic of Korea punishes “[a]ny attempt to commit a
crime” constituting a crime against humanity. 141 The United Kingdom “imposes both
principal and accessory liability for crimes against humanity. In particular … the
[International Criminal Court (ICC)] Act 2001 makes clear that the following
constitute ‘ancillary’ offences in respect of crimes against humanity: (a) aiding,
abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of an offence, ( b) inciting a
person to commit an offence, (c) attempting or conspiring to commit an offence, or
(d) assisting an offender or concealing the commission of an offence ”. 142
37. In the case of Zazai v. Canada, a Canadian appellate court explained the
nature of complicity in the context of a prosecution for crimes against humanity:
At common law and under Canadian criminal law, [complicity] was, and still is, a mode of
commission of a crime. It refers to the act or omission of a person that helps, or is done for the
purpose of helping, the furtherance of a crime. An accomplice is then charged with, and tried for,
the crime that was actually committed and that he assisted or furthered. In other words, whet her
one looks at it from the perspective of our domestic law or of international law, complicity
contemplates a contribution to the commission of a crime. 143

38.

Thus, the defendant in that case was found guilty because he

was willingly and to his benefit a member of an organization that only existed for a limited brutal
purpose, i.e. the elimination of anti-government activity and the commission of crimes which
amount to or can be characterized as crimes against humanity. He knew that the organization in
which he was participating and that he assisted was committing crimes of torture and murder. 144

39. Treaties addressing crimes other than crimes against humanity typically
provide for criminal responsibility of persons who participate in the commission of
the offence, using broad terminology that does not seek to require States to alter the
preferred terminology or modalities that are well settled in national law. In other
__________________
138

Written comments to the International Law Commission (2015), Cuba, citing article 18,
paragraph 2 of its Criminal Code. See also ibid., Germany, citing section 2, paragraph (5) of its
Criminal Code.
139
Ibid., Cuba, citing article 18, paragraph 4 of its Criminal Code.
140
Ibid., Finland, citing chapter 11, section 3 of its Criminal Code. See also ibid., Austria, citing
section 321b, paragraphs 4–5 of its Criminal Code; Canada, citing the Crimes Against Humanity
and War Crimes Act (S.C. 2000, c. 24) of 29 June 2000, section 4, paragraph (1.1), available
from laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/C-45.9/FullText.html; and United States Code, Title 18,
section 1091.
141
Written comments to the International Law Commission (2015), the Republic of Korea, citing
article 9, paragraph (5) of its Criminal Code. See also ibid., Belgium, citing article 136sexies–septies
of its Criminal Code.
142
Ibid., the United Kingdom.
143
Zazai v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. 2005 FCA 303, Judgment of
20 September 2005, Federal Court of Appeal Decisions, paras. 13–14.
144
Ibid., para. 26.
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words, such treaties use general terms rather than detailed language, allowing States
to shape the contours of the criminal responsibility within national statutes or
jurisprudence. For example, article 15, paragraph 2, of the 1999 Second Protocol to
the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict, provides:
Each Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offe nces under
its domestic law the offences set forth in this Article and to make such offences punishable by
appropriate penalties. When doing so, Parties shall comply with general principles of law and
international law, including the rules extending individual criminal responsibility to persons other
than those who directly commit the act. *

40. Although the general formulation used in contemporary treaties addressing
commission of, attempt to commit and participation in a crime can vary, a succinct
recent formulation appears in article 6, paragraph 1(a) of the International Convention
for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance: “Each State party
shall take the necessary measures to hold criminally responsible at least … [a]ny
person who commits, orders, solicits or induces the commission of, attempts to
commit, is an accomplice to or participates in an enforced disappearance .”
41. Most criminal responsibility under international and national jurisdictions
concerns the liability of natural persons, not legal persons (for example,
corporations). However, in recent years, corporate criminal liability has become a
feature of many national jurisdictions. 145 Moreover, in some of these national
jurisdictions, such responsibility exists with respect to international crimes, 146 which
has prompted calls for developing the law in this area. 147 Even so, criminal
responsibility for corporations is not uniformly recognized worldwide 148 and the
approach adopted in jurisdictions where it is recognized can diverge si gnificantly. 149
42. To date, corporate criminal responsibility has not featured significantly in any
of the international criminal courts or tribunals. The Nürnberg Charter authorized
the IMT to designate any group or organization as criminal 150 and in the course of
the proceedings of the IMT, as well as subsequent proceedings under Control
Council Law No. 10, 151 a number of Nazi organizations were so designated.
__________________
145

See de Doelder and Tiedemann (surveying States generally); Brickey, (discussing the history of
corporate criminal responsibility in the United States); Hasnas (same); Gobert and Pascal
(assessing corporate criminal liability in 16 European jurisdictions); and Vermeulen, De Bondt
and Ryckman (noting that corporate criminal liability did not come to European countries until
1976 in the Netherlands). See also Couturier; Fisse and Braithwaite; Wells; Kyriakakis,
“Prosecuting corporations for international crimes…”; Pieth and Ivory; and St ewart, “The turn
to corporate criminal liability …”.
146
See Ramasastry and Thompson (surveying 16 legal systems and finding that corporate criminal
responsibility for international crimes is available in many of them). See also Amann; and
Stewart, “A pragmatic critique of corporate criminal theory”.
147
See, for example, Clapham, “Extending international criminal law…”; Kelly; Stoitchkova; and
van der Wilt, “Corporate criminal responsibility for international crimes”.
148
See, for example, the Harvard Law Review Association, p. 2031 (finding that many States do
not recognize corporate liability in their national law).
149
For example, in Switzerland corporate criminal liability only arises where a crime or
misdemeanor committed as part of a business activity cannot be imputed to a particular person
associated with the business. See the Criminal Code of Switzerland, art. 102(1), SR 311.0.
150
Art. 9 (“At the trial of any individual member of any group or organization the Tribunal may
declare (in connection with any act of which the individual may be convicted) that the group or
organization of which the individual was a member was a criminal organization”).
151
Control Council Law No. 10, in Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military
Tribunals, vol. I, Washington D.C., United States Government Printing Office, pp. XVI–XIX.
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Ultimately, however, only natural persons were tried and punished by these post -war
tribunals. 152 Likewise, the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the
International Tribunal for Rwanda did not have any criminal jurisdiction over
corporations or other legal persons, nor do the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the
Special Panels for Serious Crimes in East Timor, the Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia, the Iraqi Supreme Criminal Tribunal or the Extraordinary
African Chambers within the Senegalese Judicial System. The drafters of the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court noted that “[t]here is a deep divergence
of views as to the advisability of including criminal responsibility of legal persons
in the Statute” 153 and, although proposals for inclusion of a provision on corporate
criminal responsibility were made, the Statute ultimately did not contain such a
provision. 154
43. One recent exception, however, appears to be the June 2014 African Union
protocol amending the statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights;
once that protocol enters into force, it will pro vide jurisdiction to the reconstituted
African Court to try corporations for international crimes, including crimes against
humanity. 155 Further, although jurisdiction over corporations (or over crimes against
humanity) is not expressly provided to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, an appeals
panel of that Tribunal concluded in 2014 that a corporation could be prosecuted for
contempt of court (due to an alleged disclosure of the identities of protected
witnesses). 156 Among other things, the panel concluded “that the current

__________________
152

See, for example, United States v. Krauch et al., (“The I.G. Farben Case”), in Trials of War
Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals, vols. VII–VIII, Washington D.C., United
States Government Printing Office, 1952. The Tribunal in this case found that “where a private
individual or a juristic person becomes a party to unlawful confiscation of public or private
property by planning and executing a well-defined design to acquire such property permanently,
acquisition under such circumstances subsequent to the confiscation constitutes conduct in
violation of the Hague Regulations”. Ibid., vol. VIII, pp. 1132–1133. Further, the tribunal found
“that the proof establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that offenses against property as defined
in Control Council Law No. 10 were committed by [I.G.] Farben, and that these offenses were
connected with, and an inextricable part of the German policy for occupied countries as above
described. ... The action of [I.G.] Farben and its representatives, under these circumstances,
cannot be differentiated from the acts of plunder or pillage committed by officers, soldiers, or
public officials of the German Reich.” Ibid., p. 1140. Ultimately, however, “the corporate
defendant, [I.G.] Farben, is not before the bar of this Tribunal and cannot be subjected to
criminal penalties in these proceedings”. Ibid., p. 1153. For analysis of the Nuremberg legacy in
this regard, see Bush.
153
Draft statute for the International Criminal Court, in the Report of the Preparatory Committee
on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court (A/CONF.183/2/Add.1), art. 23, para. 6,
footnote 3.
154
See Kyriakakis, “Corporate criminal liability and the ICC Statute”.
155
See Draft Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice
and Human Rights as at Thursday 15 May 2014 (STC/Legal/Min/7(I) Rev. 1), art. 46C,
paragraph 1 (providing that “[f]or the purpose of this Statute, the Court shall have jurisdiction
over legal persons, with the exception of States”).
156
New TV S.A.L. Karma Mohamed Tashin Al Khayat, Case No. STL-14-05/PT/AP/AR126.1,
Appeals Panel, Decision of 2 October 2014 on interlocutory appeal concerning personal
jurisdiction in contempt proceedings, Special Tribunal for Lebanon.
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international standards on human rights allow for interpreting the term ‘person’ to
include legal entities for the purposes of” contempt jurisdiction. 157
44. Such criminal responsibility has not been expressly incorporated into many
treaties addressing crimes, including the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; the Geneva Conventions for the protection of
war victims; the Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against
internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents; the Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment;
and the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance. Some recent treaties, usually those targeting financial
transactions, 158 do call for enactment of national laws addressing corporate
responsibility. 159 Even then, however, the relevant provision typically does not
require criminal sanctions, and instead provides that subject “to the legal principles
of the State party, the liability of legal persons may be criminal, civil or
administrative”. 160
__________________
157

Ibid., para. 60. After briefly surveying treaties that refer to corporate criminal responsibility, the
Appeals Panel found that “corporate liability for serious harms is a feature of most of the
world’s legal systems and therefore qualifies as a general principle of law. Where States still
differ is whether such liability should be civil or criminal or both. However, the Appeals Panel
considers that, given all the developments outlined above, corporate criminal liability is on the
verge of attaining, at the very least, the status of a general principle of law applicable under
international law”. Ibid., para. 67.
158
But see the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid, art. I, para. (2) (“The States Parties to the present Convention declare criminal those
organizations, institutions and individuals committing the crime of apartheid”).
159
Basel Convention on the control of transboundary movements of hazardous wastes and their
disposal, art. 2, para. 14 (“For the purposes of this Convention: ... ‘Person’ means any natural or
legal person”) and art. 4, para. 3 (“The Parties consider that illegal traffic in hazardous wastes or
other wastes is criminal”).
160
The International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, art. 5, para. 1
(“Each State party, in accordance with its domestic legal principles, shall take the necessary
measures to enable a legal entity located in its territory or organized under its laws to be held
liable when a person responsible for the management or control of that legal entity has, in that
capacity, committed an offence…. Such liability may be criminal, civil or administrative”); the
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, art. 10, para. 2 (“Subject to
the legal principles of the State party, the liability of legal persons may be criminal, civil or
administrative.”); and the United Nations Convention against Corruption, art. 26, para. 2 (same).
See also the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, art. 10, para. 2
(“Subject to the legal principles of the Party, the liability of legal entities m ay be criminal, civil
or administrative”); the Convention on combating bribery of foreign public officials in
international business transactions, art. 2 (“Each Party shall take such measures as may be
necessary, in accordance with its legal principles, to establish the liability of legal persons for
the bribery of a foreign public official”) and art. 3, para. 3 (“Each Party shall take such measures
as may be necessary to provide that the bribe and the proceeds of the bribery of a foreign public
official, or property the value of which corresponds to that of such proceeds, are subject to
seizure and confiscation or that monetary sanctions of comparable effect are applicable”); and
the Second Protocol, drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the treaty on Eur opean Union, to
the Convention on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests, art. 3,
para. 1 (on liability of legal persons: “Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to
ensure that legal persons can be held liable for fraud, active corruption and money laundering
committed for their benefit by any person, acting either individually or as part of an organ of the
legal person, who has a leading position within the legal person”); and art. 4 (on sanctions for
legal persons: “Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that a legal
person held liable pursuant to Article 3 (I) is punishable by effective, proportionate and
dissuasive sanctions, which shall include criminal or non-criminal fines”).
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D.

Command or other superior responsibility

45. Separate from the ordering of an individual to commit an offence (addressed in
the prior subsection), most jurisdictions impute criminal responsibility to a military
commander or other superior for an offence committed by subordinates in c ertain
circumstances, a type of criminal responsibility referred to as “command
responsibility” or “superior responsibility”. 161 Not all acts committed by subordinates,
however, are imputable to those who command them; instead, some form of
dereliction of duty by the commander is required. Thus, in the “High Command” case
(one of the 12 Nuremberg trials conducted by the United States authorities), the
Tribunal noted that:
A high commander cannot keep completely informed of the details of military operations o f
subordinates and most assuredly not of every administrative measure. He has the right to assume
that details entrusted to responsible subordinates will be legally executed. The President of the
United States is Commander in Chief of its military forces. Criminal acts committed by those
forces cannot in themselves be charged to him on the theory of subordination. The same is true of
other high commanders in the chain of command. Criminality does not attach to every individual
in this chain of command from that fact alone. There must be a personal dereliction. That can
occur only where the act is directly traceable to him or where his failure to properly supervise his
subordinates constitutes criminal negligence on his part. In the latter case it must be a p ersonal
neglect amounting to a wanton, immoral disregard of the action of his subordinates amounting to
acquiescence. Any other interpretation of international law would go far beyond the basic
principles of criminal law as known to civilized nations. 162

46. Notably, the Nürnberg Tribunal and the International Military Tribunal for the
Far East used command responsibility with respect to both military and civilian
commanders, 163 an approach that influenced later tribunals. As indicated by a Trial
Chamber of the International Tribunal for Rwanda in Prosecutor v. Musema, “[a]s to
whether the form of individual criminal responsibility referred to under Article 6(3)
of the Statute [of the International Tribunal for Rwanda] also applies to persons in
both military and civilian authority, it is important to note that during the trials
under the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, civilian authorities were
convicted of war crimes under this principle”. 164
47. Indeed, contemporary international criminal courts and tribunals provide for the
criminal responsibility of commanders. The Statute of the International Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia Statute provides that “[t]he fact that any of the acts referred to
in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute was committed by a subordinate does not
relieve his superior of criminal responsibility if he knew or had reason to know that
the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed
to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the
perpetrators thereof”,165 and several defendants have been convicted by the
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia on the basis of such command
__________________
161

For commentary, see Lael; Bantekas, “The contemporary law of superior responsibility”; Damas̆ ka;
and Sepinwall.
162
United States v. von Leeb, et al. (“The High Command Case”), in Trials of War Criminals
before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals, vol. XI, Washington D.C., United States Government
Printing Office, 1950, pp. 543–544.
163
See, for example, Bassiouni, p. 461; and Heller, pp. 262–263.
164
Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Judgment and Sentence of 27 January 2000,
International Tribunal for Rwanda, Trial Chamber I, para. 132.
165
Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (see footnote 99
above), art. 7, para. 3.
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responsibility. 166 The same language appears in the Statute of the International
Tribunal for Rwanda 167 and that Tribunal has also convicted defendants on the basis of
command responsibility. 168 Similar wording appears in the instruments regulating the
Special Court for Sierra Leone, 169 the Special Tribunal for Lebanon,170 the Special
Panels for Serious Crimes in East Timor, 171 the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts
of Cambodia, 172 the Iraqi Supreme Criminal Tribunal 173 and the Extraordinary African
Chambers within the Senegalese Judicial System. 174
48. The Commission’s 1996 draft code of crimes against the peace and security of
mankind stated in its article 6:
The fact that a crime against the peace and security of mankind was committed by a subordinate does
not relieve his superiors of criminal responsibility, if they knew or had reason to know, in the
circumstances at the time, that the subordinate was committing or was going to commit such a crime
and if they did not take all necessary measures within their power to prevent or repress the crime. 175

49. Article 28 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 176 contains a
detailed standard by which criminal responsibility applies to a military commander or
person effectively acting as a military commander in regard to the acts of others. 177 As
a general matter, criminal responsibility arises when: (a) there is a relationship of
subordination; (b) the commander knew or should have known that his subordinates
__________________
166

See, for example, Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-T, Judgment of 25 June 1999,
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber, Judicial Reports 1999,
pp. 535–761, at pp. 565–573, paras. 66–77; and Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., Case No. IT-96-21-T,
Judgment of 16 November 1998, International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber,
paras. 330–400 and 605–810.
167
Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda (see footnote 100 above), art. 6, para. 3.
168
See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4, Judgment of 2 September 1998, International
Tribunal for Rwanda, Trial Chamber; and Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-S,
Judgment and Sentence of 4 September 1998, International Tribunal for Rwanda, Trial Chamber.
169
Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (see footnote 101 above), art. 6, para. 3.
170
Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (S/RES/1757 (2007), attachment), art. 3, para. 2.
171
UNTAET/REG/2000/15 (see footnote 102 above), sect. 16.
172
Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the
Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea (see
footnote 103 above), art. 29.
173
Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal (see footnote 104 above), art. 15.
174
Statute of the Extraordinary African Chambers within the courts of Senegal created to prosecute
international crimes committed in Chad between 7 June 1982 and 1 December 1990 (see
footnote 105 above), art. 10, para. 4.
175
Draft code of crimes against the peace and security of mankind (see footnote 134 above) , p. 25.
176
Article 28, entitled “Responsibility of commanders and other superiors”, provides in paragraph (a), that:
“A military commander or person effectively acting as a military commander shall be
criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court committed by forces under
his or her effective command and control, or effective authority and control as the case may be, as
a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly over such forces, where:
“(i) That military commander or person either knew or, owing to the circumstances at the
time, should have known that the forces were committing or about to commit such crimes; and
“(ii) That military commander or person failed to take all necessary and reasonable
measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the
matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.”
177
See, for example, Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez, Case. No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment of
26 February 2001, International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber, para. 369
(“It should be emphasised that the doctrine of command responsibility does not hold a superior
responsible merely because he is in a position of authority as, for a superior to be held liable, it
is necessary to prove that he ‘knew or had reason to know’ of the offences and failed to act to
prevent or punish their occurrence. Superior responsibility, which is a type of imputed
responsibility, is therefore not a form of strict liability”).
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were committing or about to commit the offence; and (c) the commander failed to take
all necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress
their commission or to submit the matter for investigation and prosecution. This
standard has begun influencing the development of “command responsibility” theory
in national legal systems, in both the criminal and civil contexts. 178
50. Article 28 also addresses the issue of “superior and subordinate relationships”
arising in a non-military or civilian context. Such superiors include civilians that
“lead” but are not “embedded” in military activities. 179 Here, criminal responsibility
arises when: (a) there is a relationship of subordination; (b) the civilian superior
knew or consciously disregarded information about the offences; ( c) the offences
concerned activities that were within the effective responsibility and control of the
superior; and (d) the superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures
within his or her power to prevent or repress commission of all the offences or to
submit the matter for investigation and prosecution. 180
51. National laws also contain this type of criminal responsibility for war crimes,
genocide, and crimes against humanity, but slightly differing standards are used
among States that sometimes do not replicate the standard of the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court. For example, the national law of Canada provides:
A superior commits an indictable offence if the superior fails to exercise control properly over a person
under their effective authority and control …; the superior knows that the person is about to commit or is
committing such an offence, or consciously disregards information that clearly indicates that such an
offence is about to be committed or is being committed by the person; the offence relates to activities for
which the superior has effective authority and control; and the superior subsequently fails to take, as
soon as practicable, all necessary and reasonable measures within their power to prevent or repress the
commission of the offence, or the further commission of offences. 181

A number of other States make similar provisions, including Australia, 182 France, 183
Germany, 184 Malta, 185 the Netherlands, 186 New Zealand, 187 Spain, 188 the United
__________________
178

See, for example, Ford v. Garcia, 289 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Van Schaack, p. 1217.
Ronen, p. 347.
180
Article 28, paragraph (b) provides that:
“With respect to superior and subordinate relationships not described in paragraph (a), a
superior shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court committed
by subordinates under his or her effective authority and control, as a result of his or her failure to
exercise control properly over such subordinates, where:
“(i) The superior either knew, or consciously disregarded information which clearly
indicated, that the subordinates were committing or about to commit such crimes;
“(ii) The crimes concerned activities that were within the effective responsibility and control
of the superior; and
“(iii) The superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power
to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for
investigation and prosecution.”
181
Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act (S.C. 2000, c. 24) of 29 June 2000,
sect. 5(2)(a)–(d), available from laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/C-45.9/FullText.html.
182
International Criminal Court (Consequential Amendments) Act 2002, No. 42, 2002, article 268.115,
available from www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2004A00993.
183
Written comments to the International Law Commission (2015), France, citing article 214-4-1
of its Criminal Code.
184
Act to Introduce the Code of Crimes Against International Law of 26 June 2002, sects.4, 13 and 14,
available from www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/VoeStGB.pdf.
185
International Criminal Court Act, Act XXIV of 2002, part 54E, available from www.iccnow.org/
documents/MaltaDraftICCImpLeg.pdf.
186
Act of 19 June 2003 containing rules concerning serious violations of international humanitarian
law (International Crimes Act), sect. 9, available from www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl-nat.nsf/0/
2a6d559625223f62c12577d0003be499/$FILE/60466371.pdf/Netherlands%20International%20C
rimes%20Act%202003%20EN.pdf.
179
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Kingdom, 189 the United States of America 190 and Uruguay. 191 Some States, such as
Argentina 192 and Ecuador, 193 that recently adopted laws to implement the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, do not address in those laws the issue of
command responsibility.
52. Military manuals adopted by States also identify this form of criminal
responsibility. For example, the Military Manual of Argentina provides: “Breaches
committed by a subordinate do not absolve his superiors from penal or disciplinary
responsibility, as the case may be, if they knew that the subordi nate was committing
or was going to commit the breach and if they did not take the measures within their
power to prevent or repress the breach.” 194 Other examples may be found in the
military manuals of Cameroon, 195 France, 196 the Russian Federation, 197 Ukraine, 198
the United Kingdom 199 and the United States of America. 200
53. Treaties addressing offences other than crimes against humanity also often
acknowledge command responsibility. While the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and the Geneva Conventions for the
protection of war victims do not do so, the Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the protection of victims of
international armed conflicts (Protocol I), provides a general formula in article 86,
paragraph 2, which has been accepted by its 174 States parties. That provision
reads:

__________________
187

International Crimes and International Criminal Court Act of 6 September 2000, sect. 12,
available from www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2000/0026/latest/DLM63091.html.
188
Written comments to the International Law Commission (2015), Spain, citing article 451 of its
Criminal Code.
189
International Criminal Court Act 2001, sect. 65, available from www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/
2001/17/contents.
190
Principals, United States Code, Title 10, sect. 950q (2012), available from www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
USCODE-2014-title10/pdf/USCODE-2014-title10-subtitleA-partII-chap47A-subchapVIII-sec950q.pdf.
191
Ley No. 18.026, Cooperación con la Corte Penal Internacional en materia de lucha contra el
genocidio, los crímenes de guerra y de lesa humanidad, 4 October 2006, art. 10, available from
www.parlamento.gub.uy/leyes/AccesoTextoLey.asp?Ley=18026&Anchor=.
192
Ley 26.200, Ley de implementación del Estatuto de Roma de la Corte Penal, 5 January 2007,
available from www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/120000-124999/123921/norma.htm.
193
Código Orgánico Integral Penal, 2014, available from www.justicia.gob.ec/wp-content/
uploads/2014/05/c%C3%B3digo_org%C3%A1nico_integral_penal_-_coip_ed._sdn-mjdhc.pdf.
194
Argentina, Leyes de Guerra, PC-08-01, Público, Edición 1989, Estado Mayor Conjunto de las
Fuerzas Armadas, aprobado por Resolución No. 489/89 del Ministerio de Defensa,
23 Apr. 1990, sect. 8.07 (see www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_cou_ar_rule153).
195
Droit des conflits armés et droit international humanitaire, Manuel de l’instructeur en vigueur dans
les forces de défense, Ministère de la Défense, Présidence de la République, Etat-major des Armées
(2006), p. 296, sect. 662 (see www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_cou_cm_rule153).
196
Manuel de droits des conflits armés, Ministère de la Défense (2001), p. 113 (see
www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_cou_fr_rule153).
197
Instructions on the Application of the Rules of International Humanitarian Law by the Armed
Forces of the USSR, Appendix to Order of the USSR Defence Minister No. 75 (1990),
sect. 14(b) (see www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_cou_ru_rule153).
198
Manual on the Application of IHL Rules, Ministry of Defence (2004), sect. 1.8.8 (see
www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_cou_ua_rule153).
199
The Law of War on Land being Part III of the Manual of Military Law , The War Office, HMSO
(1958), sect. 631 (see www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_cou_gb_rule153).
200
Department of Defense Law of War Manual, Office of General Counsel, Department of Defense,
sect. 18.23.3.2 (June 2015), available from www.defense.gov/pubs/Law-of-War-Manual-June2015.pdf.
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The fact that a breach of the Conventions or of this Protocol was committed by a subordinate does
not absolve his superiors from penal or disciplinary responsibility, as the case may be, if they
knew, or had information which should have enabled them to conclude in the circumstances at the
time, that he was committing or was going to commit such a breach and if they did not take all
feasible measures within their power to prevent or repress the breach. 201

54. As such, national laws and international instruments relating to crimes against
humanity, as well as relevant treaties addressing other crimes, typically include —
as one facet of participation in the commission of the offence — the possibility of
imputation of criminal responsibility to a military commander or other superior for
acts committed by subordinates, in circumstances where the superior has been
derelict in his or her duties.

E.

Superior orders

55. All jurisdictions that address crimes against humanity permit grounds for
excluding criminal responsibility to one degree or another. For example, most
jurisdictions preclude criminal responsibility if the alleged perpetrator suffers from
a mental disease that prevents the person from appreciating the unlawfulness of his
or her conduct. 202 Some jurisdictions provide that a state of intoxication also
precludes criminal responsibility, at least in some circumstances. 203 Action taken in
self-defence can also preclude responsibility, 204 as well as duress resulting from a
threat of imminent harm or death. 205 In some instances, the person must have
achieved a certain age to be criminally responsible. 206 The exact grounds vary by
jurisdiction and, with respect to national systems, are usually embedded in that
__________________
201

Provisions on command responsibility also appear in the International Convention for the Protection
of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, article 6, paragraph 1, of which provides:
“Each State party shall take the necessary measures to hold criminally responsible at least:
“….
“(b) A superior who:
“(i) Knew, or consciously disregarded information which clearly indicated, that subordinates
under his or her effective authority and control were committing or about to commit a crime of
enforced disappearance;
“(ii) Exercised effective responsibility for and control over activities which were concerned
with the crime of enforced disappearance; and
“(iii) Failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or
repress the commission of an enforced disappearance or to submit the matter to the competent
authorities for investigation and prosecution;
“(c) Subparagraph (b) above is without prejudice to the higher standards of responsibility
applicable under relevant international law to a military commander or to a person effectively acting
as a military commander.”
202
See, for example, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, article 31, paragraph 1(a);
the Criminal Code of the Republic of Croatia (footnote 64 above), art. 40; and the Criminal Code of
the Republic of Finland (1889) (amended 2012), chap. 3, sects. 4(2)–(3), available from
http://www.legislationline.org/documents/section/criminal-codes/country/32.
203
See for example, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, article 31, paragraph 1(b);
the Criminal Code of the Republic of Croatia (footnote 64 above), art. 41; and the Criminal Code
of the Republic of Finland (footnote above), chap. 3, sect. 4(4).
204
See the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, article 31, paragraph 1(c); the
Criminal Code of the Republic of Croatia (footnote 64 above), arts. 29–30; and the Criminal
Code of the Republic of Finland, chap. 4, sect. 4 (footnote 202 above).
205
See the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, article 31, paragraph 1(d); the Criminal
Code of the Republic of Croatia (footnote 64 above), art. 31; and the Criminal Code of Finland
(footnote 202 above), chap. 4, sect. 5.
206
See the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, article 26; the Criminal Code of the
Republic of Croatia (footnote 64 above), art. 10; and the Criminal Code of Finland (footnote 202
above), chap. 3, sect. 4(1).
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jurisdiction’s approach to criminal responsibility generally, not just in the context of
crimes against humanity. 207
56. At the same time, most jurisdictions that address crimes against humanity
provide that perpetrators of such crimes cannot invoke as a defines that they were
ordered by a superior to commit the offence. 208 Article 8 of the Nürnberg Charter
provides: “The fact that the Defendant acted pursuant to order of his Government or
of a superior shall not free him from responsibility, but may be considered in
mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires ”.
Consequently, in conformity with article 8 and “with the law of all nations”, the
IMT found: “The fact that the Defendant acted pursuant to an order of his
Government or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility, but may be
considered in mitigation of punishment.” 209
57. Likewise, article 6 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the
Far East provides: “Neither the official position, at any time, of an accused, nor the
fact that an accused acted pursuant to order of his government or of a superior shall,
of itself, be sufficient to free such accused from responsibility for any crime with
which he is charged, but such circumstances may be considered in mitigation of
punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires. ”
58. The Commission’s 1996 draft code of crimes against the peace and security of
mankind provides in article 5: “The fact that an individual charged with a crime
against the peace and security of mankind acted pursuant to an order of a
Government or a superior does not relieve him of criminal responsibility, but may
be considered in mitigation of punishment if justice so requires. ” 210 The
Commission noted in regard to this article:
the culpability and the indispensable role of the subordinate who actually commits the criminal act
cannot be ignored. Otherwise the legal force and effect of the prohibition of crimes under
international law would be substantially weakened by the absence of any responsibility or
punishment on the part of the actual perpetrators of these heinous crimes and thus of any
deterrence on the part of the potential perpetrators thereof. 211

59. While article 33 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
allows for a limited superior orders defines, it does so exclusively with respect to
war crimes; orders to commit acts of genocide or crimes against humanity do not
fall within the scope of the exception (art. 33). 212 The instruments regulating the
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 213 the International Tribunal for
Rwanda, 214 the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 215 the Special Tribunal for
__________________
207

See the draft code of crimes against the peace and security of mankind (footnote 134 above),
p. 23, and p. 42, article 15 (“In passing sentence, the court shall, where appropriate, take into
account extenuating circumstances in accordance with the general principles of law”) and the
commentary thereto.
208
See, generally, D’Amato, pp. 288–289; and Nowak and McArthur, p. 102.
209
“Judicial decisions: International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg) …”, p. 221.
210
Draft code of crimes against the peace and security of mankind (see footnote 134 above), p. 23
(art. 5); see also the Principles of International Law recognized in the Charter of the Nürnberg
Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, Yearbook … 1950, vol. II, p. 375 (Principle IV).
211
Draft code of crimes against the peace and security of mankind (see footnote 134 above), p. 24.
212
For analysis, see Gaeta; and Cryer, pp. 768–769.
213
Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (see footnote 99
above), art. 7, para. 4.
214
Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda (see footnote 100 above), art. 6, para. 4.
215
Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (see footnote 101 above), art. 6, para. 4.
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Lebanon, 216 the Special Panels for Serious Crimes in East Timor, 217 the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, 218 the Iraqi Supreme Criminal
Tribunal 219 and the Extraordinary African Chambers within the Senegalese Judicial
System 220 all similarly exclude superior orders as a defines. The 2005 ICRC Study
of Customary International Humanitarian Law, in Rule 155, provides: “Obeying a
superior order does not relieve a subordinate of criminal responsibility if the
subordinate knew that the act ordered was unlawful or should have known because
of the manifestly unlawful nature of the act ordered.” 221
60. Such exclusion of superior orders as a defines exists in a range of treaties
addressing crimes, such as: the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; 222 the Inter-American Convention
to Prevent and Punish Torture; 223 the Inter-American Convention on the Forced
Disappearance of Persons; 224 and the International Convention for the Protection of
All Persons from Enforced Disappearance. 225 In the context of the Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
the Committee against Torture has criticized national legislation that permits such a
defines or is ambiguous on the issue. Thus, in evaluating the performance of
Guatemala in 2006, the Committee stated: “The State party should amend its
legislation in order to explicitly provide that an order from a superior officer or a
public authority may not be invoked as a justification of torture. ” 226 Among other
things, the Committee indicated that it was “concerned that the requirement ... of the
Convention [on this point was] expressed ambiguously in the State party ’s
legislation”. 227 In some instances, the problem arises from the presence in a State ’s
national law of what is referred to as a “due obedience” defines. 228 For example,
when reviewing in 2004 the implementation of the Convention by Chile, the
__________________
216

Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (see footnote 170 abo ve), art. 3, para. 3.
UNTAET/REG/2000/15 (see footnote 102 above), sect. 21.
218
Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the
Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea (see footnot e 103
above), art. 29.
219
Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal (see footnote 104 above), art. 15.
220
Statute of the Extraordinary African Chambers within the courts of Senegal created to prosecute
international crimes committed in Chad between 7 June 1982 and 1 December 1990
(see footnote 105 above), art. 10, para. 5.
221
See ICRC, Customary IHL Database, “Chapter 43: Practice relating to Rule 155. Defence of
superior orders”, available from www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule155.
222
Art. 2, para. 3 (“An order from a superior officer or a public authority may not be invoked as a
justification of torture”).
223
Art. 4 (“The fact of having acted under orders of a superior shall not provide exemption from
the corresponding criminal liability”).
224
Art. VIII (“The defense of due obedience to superior orders or instructions that stipulate,
authorize, or encourage forced disappearance shall not be admitted. All persons who receive
such orders have the right and duty not to obey them”).
225
Art. 6, para. 2 (“No order or instruction from any public authority, civilian, military or other,
may be invoked to justify an offence of enforced disappearance”). This provision “received
broad approval” at the drafting stage. See Commission on Human Rights, Report of the
intersessional open-ended working group to elaborate a draft legally binding normative
instrument for the protection of all persons from enforced disappearance (E/CN.4/2004/59),
para. 72; see also the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance, General Assembly resolution 47/133 of 18 December 1992, article 6.
226
Conclusions and recommendations of the Committee against Torture, Guatemala
(CAT/C/GTM/CO/4 and Add.1), para. 13.
227
Ibid.
228
Nowak and McArthur, p. 102.
217
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Committee against Torture expressed concern about “[t]he continued provision, in
articles ... of the Code of Military Justice, of the principle of due obedience,
notwithstanding provisions affirming a subordinate’s right to protest against orders
that might involve committing a prohibited act”. 229
61. While superior orders are not permitted as a defines to prosecution for an
offence, some of the international and national jurisdictions mentioned above allow
orders from a superior to serve as a mitigating factor at the sentencing stage.
Article 5 of the draft code of crimes against the peace and security of mankind
indicated this when it stated that action pursuant to an order “may be considered in
mitigation of punishment if justice so requires”. 230 In its commentary to that
provision, the Commission stated:
a subordinate who unwillingly commits a crime pursuant to an order of a superior beca use of the
fear of serious consequences for himself or his family resulting from a failure to carry out that
order does not incur the same degree of culpability as a subordinate who willingly participates in
the commission of the crime. The fact that a subordinate unwillingly committed a crime pursuant
to an order of a superior to avoid serious consequences for himself or his family resulting from the
failure to carry out that order under the circumstances at the time may justify a reduction in the
penalty that would otherwise be imposed to take into account the lesser degree of culpability. The
phrase “if justice so requires” is used to show that even in such cases the imposition of a lesser
punishment must also be consistent with the interests of justice. 231

62. As suggested by this text, statutes of various international criminal tribunals
have recognized the relevance of superior orders at the sentencing stage. 232
However, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court does not address
whether a superior order is relevant at the sentencing stage. The ICRC Study
concluded that “there is extensive State practice to this effect in military manuals,
national legislation and official statements”, but also found that some States
“exclude mitigation of punishment for violations committed pursuant to manifestly
unlawful orders”. 233

F.

Statute of limitations

63. One possible restriction on the prosecution of a person for crimes against
humanity concerns the application of a “statute of limitations” (“period of
prescription”), meaning a rule that forbids prosecution of an alleged offender for a
crime that was committed more than a specified number of years prior to the
initiation of the prosecution. 234 The purpose of such a rule is principally to limit the
__________________
229

Conclusions and recommendations of the Committee against Torture, Chil e (CAT/C/CR/32/5),
para. 6(i). See also the Conclusions and recommendations of the Committee against Torture,
Argentina (CAT/C/CR/33/1), para. 3(a) (praising Argentina for declaring its Due Obedience Act
“absolutely null and void”).
230
See the draft code of crimes against the peace and security of mankind (footnote 134 above),
p. 23.
231
Ibid., p. 24, para. (5). See also D’Amato, p. 288.
232
For provisions allowing mitigation at the sentencing stage, see the Nürnberg Charter, article 8;
Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, art. 6; Updated Statute of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (see footnote 99 above), art. 7, para. 4;
Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda (footnote 100 above), art. 6, para. 4; Statute of
the Special Court for Sierra Leone (see footnote 101 above), art. 6, para. 4; and the instrument
regulating the Special Panels for Serious Crimes in East Timor, UNTAET/REG/2000/15
(footnote 102 above), sect. 21.
233
See footnote 221 above.
234
See, generally, Kok.
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pursuit of prosecutions to a time when the physical and eyewitness evidence
remains fresh and has not deteriorated.
64. No rule on statute of limitations with respect to international crimes, including
crimes against humanity, was established in the Nürnberg Charter or the Charter of
the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, or in the constituent instruments
of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the International Tribunal
for Rwanda or the Special Court for Sierra Leone. 235 By contrast, Control Council
Law No. 10, adopted in 1945 by the Allied Powers occupying Germany to ensure
the continued prosecution of alleged offenders, provided that in any trial or
prosecution for crimes against humanity (as well as war crimes, and crimes against
the peace) “the accused shall not be entitled to the benefits of any statute of
limitation in respect to the period from 30 January 1933 to 1 July 1945”. 236
Likewise, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court expressly addresses
the matter, providing that “[t]he crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court shall not
be subject to any statute of limitations” (art. 29). The drafters of the Statute strongly
supported this provision as applied to crimes against humanity. 237 Similarly, the Law
on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia and the
instruments regulating the Iraqi Supreme Criminal Tribunal and the Special Panels
for Serious Crimes in East Timor all explicitly defined crimes against humanity as
offences for which there was no statute of limitations. 238
65. With respect to whether a statute of limitations may apply to the prosecution of
an alleged offender in national courts, in 1967 the General Assembly of the United
Nations asserted that “the application to war crimes and crimes against humanity of
the rule of municipal law relating to the period of limitation for ordinary crimes is a
matter of serious concern to world public opinion, since it prevents the prosecution
and punishment of persons responsible for those crimes”. 239 The following year, States
adopted the 1968 Convention on the non-applicability of statutory limitations to war
crimes and crimes against humanity, which requires State Parties to adopt “any
legislative or other means necessary to ensure that statutory or other limitations shall
not apply to the prosecution and punishment” of these two types of crimes (art. IV).
Similarly, in 1974, the Council of Europe adopted the European Convention on the
Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitation to Crimes Against Human ity and War
Crimes, which uses substantially the same language. These conventions, however,
have secured limited adherence; as of 2015, fifty-five States are parties to the
1968 Convention, while eight States are parties to the 1974 Convention.
__________________
235

See Schabas, The International Criminal Court…), p. 429, and “Article 29”.
Control Council Law No. 10 (see footnote 150 above), p. 52, art. II, para. 5.
237
Official Records of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome, 15 June –17 July 1998, vol. II,
Summary records of the plenary meetings and of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole
(A/CONF.183/13 (Vol. II)), 2nd meeting, paras. 45–74. See also Schabas, The International
Criminal Court…, p. 469 (citing A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.8, paras. 76 and 82).
238
Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the
Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea (see footnote 103
above), art. 5; Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal (see footnote 104 above), art. 17(d); and the
instrument regulating the Special Panels for Serious Crimes in East Timor UNTAET/REG/2000/15
(see footnote 102 above), sect. 17.1. Further, it should be noted that the Extraordinary Chambers in
the Courts of Cambodia was provided jurisdiction over crimes against humanity committed decades
prior to its establishment, in 1975–1979, when the Khmer Rouge held power.
239
General Assembly resolution 2338 (XXII) of 18 December 1967. See also General Assembly
resolutions 2712 (XXV) of 15 December 1970 and 2840 (XXVI) of 18 December 1971.
236
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66. At the same time, there appears to be no State with a law on crimes against
humanity which also bars prosecution after a period of time has elapsed. 240 Rather,
numerous States have specifically legislated against any such limitation, including
Albania, Argentina, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, the Central African
Republic, Cuba, Estonia, Ethiopia, France, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Mali, the
Netherlands, Niger, Peru, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Latvia, the Russian
Federation, Rwanda, Spain, Ukraine, Uruguay and Uzbekistan. 241 For example, in
1964, France enacted a law providing that crimes against humanity as defined by
General Assembly resolution 3(I) of 13 February 1946 (concerning the extradition
and punishment of war criminals from the Second World War) and the Nürnberg
Charter “are imprescriptible by their nature”. 242 In the following decades, France
prosecuted several persons for crimes against humanity committed many years
earlier, during the Second World War, such as Klaus Barbie, Maurice Papon and
Paul Touvier. In the Barbie case, the French Cour de Cassation determined that “the
prohibition on statutory limitations for crimes against humanity is now part of
customary law”. 243
67. Other national courts have also addressed questions as to whether allega tions
of crimes against humanity are time-barred. The Jerusalem District Court in the
Eichmann case rejected the defendant’s argument that his prosecution was timebarred: “Because of the extreme gravity of the crime against the Jewish People, the
crime against humanity and war crime, the Israeli legislator has provided that such
crimes shall never prescribe.” 244 The Special Prosecutor ’s Office noted during the
Mengistu trial that, under the Constitution of Ethiopia, “no statutory limitation shall
apply to crimes against humanity. This concept emanates from internationally

__________________
240

Schabas, The International Criminal Court, p. 469.
See the Criminal Code of Albania (footnote 89 above), art. 67; Argentina, Law concerning the
Imprescriptibility of War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity (1995); the Criminal Code of
Belgium, art. 91 (1867, as amended on 5 August 2003); the Criminal Code of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, art. 19 (2003); the Criminal Code of Burundi, arts. 150 and 155 (2009); the
Criminal Procedure Code of the Central African Republic, art. 7(c) (2010); Cuba (footnote 65
above), art. 64, para. 5; the Criminal Code of Estonia, sect.81, para. (2) (2002); Ethiopia,
Constitution, art. 28, para. 1 (1994); France, Criminal Code art. 213-5 (1994); Germany
(footnote 68 above), art. 1, sect. 5; Hungary, Act IV of 1978 on the Criminal Code, art. 33,
para. (2) (as amended in 1998); Israel, Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law, art. 12
(1950); the Criminal Code of Latvia, sect. 57 (2000); the Criminal Code of Mali, art. 32 (2001);
the Netherlands, International Crimes Act, sect. 13 (2003); the Criminal Code of Niger,
art. 208.8 (1961, as amended in 2003); Peru, Legislative Resolution No. 27998, art. 1 (2003) and
Presidential Decree No. 082-2003-RE, art. 1 (2003); the Criminal Code of Poland, art. 109
(1997); the Republic of Korea, Act on the Punishment of Crimes within the Jurisdiction of the
International Criminal Court, art. 6 (2007); the Russian Federation, Decree on the Punishment of
War Criminals (1965); the Constitution of Rwanda, art. 13 (2003); the Criminal Code of Spain,
art. 131, para. 4 (1995, as amended on 23 June 2010); the Criminal Code of Ukraine, art. 49,
para. 5 (2010); Uruguay, Law on Cooperation with the ICC, art. 7 (2006); and the Criminal
Code of Uzbekistan, art. 64 (1994). See, generally, ICRC, Practice relating to Rule 160. Statutes
of Limitation, available from www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule160.
242
France, Law No. 64-1326 (26 December 1964).
243
Fédération nationale des déportés et internés résistants et patriotes et al. v. Barbie, Judgment
of 20 December 1985, France, Court of Cassation (Criminal Chamber), ILR, vol. 78 (1988),
pp. 125–131.
244
The Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v. Eichmann, Criminal Case No. 40/61,
Judgment of 11 December 1961, District Court of Jerusalem, para. 53. See also Ambos, Treatise
on International Criminal Law, p. 428.
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recognized principles”. 245 In the In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation
case, a United States federal district court asserted that the Convention on the
non-applicability of statutory limitations to war crimes and crimes against humanity
and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court “suggest the need to
recognize a rule under customary international law that no statute of limitations
should be applied to war crimes and crimes against humanity”. 246 The Supreme
Court of Argentina has ruled that a statute of limitations will not apply to war
crimes and crimes against humanity as a matter of customary international law and
jus cogens principles. 247
68. Many treaties addressing other crimes in national law have not contained a
prohibition on a statute of limitations. For example, the Commission proposed in its
draft articles on the prevention and punishment of crimes against diplomatic agents
and other internationally protected persons to include an article 9 reading: “The
statutory limitation as to the time within which prosecution may be instituted for the
crimes set forth in article 2 shall be, in each State party, that fixed for the most
serious crimes under its internal law.” 248 States, however, declined to include that
provision in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against
Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents. The Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
also contains no prohibition on the application of a statute of limitations to torture related offences, but the Committee against Torture has asserted that, taking into
account their grave nature, such offences should not be subject to any statute of
limitations. 249 Similarly, while the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights does not directly address the issue, the Human Rights Committee has called
for the abolition of statutes of limitations in relation to serious violations of the
Covenant. 250
69. The International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance does address the issue of statute of limitations, providing that
“[a] State party which applies a statute of limitations in respect of enforced
disappearance shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the term of limitation
for criminal proceedings … [i]s of long duration and is proportionate to the extreme
seriousness of this offence”.251 The travaux préparatoires for the Convention
indicates that this provision was intended to distinguish between those offences that
might constitute a crime against humanity — for which there should be no statute of
__________________
245

Ethiopia v. Mengistu and Others, Reply submitted by the Special Prosecutor in response to the
objection filed by counsels by defendants (23 May 1995), Ethiopia, Special Prosecutor’s Office,
sect. 6.1.1.
246
In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 373 F.Supp.2d 7 (E.D.N.Y. 2005), at p. 63.
247
Office of the Prosecutor v. Priebke (Erich), Case No. P/457/XXXI, Ordinary Appeal Judgment,
Request of Extradition, 2 November 1995, Supreme Court of Argentina.
248
Yearbook … 1972, vol. II, p. 320.
249
See, for example, Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under article 19 of the
Convention, concluding observations of the Committee against Torture, Montenegro
(CAT/C/MNE/CO/1 and Add.1); and Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under
article 19 of the Convention, conclusions and recommendations, Italy (CAT/C/ITA/CO/4),
para. 19.
250
See, for example, Consideration of reports submitted by Stat es parties under article 40 of the
Covenant, concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee, Panama
(CCPR/C/PAN/CO/3), para. 7.
251
Art. 8, para. 1(a). By contrast, the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of
Persons provides that criminal prosecution and punishment of all forced disappearances shall not
be subject to statutes of limitations (art. VII).

42/106

16-00720

A/CN.4/690

limitations — and all other offences under the Convention. 252 Specifically, the
drafters of the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearance appeared to hold a consensus opinion that:
In international law, there should be no statute of limitations for enforced disappearances which
constituted crimes against humanity. Where enforced disappearances constituting offences under
ordinary law were concerned, the longest limitation period stip ulated in domestic law should be
applied — or, in any event, a limitation period commensurate with the seriousness of the crime. 253

70. One of the key issues identified by States for not joining the Convention on
the non-applicability of statutory limitations to war crimes and crimes against
humanity was a concern with the retroactive effect of the prohibition on a statute of
limitations. Article 1 of the Convention prohibited a statute of limitations
“irrespective of their date of commission” (art. I), thereby requiring States parties to
abolish statutory limitations with retroactive effect. An alternative approach to such
a prohibition in a new convention would be to prohibit statutory limitations, but not
with retroactive effect, either by affirmatively sta ting as much or by not addressing
the issue. Article 28 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that
“[u]nless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established, its
provisions do not bind a party in relation to any act or fact which took place or any
situation which ceased to exist before the date of the entry into force of the treaty
with respect to that party”. 254 The ICJ applied article 28 in the context of a treaty
addressing a crime (torture) in Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or
Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal) finding that the “the obligation to prosecute the
alleged perpetrators of acts of torture under the Convention applies only to facts
having occurred after its entry into force for the State concerned”.255 Thus, without a
clearly stated contrary intention, a treaty will generally not apply to actions taken
entirely prior to the State’s acceptance of the treaty. 256
71. At the same time, article 28 does not apply to continuing incidents that have
not ended before the entry into force of the treaty. 257 As the Commission noted in
1966:
if … an act or fact or situation which took place or arose prior to the entry into force of a treaty
continues to occur or exist after the treaty has come into force, it will be caught by the provisions
of the treaty. The non-retroactivity principle cannot be infringed by applying a treaty to matters
that occur or exist when the treaty is in force, even if they first began at an earlier date. 258

__________________
252

Commission on Human Rights, Report of the intersessional open-ended working group to
elaborate a draft legally binding normative instrument for the protection of all persons from
enforced disappearance (E/CN.4/2003/71), paras. 43–46 and 56.
253
Ibid., para. 56.
254
See also the draft code of crimes against the peace and security of mankind (footnote 134
above), article 13, paragraph 1, p. 32 (“No one shall be convicted under the present Code for
acts committed before its entry into force”).
255
Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal)
(see footnote 98 above), p. 457, para. 100. See also O. R., M. M. and M. S. v. Argentina,
Communications Nos. 1/1988, 2/1988 and 3/1988, Views of the Committee against Torture of
23 November 1989, Official Documents of the General Assembly, Forty ‑Fifth Session,
Supplement No. 44 (A/45/44), annex V, p. 112, para. 7.5 (finding that “‘torture’ for purposes of
the Convention can only mean torture that occurs subsequent to the entry into force of the
Convention”).
256
Crawford, p. 378; Shaw, p. 671; and Yearbook … 1966, vol. II, at pp. 211–213.
257
Odendahl, p. 483.
258
Yearbook … 1966, vol. II, p. 212, para. (3) of the commentary to draft article 24.
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72. The European Court of Human Rights and the Human Rights Committee have
both followed this approach, such that if there is a “continuing violation” of human
rights, not simply an “instantaneous act or fact” with continuing effects, then the
Court and the Committee view the matter as within the scope of their jurisdiction. 259
According to the Court, “the concept of a ‘continuing situation’ refers to a state of
affairs which operates by continuous activities by or on the part of the State to
render the applicants victims”. 260 The Human Rights Committee has “declared that
it could not consider an alleged violation of human rights said to have taken place
prior to the entry into force of the Covenant for a State party, unless it is a violation
that continues after that date or has effects which themselves constitute a violation
of the Covenant after that date”. 261
73. Further, while the obligations for the State under a new convention would only
operate with respect to acts or facts that arise after the convention enters into force
for that State, the convention (at least as currently reflected in the present draft
articles) would not address, one way or the other, the manner in which a State
applies its law to crimes against humanity arising prior to that time. A State that
previously possessed the capacity to prosecute crimes against humanity with respect
to acts or facts pre-dating the convention would remain able to do so after entry into
force of the convention. In other words, while such prosecutions would fall outside
the scope of the convention, the convention would not preclude them. For those
States, a relevant limitation on its capacity to prosecute for such crimes might be the
date on which the State enacted its national law on crimes against humanity, since
international law and most national legal systems preclude punishment for an act
that was not criminal at the time it was committed. 262 Even then, however, there is
support for the proposition that crimes against humanity committed prior to
enactment of a national law criminalizing such conduct nevertheless might be
nationally prosecuted, since such acts have been regarded as criminal under
international law at least since the Second World War. 263
__________________
259

See Loizidou v. Turkey (Article 50) (40/1993/435/514), Grand Chamber judgment of 28 July
1998, European Court of Human Rights; Kalashnikov v. Russia, Application no. 47095/99,
Chamber judgment of 15 July 2002, European Court of Human Rights, Third Section, para. 111;
Posti and Rahko v. Finland, Application no. 27824/95, Chamber judgment of 24 September
2002, European Court of Human Rights, Fourth Section, para. 39; Blečić v. Croatia, Application
no. 59532/00, Chamber judgment of 29 July 2004, European Court of Human Rights, First
Section, paras. 73 et seq; and Gueye et al. v. France, Communication No. 196/1985, Views of
the Human Rights Committee, Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-Fourth Session,
Supplement No. 40 (A/44/40), pp. 189 and 191–192.
260
Posti and Rahko v. Finland (see footnote above), para. 39.
261
Gueye et al. v. France (see footnote 259 above), pp. 191–192, para. 5.3.
262
In this regard, reference is often made to the prohibition of ex post facto (after the facts) laws or
to the doctrine of nullum crimen, nulla poena sine praevia lege poenali (“[there exists] no crime
[and] no punishment without a pre-existing penal law [appertaining]”).
263
See, for example, Kolk and Kislyiy v. Estonia, Application nos. 23052/04 and 24018/04, Decision
on admissibility of 17 January 2006, European Court of Human Rights, Fourth Section (denying
applicants’ claim that their convictions for crimes against humanity transgressed article 7 of the
European Convention on Human Rights, which prohibits retrospective application of criminal law,
because “even if the acts committed by the applicants could have been regarded as lawful under the
Soviet law at the material time, they were nevertheless found by Estonian courts to constitute crimes
against humanity under international law at the time of their commission”). See also Penart v.
Estonia, Application no. 14685/04, Decision on admissibility of 24 January 2006, European Court
of Human Rights, Fourth Section (same); Kononov v. Latvia, Application no. 36376/04, Judgment of
17 May 2010, European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber (same but with respect to war
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G.

Appropriate penalties

74. The Commission provided in its 1996 draft Code of crimes against the peace
and security of Mankind that “[a]n individual who is responsible for a crime against
the peace and security of mankind shall be liable to punishment. The punishment
shall be commensurate with the character and gravity of the crime”. 264 The
commentary further explained that the “character of a crime is what distinguishes
that crime from another crime... The gravity of a crime is inferred from the
circumstances in which it is committed and the feelings which impelled the author.”
Thus, “while the criminal act is legally the same, the means and methods used
differ, depending on varying degrees of depravity and cruelty. All of these factors
should guide the court in applying the penalty.” 265
75. To the extent that an international court or tribunal has jurisdiction over crimes
against humanity, the penalties attached to such an offence may vary, but are expected
to be appropriate given the gravity of the offence. The Statute of the Internation al
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia provides that “[t]he penalty imposed by the Trial
Chamber shall be limited to imprisonment. In determining the terms of imprisonment,
the Trial Chambers shall have recourse to the general practice regarding prison
sentences in the courts of the former Yugoslavia” (art. 24, para. 1). Furthermore, the
Tribunal is to “take into account such factors as the gravity of the offence and the
individual circumstances of the convicted person” (art. 24, para. 2). The Statute of the
International Tribunal for Rwanda includes identical language, except that recourse is
to be had to “the general practice regarding prison sentences in the courts of
Rwanda”.266 Even for convictions for the most serious international crimes of
international concern, this can result in a wide range of sentences; thus, the
International Tribunal for Rwanda imposed “custodial terms of forty-five, thirty-five,
thirty-two, thirty, twenty-five, fifteen, twelve, ten, seven and six years in genocide
prosecutions”.267 Article 77, paragraph 1(b) of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court also allows for flexibility of this kind, by providing for a term of
imprisonment of up to 30 years or life imprisonment “when justified by the extreme
gravity of the crime and the individual circumstances of the convicted person”.
Similar formulations may be found in the instruments regulating the Special Court for
Sierra Leone, 268 the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 269 the Special Panels for Serious
__________________

crimes); but see Vasiliauskas v. Lithuania, Application no. 35343/05, Judgment of 20 October 2015,
European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber (finding unlawfully retroactive the application of
a national law on genocide committed in the form of killing of a political group, since at the time of
the act international treaty law had not included “political group” in the definition of genocide and
customary international law was unclear). The Special Tribunal for Lebanon concluded “that
individuals are expected and required to know that a certain conduct is criminalised in international
law: at least from the time that the same conduct is criminalised also in a national legal order, a
person may thus be punished by domestic courts even for conduct predating the adoption of national
legislation”, Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, H omicide,
Perpetration, Cumulative Charging of 16 February 2011, Case No. STL-11-01/I, Special Tribunal
for Lebanon, para. 13.
264
Draft code of crimes against the peace and security of mankind (see footnote 134 above), art. 3,
p. 22.
265
Ibid., p. 23.
266
Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda (see footnote 100 above), art. 23, para. 1.
267
Schabas, Genocide in International Law, pp. 464–465 (citations omitted).
268
Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (see footnote 101 above), art. 19.
269
Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (see footnote 170 above), art. 24.
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Crimes in East Timor, 270 the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, 271
the Iraqi Supreme Criminal Tribunal 272 and the Extraordinary African Chambers
within the Senegalese Judicial System. 273
76. Likewise, to the extent that a national jurisdiction has criminalized crimes
against humanity, the penalties attached to such an offence may vary, but are expected
to be appropriate given the gravity of the offence. France, for example, may punish
crimes against humanity with life in prison “[l]orsqu’ils sont commis en temps de
guerre en exécution d’un plan concerté contre ceux qui combattent le système
idéologique”274 (when committed in time of war pursuant to a concerted campaign
against those fighting the ideological system), as well as when there is “participation
à un groupement formé ou à une entente établie en vue de la préparation, caractérisée
par un ou plusieurs faits matériels, de l’un des crime définis” 275 (participation in a
group formed or association established with a view to the preparation, marked by one
or more material actions, of one of the defined crimes). Other offences constituting
crimes against humanity in France, however, are punished by only 10 or 15 years ’
imprisonment. 276 Austria also “varies [the term of imprisonment] according to the
gravity of the specific crime committed. Murder committed in the course of such an
attack, for example, is punishable with life imprisonment ..., rape with imprisonment
of five to fifteen years”.277 The Republic of Korea does the same, providing for a
minimum sentence of seven years for murder and five years for any other offence
constituting a crime against humanity. 278
77. Spain also provides for a wide range of possible prison sentences for offences
constituting crimes against humanity: 15-20 years if death results; 12-15 years for
rape and 4-6 years for any other type of sexual assault; 12-15 years for injuries;
8-12 years for conditions that endanger the lives or seriously impair the health of
the victim; 8-12 years for expulsion; 6-8 years for forcible pregnancy; 12-15 years
for forced disappearance; 8-12 years for unlawful imprisonment; 4-8 years for
torture; 4-8 years for prostitution offences, including trafficking for purposes of
sexual exploitation; and 4-8 years for slavery. 279 National law in Finland allows for
a sentence between one year and life for the commission of a crime against
humanity, with a minimum of eight years if the offender committed an “aggravated”
crime against humanity. 280 Switzerland requires a minimum sentence of five years

__________________
270

UNTAET/REG/2000/15 (see footnote 102 above), sect. 10.
Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the
Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea (see footnote 103
above), art. 39.
272
Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal (see footnote 104 above) , art. 24.
273
Statute of the Extraordinary African Chambers within the courts of Senegal created to prosecute
international crimes committed in Chad between 7 June 1982 and 1 December 1990 (see
footnote 105 above), art. 24.
274
Written comments to the International Law Commission (2015), France, citing article 212-2 of
its Criminal Code.
275
Ibid., citing article 212-3 of its Criminal Code.
276
Ibid., citing article 213-1 of its Criminal Code.
277
Ibid., Austria.
278
Ibid., the Republic of Korea, citing article 9 of its Criminal Code.
279
Ibid., Spain, citing article 607 bis, paragraph 2 of its Criminal Code. See also ibid., Germany,
and Written comments to the International Law Commission (2016), Australia, for examples of
other States with various sentence ranges for different types of offences.
280
Ibid., Finland, citing chapter 11, sections 3–4 of its Criminal Code.
271
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for a crime against humanity, with a potential sentence of life in prison “[s]i l’acte
est particulièrement grave” 281 (if the offense is particularly serious).
78. A large number of States do not permit the death penalty for any crime,
including crimes against humanity (nor do international criminal tribunals since
Nuremberg), and many other States that have not abolished it do not apply it in
practice. Indeed, many States view application of the death pe nalty as contrary to
human rights law. Even so, a substantial minority of States permit the death penalty,
including Bangladesh, Belarus, Botswana, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia,
Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Nigeria, Oman, Singapore,
Thailand, Uganda, Viet Nam, the United Arab Emirates and the United States of
America, viewing it as permissible under international law. 282 To date, treaties
addressing criminalization of offences in national law have not precluded
application of the death penalty, apparently recognizing that the practice of States
currently varies in this regard.
79. Indeed, international treaties addressing crimes do not dictate to States parties
the penalties to be imposed (or not to be imposed) but, rather, leave to States parties
the discretion to determine the punishment, based on the circumstances of the
particular offender and offence. 283 The Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide simply calls for “effective penalties for
persons guilty of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated ” (art. V). In national
practice, the flexible nature of this obligation has led to penalties prescribed for
genocide ranging from periods of imprisonment, to life imprisonment, or to the
death penalty. There is a variation in the penalties for the five different acts of
genocide in Article II(a)(e) of the Convention (with killing generally attracting the
highest penalties), and variation in the different forms of criminal participation
(with attempt, conspiracy and direct and public incitement to genocide sometimes
attracting lesser penalties, the latter particularly due to concerns about the impact on
freedom of expression). 284 According to one writer:
Most domestic legal systems treat accomplices [to genocide] as harshly as principal offenders,
depending on the specific circumstances. Thus, an aider and abettor could be subject to the most
severe sanctions. In many judicial systems, attempted crimes are subject to substantially reduced
penalties, and the same principle ought to apply with respect to genocide. The offence of direct
and public incitement has been treated in domestic legislation as being significantly less serious
than the other forms of participation in genocide. 285

80. The Geneva Conventions for the protection of war victims also provide a
general standard but leave to individual States the discretion to set the appropriate
punishment, by simply requiring “[t]he High Contracting Parties [to] undertake to
__________________
281

Ibid., Switzerland, citing article 264(a) of its Criminal Code.
For an overview, see Hood and Hoyle.
283
See, for example, Commission on Human Rights, Report of the intersessional open-ended
working group to elaborate a draft legally binding normative instrument for the protection of all
persons from enforced disappearance (E/CN.4/2004/59), para. 58 (indicating that “[s]everal
delegations welcomed the room for manoeuvre granted to States” in this provision); Cassese,
pp. 219–220; see also Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Drafting of an International
Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Official Records of the General Assembly,
Thirty-Second Session, Supplement No. 39 (A/32/39), 13th meeting, pp. 68–69, para. 4
(comments of the United States of America).
284
See, for example, Public Prosecutor and Fifteen anonymous victims v. Van Anraat, Case
No. 22-000509-06-2, Decision of 9 May 2007, Court of Appeal of The Hague. See also van der
Wilt, “Genocide, complicity in genocide and international v. domestic jurisdiction: reflections
on the van Anraat case”; and Saul, p. 72.
285
Schabas, Genocide in International Law: the Crime of Crimes, p. 470.
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enact any legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for ... any of the
grave breaches of the present Convention”. 286
81. More recent treaties addressing crimes in national legal systems typically
indicate that the penalty should be “appropriate.” Although the Commission initially
proposed the term “severe penalties” for use in its draft articles on diplomatic agents
and other protected persons, the term “appropriate penalties” was instead used by
States in the 1973 Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes agains t
internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents. 287 That term has
served as a model for subsequent treaties. 288 At the same time, the provision on
“appropriate penalties” in the 1973 Convention was accompanied by language
calling for the penalty to take into account the “grave nature” of the offence. 289 The
Commission commented that such a reference was intended to emphasize that the
penalty should take into account the important “world interests” at stake in
punishing such an offence. 290 Since 1973, this approach — that each “State party
shall make these offences punishable by the appropriate penalties which take into
account their grave nature” — has been adopted for numerous treaties, including the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or

__________________
286

Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field (Convention I), art. 49; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (Convention II),
art. 50; Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Convention III),
art. 129; and Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
(Convention IV), art. 146.
287
See article 2, paragraph 2 (“Each State shall make these crimes punishable by appropriate
penalties”). For an analysis of why the term “severe” was dropped, see Wood, p. 805 (finding that
the Commission’s proposal of “severe” penalty “had been criticised in so far as it suggested that the
punishment should be greater merely because the victim was an internationally protected person”).
288
See Nowak and McArthur, p. 232. Use of the term “appropriate” rather than “severe” penalties
was viewed as preferable during the course of drafting the International Convention against the
taking of hostages essentially because there often was no agreement among States as to what
constitutes a “severe” penalty at the national level. See the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on
the Drafting of an International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (footnote 283
above), 14th meeting, pp. 77–78, para. 25 (Mexico); ibid., p. 80, para. 39 (the Netherlands); and
15th meeting, p. 85, para. 12 (Denmark). Several States during the negotiations indicated a
preference for the “appropriate penalties” language because they thought it better reflected a
“guarantee of legal fairness”; they worried that more assertive language might lead to an
infringement of human rights in national legal systems. Ibid., 13th meeting, p. 72, para. 17
(Iran); ibid., 14th meeting, p. 75, para. 7 (Chile); ibid., pp. 77–78, para. 25 (Mexico); and ibid.,
15th meeting, p. 83, para. 3 (Nicaragua). Ultimately, the Convention provided for “appropriate
penalties which take into account the grave nature of those offences”. See International
Convention against the taking of hostages, article 2.
289
See the Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally
protected persons, including diplomatic agents, article 2, paragraph 2 (“make these crimes
punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account their grave nature”). S ee also the
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Drafting of an International Convention Against the
Taking of Hostages (footnote 283 above) pp. 74–75, para. 6.
290
Yearbook … 1972, vol. II, p. 316, para. (12) of the commentary to article 2.
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Punishment. 291 In some treaties, the issue of gravity is expressed using terms such as
“extreme seriousness”, “serious nature” or “extreme gravity” of the offences. 292
82.

Reflecting on such language, one writer has suggested that:

There is a certain element of intended obscurity in this language ..., reflecting the fact that systems
of punishment vary from State to State and that, therefore, it would be diffi cult and undesirable
(from the point of view of many States) for the Convention to set down any specific penalties, or
range of penalties, for the offences. It could certainly be argued that a convention dealing with a
crime of international concern, under which an offender may be prosecuted by a State simply on
the basis of custody, should set forth a uniform range of penalties, both for the sake of consistency
and to ensure that some punishment is ultimately imposed. However, it seems unlikely that States
are ready to accept any such an obligation. 293

83. Even so, language calling for the penalty to reflect the gravity of the offence
serves to emphasize “that the penalties established should be akin to those normally
established by Parties for serious, rather than minor, crimes”, while still deferring to
States’ national systems. 294

H.

Draft article 5. Criminalization under national law

84. Bearing these considerations in mind, the Special Rapporteur proposes the
following draft article:

Draft article 5.

Criminalization under national law

1.
Each State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the following
acts are offences under its criminal law: committing a crime against humanity;
attempting to commit such a crime; and ordering, soliciting, ind ucing, aiding,
abetting, or otherwise assisting in or contributing to the commission or attempted
commission of such a crime.
2.
Each State also shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the
following are offences under its criminal law:
(a) A military commander or person effectively acting as a military
commander shall be criminally responsible for crimes against humanity committed
by forces under his or her effective command and control, or effective authority and
control as the case may be, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control
properly over such forces, where:
__________________
291

Art. 4. See also the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel,
art. 9, para. 2 (“appropriate penalties which shall take into account their grave nature”);
the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, art. 4, para. (b)
(“appropriate penalties which take into account the grave nature of those offences”); the
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, art. 4, para. (b)
(“appropriate penalties which take into account the grave nature of the offences”); and the OAU
Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, 1999, art. 2(a) (“appropriate
penalties that take into account the grave nature of such offences”).
292
See, for example, the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance, art. 7, para. 1 (“appropriate penalties which take into account its extreme
seriousness”); the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, art. 6 (“severe
penalties that take into account their serious nature”); and the Inter-American Convention on the
Forced Disappearance of Persons, art. III (“appropriate punishment commensurate with its
extreme gravity”).
293
Lambert, p. 102.
294
See Ingelse, p. 320; Lambert, p. 103; and Nowak and McArthur, p. 249.
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(i) that military commander or person either knew or, owing to the
circumstances at the time, should have known that the forces were committing
or about to commit such crimes; and
(ii) that military commander or person failed to take all necessary and
reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their
commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for
investigation and prosecution;
(b) With respect to superior and subordinate relationships not described in
paragraph (a), a superior shall be criminally responsible for crimes against humanity
committed by subordinates under his or her effective authority and control, as a result
of his or her failure to exercise control properly over such subordinates, where:
(i) the superior either knew, or consciously disregarded information which
clearly indicated, that the subordinates were committing or about to commit
such crimes;
(ii) the crimes concerned activities that
responsibility and control of the superior; and

were

within

the

effective

(iii) the superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within
his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the mat ter
to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.
3.

Each State also shall take the necessary measures to ensure that:

(a) the fact that an offence referred to in this draft article was committed
pursuant to an order of a superior, whether military or civilian, is not a ground for
excluding criminal responsibility of a subordinate;
(b) an offence referred to in this draft article shall not be subject to any
statute of limitations; and
(c) an offence referred to in this draft article shall be punishable by
appropriate penalties that take into account their grave nature.

CHAPTER II

Establishment of national jurisdiction
85. Whenever a State adopts a national law that criminalizes an offence, the State
must also determine the extent of its national jurisdiction 295 when such offences
occur. Thus, a State may establish jurisdiction only when the offence occurs within
its territory, or only when one of its nationals commits the offence, or on some other
basis, whether singly or in combination. For example, with respect to crimes against
humanity, the first report noted that a study of the national laws of 83 States

__________________
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As a general matter, “jurisdiction” in the context of national law describes the parameters within
which a State makes (or “prescribes”), applies, and enforces rules of conduct as they pertain to
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exercise of a certain form of national jurisdiction, any given State may not have enacted national
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revealed that only 21 of them had established jurisdiction over a non -national who
allegedly committed the offence abroad against non-nationals. 296
86. As a general matter, international instruments have sought to encourage States
to establish a relatively wide range of jurisdictional bases under national law to
address the most serious crimes of international concern, so that there is no safe
haven for those who commit the offence. Thus, according to the Commission ’s 1996
draft code of crimes against the peace and security of mankind, “each State party
shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the
crimes” laid out in the draft code, other than the crime of aggression, “irrespective
of where or by whom those crimes were committed”. 297 The breadth of such
jurisdiction was necessary because the “Commission considered that the effective
implementation of the Code required a combined approach to jurisdiction based on
the broadest jurisdiction of national courts together with the possible jurisdiction of
an international criminal court”. 298 The preamble to the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court provides “that the most serious crimes of concern to
the international community as a whole must not go unpunished and that their
effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the national level ”, and
further “that it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over
those responsible for international crimes”.
87. As such, when treaties concerning crimes address national law
implementation, they typically include a provision on the establishment of national
jurisdiction. For example, discussions within a working group of the Human Rights
Council convened to draft an international instrument on enforced disappearance
concluded that: “The establishment of the broadest possible jurisdiction for
domestic criminal courts in respect of enforced disappearance appeared to be
essential if the future instrument was to be effective.” 299 At the same time, while for
most treaties addressing international crimes “[i]t is mandatory for States to
‘establish’ jurisdiction over the specified offences ... that does not carry with it an
obligation to exercise that jurisdiction in any parti cular case”. 300 Rather, such
treaties typically only obligate a State party to exercise its jurisdiction when an
alleged offender is present in the State party’s territory (see chapter IV of this
report), leading either to a submission of the matter to prose cution within that State
party or to extradition or surrender of the alleged offender to another State party or
competent international tribunal (see chapter V of this report).
88. The following analysis explains the types of national jurisdiction that usu ally
must be established under treaties addressing crimes.

__________________
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Yearbook … 2014, vol. II (Part One), document A/CN.4/680, para. 61. See also Mitchell,
paras. 34–35 (finding that “only 52 per cent of the 94 States for whom their jurisdictional
position is known have sufficient national legislation to allow for the prosecution of a
non-national who is alleged to have committed crimes against humanity outside the State”).
297
Draft code of crimes against the peace and security of mankind (see footnote 134 above), art. 8,
p. 27.
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Ibid., p. 28, para. (5).
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Commission on Human Rights, Report of the intersessional open-ended working group to
elaborate a draft legally binding normative instrument for the protection of all persons from
enforced disappearance (E/CN.4/2003/71), para. 65.
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A.

Types of national jurisdiction over offences

89. As indicated above, a key objective of treaties that address criminal acts is to
obligate States to establish national jurisdiction in a manner t hat makes it difficult
for an alleged offender to seek refuge anywhere else in the world. For example,
article 5 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment obligates each State party to establish several types of
national jurisdiction with respect to the crime of torture. The article provides:
1.
Each State party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its
jurisdiction over the offences referred to [in this Convention] in the following cases:
(a)
When the offences are committed in any territory under its jurisdiction or on board a
ship or aircraft registered in that State;
(b)

When the alleged offender is a national of that State;

(c)

When the victim is a national of that State if that State considers it appropriate.

2.
Each State party shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary to establish
its jurisdiction over such offences in cases where the alleged offender is present in any territory
under its jurisdiction and it does not extradite him pursuant to article 8 301 to any of the States
mentioned in paragraph 1 of this article.
3.
This Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance
with internal law.

90. Thus, article 5, paragraph 1(a), requires that jurisdiction be established when
the offence occurs in the State’s territory, a type of jurisdiction often referred to as
“territorial jurisdiction.” Article 5, paragraph 1(b), calls for jurisdiction when the
alleged offender is a national of the State, a type of jurisdiction at times referred to
as “nationality jurisdiction” or “active personality jurisdiction.” Article 5,
paragraph 1(c), calls for jurisdiction when the victim of the offence is a national of
the State, a type of jurisdiction at times referred to as “passive personality
jurisdiction.” Notably, this last type of jurisdiction in the Convention against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment is optional: a
State may establish such jurisdiction “if that State considers it appropriate”, but the
State is not obliged to do so.
91. Article 5, paragraph 2, addresses a situation where the other types of
jurisdiction may not exist, but the alleged offender “is present” in territory under the
State’s jurisdiction. In such a situation, even if the crime was not committed on its
territory, the alleged offender is not its national and the victim(s) of the crime is not
its national, the State nevertheless is obligated to establish jurisdiction given the
presence of the alleged offender in its territory. This obligation helps prevent an
alleged offender from seeking refuge in a State with which the offence otherwise
has no connection. In situations where the alleged offender is not present, however,
this article does not impose an obligation on the State to establish jurisdiction over
the offence.
92. Provisions comparable to article 5 exist in many recent treaties addressing
crimes, including the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons
from Enforced Disappearance (art. 9). While no convention yet exists relating to
crimes against humanity, Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal indicated in
their separate opinion in the Arrest Warrant case that:
__________________
301
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The series of multilateral treaties with their special jurisdictional provisions reflect a determination
by the international community that those engaged in war crimes, hijacking, hostage taking [and]
torture should not go unpunished. Although crimes against humanity are not yet the object of a
distinct convention, a comparable international indignation at such acts is not to be doubted. 302

93. Establishment of these types of national jurisdiction are also important in
supporting the separate provision in the Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which sets forth an
aut dedere aut judicare obligation. 303 In his separate opinion in the Arrest Warrant
case, Judge Guillaume remarked on the “system” set up under treaties of this sort:
Whenever a perpetrator of any of the offences covered by these conventions is found in the
territory of a State, that State is under an obligation to arrest him, and then extradite or prosecute.
It must have first conferred jurisdiction on its courts to try him if he is not extradited . * Thus,
universal punishment of all the offences in question is assured, as the perpetrat ors are denied
refuge in all States. 304

94.

Each of these types of jurisdiction is discussed briefly below.

1.

WHEN THE OFFENCE OCCURS IN THE S TATE’ S TERRITORY

95. National criminal jurisdiction principally focuses on crimes committed within
the territory of the State. Indeed, under the national law of many States, criminal
law is often presumed to apply only to conduct occurring within the territory of the
State and not to conduct that occurs extraterritorially unless the national law
indicates otherwise. 305 International law historically has recognized the permissibly
of the State establishing and exercising such “territorial jurisdiction”, viewing it as
an inherent aspect of State sovereignty. 306
96. States that have adopted national laws on crimes against humanity invariably
establish jurisdiction over such offences when they occur within the State ’s
territory, as may be seen in the written comments provided to the Commission in
relation to this topic. 307 Thus, Belgium punishes “[l]’infraction commise sur le
territoire du royaume, par des Belges ou par des étrangers” 308 (the offense
committed in the territory of the kingdom, by Belgians or by foreigners). The
Netherlands “is capable of exercising jurisdiction over an alleged offender for the
commission of a crime against humanity in case: the crime against humanity has
been committed in the Netherlands (territoriality principle — Article 2 of the
Criminal Code); the crime against humanity has been committed on board a vessel
or an aircraft registered in the Netherlands (flag principle — Article 3 of the
__________________
302

Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2002, Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal,
p. 78, para. 51.
303
Crawford, pp. 469–471; and McClean, p. 170.
304
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (see footnote 302 above), Separate Opinion of President
Guillaume, p. 39, para. 9.
305
Bantekas, International Criminal Law, p. 332; see also Clapham, Brierly’s Law of Nations,
p. 242; Lambert, p. 144; Nowak and McArthur, pp. 264 and 308; Staker, p. 316; and Thalmann,
p. 237 (citing the Case of the S.S. “Lotus”).
306
See, generally, Clapham, Brierly’s Law of Nations, p. 242; Crawford, pp. 458–459; Lambert,
p. 147; Shaw, pp. 474–475; and Dupuy and Kerbrat, p. 602.
307
In addition to those discussed here, see Written comments to the International Law Commission
(2015), Finland; ibid., Germany; Criminal Code of Switzerland of 21 December 1937, art. 3,
available from www.legislationline.org/documents/section/criminal-codes; and Written
comments to the International Law Commission (2015), the United Kingdom.
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Ibid., Belgium, citing article 3 of its Criminal Code.
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Criminal Code)”. 309 The French Penal Code “‘est applicable aux infractions
commises sur le territoire de la République. L’infraction est réputée commise sur le
territoire de la République dès lors qu’un de ses faits constitutifs a eu lieu sur ce
territoire’, et dans d’autres cas particuliers concernant les infractions commises à
bord des navires battant un pavillon français” 310 (‘is applicable to offenses
committed on the territory of the Republic. The offense is considered to be committed
in the territory of the Republic where one of its constituent facts took place in this
territory’, and other special cases concerning offenses committed on board vessels
flying a French flag). In Spain, “courts shall have jurisdiction to hear cases
involving offences or misdemeanours committed in Spanish territory or on board
Spanish ships or aircraft”. 311 The Republic of Korea similarly applies its laws on
crimes against humanity “to any Korean national or foreigner who commits a crime
provided for in this Act within the territory of the Republic of Korea ” and “to any
foreigner who commits a crime provided for in this Act on board a vessel or aircraft
registered in the Republic of Korea, while outside the territory of the Republic of
Korea”. 312
97. As noted in some of these examples, territorial jurisdiction often encompasses
jurisdiction over crimes committed on board a vessel or aircraft registered to the
State; 313 indeed, States that have adopted national laws on crimes against humanity
typically establish jurisdiction over acts occurring on such a vessel or aircraft. 314
98. Many States that have adopted a statute on crimes against humanity do not
expressly address the issue of jurisdiction within that statute. Rather, the national
criminal law system is structured so that, once a criminal offence is defined within
the national law, territorial jurisdiction automatically exists with respect to that
crime. Thus, the Criminal Code of Bulgaria applies “to all crimes committed on the
territory of the Republic of Bulgaria”. 315 The same is true of, among others, Cuba, 316
Germany, 317 Hungary, 318 Mexico, 319 the Russian Federation 320 and Turkey. 321
99. Treaties addressing crimes typically obligate States parties to establish territorial
jurisdiction over the offence, as was indicated above with respect to article 5 of the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or

__________________
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Punishment. 322 Similar provisions may be found in the Convention on the suppression
of unlawful seizure of aircraft (art. 4); the Convention for the suppression of unlawful
acts against the safety of civil aviation (art. 5, para. 1(a)-(b)); the Convention on the
prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons,
including diplomatic agents (art. 3); the International Convention against the taking of
hostages (art. 5, para. 1(a)); the 1985 Inter-American Torture Convention (art. 12(a));
the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel (art. 10,
para. 1(a)); the Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons
(art. IV); the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings
(art. 6, para. 1(a)-(b)); the International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism (art. 7, para. 1(a)-(b)); the OAU Convention on the
Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, 1999 (art. 6, para. 1(a)-(b)); the United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (art. 15, para. 1(a) -(b));
the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance (art. 9, para. 1(a)); and the ASEAN Convention on Counter
Terrorism (art. VII, para. 1(a)-(b)).
100. In drafting what would become the Convention on the prevention and
punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons, including
diplomatic agents, the Commission explicitly noted “the generally acknowledged
primacy of the principle of territoriality in matters of jurisdiction”. 323 As writers
have indicated, the territorial basis for jurisdiction is non -controversial and
generally goes unchallenged during the drafting of these treaties. 324

2.

WHEN THE OFFENCE IS COMMITTED BY THE S TATE’ S NATIONAL

101. National law may also allow for the establishment of jurisdiction over crimes
committed outside the State’s territory by a national of that State, a type of
jurisdiction often referred to as “nationality jurisdiction” or “active personality
jurisdiction”. 325 As has been noted, “[t]he competence of a State to prosecute its
nationals on the sole basis of their nationality — and regardless of the territorial
State’s competing claim — is based on the allegiance that is owed to one’s country
of nationality under domestic law”. 326
102. Of those States that responded to the Commission’s request for information
about their national laws on crimes against humanity, most indicated that they
__________________
322

Article VI of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
provides that States parties must exercise jurisdiction when the crime is committed within
their territory (“Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in
[this Convention] shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the
act was committed”). To that end, States parties either implement the treaty ob ligation directly
in their national law or through an implementing statute. For example, the United States
provides for jurisdiction over the offences of genocide, as well as incitement, attempt and
conspiracy to commit genocide, if “the offense is committed in whole or in part within the
United States” (United States Code, Title 18, sect. 1091(e)).
323
Yearbook … 1972, vol. II, p. 320, para. (6) of the commentary to article 8 of the draft articles on
the protection and inviolability of diplomatic agents and other persons entitled to special
protection under international law.
324
See Clapham, Brierly’s Law of Nations, p. 242; Lambert, p. 144; Nowak and McArthur, pp. 264
and 308; Shaw, p. 477; and Thalmann, p. 237.
325
See Clapham, Brierly’s Law of Nations, p. 242; Crawford p. 459; Dupuy and Kerbrat, p. 602;
and Shaw, p. 479.
326
Bantekas, International Criminal Law, p. 338. See also Lambert, p. 147; Crawford, pp. 459
and 461; Shaw, pp. 279 and 482; and Staker, pp. 318–319.
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provide for such jurisdiction. 327 For example, Belgium has established jurisdiction
over “tout Belge ou toute personne ayant sa résidence principale sur le territoire du
royaume qui, hors du territoire du royaume, se sera rendu coupable ” 328 (any Belgian
or any person whose main residence is in the territory of the kingdom who, outside
the territory of the kingdom, is guilty). The Netherlands “is capable of exercising
jurisdiction over an alleged offender for the commission of a crime against
humanity in case ... the crime against humanity has been committed outside the
Netherlands by a Dutch national (including the situation that the alleged offender
has become a Dutch national only after committing the crime) (active nationality
principle — Article 2 of the International Crimes Act); the crime against humanity
has been committed outside the Netherlands by a Dutch resident, under the condition
of double criminality (active personality principle — Article 7(1) [and] (3) of the
Criminal Code)”. 329 French law similarly has established “la compétence pénale active
des juridictions françaises, lorsque l’auteur est français (Article L 1136 du Code
pénal: ‘la loi pénale française est applicable à tout crime commis par un Français
hors du territoire de la République’)” 330 (active criminal jurisdiction of the French
courts, where the author is French (Article L 1136 of the Criminal Code: ‘French
criminal law is applicable to any crime committed by a French national outside the
territory of the Republic’). The Republic of Korea can apply its legal provisions on
crimes against humanity “to any Korean national who commits a crime provided for
in this Act outside the territory of the Republic of Korea”.331
103. Neither the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide nor the Geneva Conventions for the protection of war victims obligate
States parties to establish nationality jurisdiction, although the travaux préparatoires
of the former suggests a belief that States would exercise nationality jurisdiction over
alleged offenders. 332 Even so, nationality jurisdiction is a feature of virtually all
contemporary treaties addressing crimes, including the Convention on the prevention
and punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons, including
diplomatic agents (art. 3); the International Convention against the taking of hostages
(art. 5, para. 1(b)); the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (art. 5, para. 1(b)); the Inter-American
Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture (art. 12(b)); the Convention on the Safety
of United Nations and Associated Personnel (art. 10, para. 1(b)); the Inter -American
Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons (art. IV, para. (b)); the
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (art. 6,
para. 1(c)); the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism (art. 7, para. 1(c)); the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating
of Terrorism, 1999 (art. 6, para. 1(c); the International Conventio n for the Protection
of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (art. 9, para. 1(b)); and the ASEAN
__________________
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Convention on Counter Terrorism (art. VII, para. 1(c)). The Convention on the
suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft, however, does not contain such la nguage.
104. Such conventions do not impose an obligation to establish jurisdiction with
respect to persons who are not nationals but are legal residents of a State party. As
such, it is left to the States parties whether, in their national law, to establi sh
jurisdiction as well with respect to residents. 333 As noted below, however, under
such conventions a State party typically is obligated to establish jurisdiction with
respect to any alleged offenders who are present in its territory, which includes
either residents or stateless persons.

3.

WHEN THE OFFENCE IS COMMITTED AGAINST THE STATE’ S NATIONAL

105. National law may also establish jurisdiction over crimes committed outside
the State’s territory when the victim of the crime is a national of that State, a type of
jurisdiction sometimes referred to as “passive personality” or “passive nationality”
jurisdiction. 334 The establishment of this type of jurisdiction by States is less
common than the establishment of territorial and nationality jurisdiction; some
States have established this type of jurisdiction at least for some types of crimes,
while others do not, and still others vigorously oppose it. Those in favour argue that
such jurisdiction can help fill a jurisdictional gap and that States have a strong
interest in protecting their nationals at least against certain types of serious crimes,
such as the taking of hostages. 335 Those States opposing such jurisdiction have
expressed concerns about promoting such jurisdiction, which might be abused or at
least give rise to unnecessary, conflicting jurisdictional claims. 336
106. Of those States that responded to the Commission’s request for information
about their national laws on crimes against humanity, many indicated that they
provide for such jurisdiction. 337 For example, Belgium has established jurisdiction
over a grave violation of international humanitarian law “commise contre une
personne qui, au moment des faits, est un ressortissant belge ou un réfugié reconnu
en Belgique et y ayant sa résidence habituelle ... ou une personne qui, depuis au
moins trois ans, séjourne effectivement, habituellement et légalement en
Belgique” 338 (committed against a person who, at the time, is a Belgian citizen or a
recognized refugee in Belgium with habitual residence in Belgium … or a person
who, for at least three years has been effectively, habitually and legally staying in
Belgium). Similarly, “the Netherlands is capable of exercising jurisdiction over an
alleged offender for the commission of a crime against humanity in case ... the
crime against humanity has been committed outside the Netherlands against a Dutch
__________________
333

See, for example, Ireland-Piper, p. 74.
Crawford, p. 461; and Shaw, p. 482.
335
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Taking of Hostages, Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-Third Session,
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Switzerland, citing, article 264m of its Criminal Code.
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national (passive nationality principle — Article 2 of the International Crimes Act);
the crime against humanity has been committed outside the Netherlands against a
Dutch resident, under the condition of double criminality”. 339 French law allows for
the exercise “de la compétence pénale passive lorsque la victime est française au
moment de l’infraction (Article L 1137 du Code pénal: ‘La loi pénale française est
applicable à tout crime, ainsi qu’à tout délit puni d’emprisonnement, commis par un
Français ou par un étranger hors du territoire de la République lorsque la victime
est de nationalité française au moment de l’infraction’)” 340 (of passive criminal
jurisdiction when the victim is French at the time of the offense (Article L 1137 of
the Criminal Code: ‘French criminal law is applicable to any crime, as well as any
offense punishable by imprisonment, committed by a French person or a foreigner
outside the territory of the Republic when the victim is of French nati onality at the
time of the offense’) Finally, the Republic of Korea has established jurisdiction over
“any foreigner who commits a crime provided for in this Act against the Republic of
Korea or its people outside the territory of the Republic of Korea ”. 341
107. Given the uneven State practice with respect to this jurisdiction, its
establishment is usually not compelled in treaties addressing crimes; rather, this
type of jurisdiction is identified as an option that any given State party may or may
not exercise. 342 Such an approach reflects a desire for establishing as much
jurisdiction as possible to promote the punishment of offenders, while at the same
time preserving and respecting State sovereignty and discretion when responding to
harms inflicted on that State’s nationals. 343
108. Neither the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide nor the Geneva Conventions for the protection of war victims obligate
States parties to establish “passive personality” jurisdiction, but such jurisdiction is
identified as an option in many treaties addressing crimes, including the Convention
on the suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft (art. 4, para. 1(a)), as amended by
the protocol supplementary to the Convention for the suppression of unlawful
seizure of aircraft; 344 the International Convention against the taking of hostages
(art. 5, para. 1(d)); the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (art. 5, para. 1( c)); the Inter-American
Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture (art. 12(c)); the Convention on the Safety
of United Nations and Associated Personnel (art. 10, para. 2(b)); the Inter-American
Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons (art. IV, para. (c)); the
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (art. 6,
para. 2(a)); the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism (art. 7, para. 2(a)); the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating
of Terrorism, 1999 (art. 6, para. (2)(a)); the United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime (art. 15, para. 2(a)); the International Convention for
__________________
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the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (art. 9, para. 1(c)); and the
ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism (art. VII, para. 2(a)).

4.

WHEN THE ALLEGED OFFENDER IS PRESENT IN THE S TATE’ S TERRITORY

109. National law may also establish jurisdiction over crimes committed outside
the State’s territory based solely on the presence of the alleged offender within that
territory. As noted above, such jurisdiction is irrespective of nationality, and
therefore includes persons who are non-nationals (whether or not resident in the
State) as well as stateless persons. With respect to crimes against humanity, the
ninth edition of Oppenheim’s International Law (published in 1992) found that:
While no general rule of positive international law can as yet be asserted which gives to states the
right to punish foreign nationals for crimes against humanity in the same way as they are, for
instance, entitled to punish acts of piracy, there are clear indications pointing to the gradual
evolution of a significant principle of international law to that effect. 345

110. Of those States that responded to the Commission’s request for information
about their national laws on crimes against humanity, many indicated that they
provide for such jurisdiction within their national law. 346 Austria, for example, has
jurisdiction over “a foreigner who has his habitual residence on the territory of
Austria or is present in Austria and cannot be extradited ”. 347 Finnish law also
“applies to an offence committed outside of Finland where the punishability of the
act, regardless of the place of commission, is based on an international agreement
binding on Finland or on another statute or regulation internationally binding on
Finland (international offence). Crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide
are included in such offences.” 348 French law “est également applicable à tout crime
ou à tout délit puni d’au moins cinq ans d’emprisonnement commis hors du
territoire de la République par un étranger dont l’extradition ou la remise a été
refusée à l’État requérant par les autorités françaises” 349 (is also applicable to any
felony or any offense punishable by at least five years’ imprisonment committed
outside the territory of the Republic by a foreigner whose extradition or surrender
has been denied to the requesting State by the French authorities). Finally, the
Republic of Korea also applies jurisdiction “to any foreigner who commits the crime
of genocide, etc. outside the territory of the Republic of Korea and resides in the
territory of the Republic of Korea”. 350 Other States allow for such jurisdiction as
well in the context of crimes against humanity, often under the influence of their
adherence to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, such as Kenya,
Mauritius, South Africa and Uganda. 351 In 2012, the African Union adopted a model
__________________
345

Jennings and Watts, p. 998.
In addition to those discussed here, see Written comments to the International Law Commission
(2015), Cuba, citing article 5, paragraph 3 of its Criminal Code; ibid., the Czech Republic; ibid.,
Germany, citing section 153f, paragraph 2 of its Criminal Code; ibid., Spain; ibid., Switzerland;
and ibid., the United Kingdom.
347
Ibid., Austria.
348
Ibid., Finland.
349
Ibid., France.
350
Ibid., Republic of Korea, citing article 3, paragraph (5), of its Criminal Code.
351
See the Kenya International Criminal Courts Act, 2008, section 18(c) (2008) (providing that
“[a] person who is alleged to have committed an offence under any of sections 9 to 17 of the Act
may be tried and punished in Kenya for that offence if … the person is, after commission of the
offence, present in Kenya”); the Mauritius International Criminal Court Act 2011, Act No. 27 of
2011, section 4, paragraph (3)(c) (providing that “[w]here a person commits an international crime
outside Mauritius, he shall be deemed to have committed the crime in Mauritius if he —... (c) is
present in Mauritius after the commission of the crime”); the South Africa Implementation of the
346
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law for use by African States that, inter alia, provides for jurisdiction to prosecute
for crimes against humanity based solely on the presence of the alleged offender
“within the territory of the State”. 352
111. Favouring the establishment of such jurisdiction, even in the absence of a
treaty, is the argument that doing so furthers the interests of the international
community in deterring and punishing international crimes. 353 Even so, often such
jurisdiction appears to be established pursuant to a treaty obligation. While the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide did not
envisage such jurisdiction, the Geneva Conventions for the protection of war victims
provide that:
Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons alleged to have
committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring such persons,
regardless of their nationality, before its own courts. It may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with
the provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons over for trial to another High Contracting
Party concerned, provided such High Contracting Party has made out a prima facie case. 354

The Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to
the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I) incorporates this
provision by reference (art. 85, para. 1). According to Pictet’s Commentary on the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, the obligation set forth in the first sentence
requires States parties to search for offenders who may be on their territory, 355 not
__________________

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act 27 of 2002, section 4, paragraph (3)(c)
(providing that “[i]n order to secure the jurisdiction of a South African court for purposes of this
Chapter, any person who commits a crime contemplated in subsection (1) outside the territory of the
Republic, is deemed to have committed that crime in the territory of the Republic if ... ( c) that
person, after the commission of the crime, is present in the territory of the Republic”); and the
Uganda International Criminal Court Act, 2010, section 18(d) (similarly allowing proceedings
against a person for crimes committed outside the territory of Uganda if that “person is, after the
commission of the offence, present in Uganda”).
352
See African Union Model National Law on Universal Jurisdiction over International Crimes,
document EX.CL/731(XXI)c, articles 4a) and 8, adopted by the African Union Executive Council
at its Twenty-First Ordinary Session, in Addis Ababa, (9–13 July 2012). Article 4a) states in full:
“The Court shall have jurisdiction to try any person alleged to have committed any crime under
this law, regardless of whether such a crime is alleged to have been committed in the territory of
the State or abroad and irrespective of the nationality of the victim, provided that such a person
shall be within the territory of the State.”
353
See Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija (footnote 128 above), paragraph 156: “it would seem that
one of the consequences of the jus cogens character bestowed by the international community
upon the prohibition of torture is that every State is entitled to investigate, prosecute and punish
or extradite individuals accused of torture, who are present in a territory under its jurisdiction. ...
It has been held that international crimes being universally condemned wherever they occur,
every State has the right to prosecute and punish the authors of such crimes.” See als o
Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction
of 10 August 1995, International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber, para. 42
(noting that the crimes within the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia “are not crimes of a purely domestic nature” but “are really crimes which are
universal in nature, well recognized in international law as serious breaches of international
humanitarian law, and transcending the interest of any one State”); and Ingelse, pp. 320–321.
354
See the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, art. 49; the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, art. 50; the
Geneva Convention Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 129; and the
Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 146.
See also ICRC, Customary IHL Database, “Practice relating to Rule 157. Jurisdiction over war
crimes”, available from www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule157.
355
See Pictet, pp. 365–366.
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offenders worldwide. Further, as may be seen in the second sentence, this type of
jurisdiction is typically linked with a statement that the State’s obligation to exercise
such jurisdiction may be satisfied by extraditing the person to another State party.
112. Numerous more recent conventions obligate States parties to establish such
jurisdiction with respect to the crimes that they address, including the Convention on
the suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft (art. 4); the Convention for the
suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation (art. 5, para. 2); the
Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally
protected persons, including diplomatic agents (art. 3, para. 2); the International
Convention against the taking of hostages (art. 5, para. 2); the Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (art. 5,
para. 2); the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture (art. 12); the
Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel (art 10,
para. 4); the Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons
(art. IV); the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings
(art. 6, para. 4); the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism (art. 7, para. 4); the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of
Terrorism, 1999 (art. 6, para. 4); the United Nations Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime (art. 15, para. 4); the International Convention for the Protection of
All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (art. 9, para. 2); and the ASEAN
Convention on Counter Terrorism (art. VII, para. 3).
113. A well-known example of the exercise of such jurisdiction under a treaty is
the Pinochet case, where the House of Lords of the United Kingdom found that by
virtue of ratifying the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, “there is an obligation on a state to extradite or
prosecute where a person accused of torture is found within its territory”. 356 Yet
other examples of the exercise of such treaty-based jurisdiction may be found in
various States and regions. 357 Sometimes such jurisdiction is referred to as
“universal jurisdiction”, but some question the use of that term in this particular
context, given the existence of a treaty and of a requirement under the treaty for the
presence of the alleged offender in the territory of the State party. 358
__________________
356

Regina v. Bartle and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and Others (Appellants)
ex parte Pinochet (Respondent) (on appeal from a Divisional Court of the Queen’s Bench
Division) and Regina v. Evans and Another and the Commissioner of the Police for the
Metropolis and Others (Appellants) ex parte Pinochet (Respondent) (on appeal from a
Divisional Court of the Queen’s Bench Division), Opinion of the Lords of Appeal for Judgment
in the Case, Opinion of Lord Llod of Berwick, p. 28. For views of the Committee against
Torture, see Conclusions and recommendations of the Committee against Torture, Yugoslavia
(CAT/C/SR.354), para. 39 (asserting that “article 5, paragraph 2 ... required States parties to
take such measures as were necessary to establish jurisdiction over the offences referred to in
article 4 in cases where the alleged offender was present in any territory un der its jurisdiction
and it had decided not to extradite him to another State”); and Conclusions and
recommendations of the Committee against Torture, France (CAT/C/FRA/CO/3 and Add.1),
para. 13 (asserting “that the State party should remain committed to prosecuting and trying
alleged perpetrators of acts of torture who are present in any territory under its jurisdiction,
regardless of their nationality”).
357
See for example, Council of the European Union, The AU-EU Expert Report on the Principle
of Universal Jurisdiction, document 8672/1/09 REV 1 of 16 April 2009, available from
www.africa-eu-partnership.org/en/documents/au-eu-expert-report-principle-universaljurisdiction. See also Macedo; and Reydams.
358
Thus, in their joint separate opinion in the Arrest Warrant case, Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and
Buergenthal referred to the “inaccurately termed ‘universal jurisdiction’ principle in these
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114. At the same time, treaties such as the Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment do not obligate States
parties to establish jurisdiction over the alleged offender if he or she is not present
in the State’s territory. Consequently, national courts are often careful to limit their
jurisdiction when implementing such treaties to situations where the alleged
offender is present. For example, in the Bouterse case, the Supreme Court of the
Netherlands made clear that the exercise of jurisdiction (pursuant to the Netherlands
Torture Convention Implementation Act) over a person alleged to have committed
the crime of torture must be based upon either a Dutch nationality associated with
the proceedings or on the presence of the alleged offender within the Netherla nds at
the time the prosecution is initiated. 359 As such, the Court rejected exercising
jurisdiction over a defendant in absentia because there was no direct link with the
Dutch legal order, the defendant (Bouterse) was in Suriname and none of the alleged
victims were Dutch nationals. 360 Reflecting on such practice, President Guillaume,
in his separate opinion in the Arrest Warrant case, concluded that none of the
relevant treaties “has contemplated establishing jurisdiction over offences
committed abroad by foreigners against foreigners when the perpetrator is not
present in the territory of the State in question”. 361
115. Further, such treaties normally do not seek to resolve the question of whether
any particular State party should have primacy in the event th at multiple States have
national jurisdiction over the criminal offence and wish to exercise such
jurisdiction. 362 While some bilateral and regional agreements have sought to address
the matter, the issue is complicated in part due to the existence of ground s for
refusing to extradite, including with respect to obligations of non-refoulement. 363
Rather, such matters often are often resolved though comity and cooperation among
the States parties, taking into account the location of the evidence, witnesses,
victims and other relevant matters. 364 As a practical matter, the State party in whose

__________________

treaties” (Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (see footnote 302 above), Separate Opinion of Judges
Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal, p. 75, para. 44). Rather, they indicated that such
jurisdiction was better characterized as “an obligatory territorial jurisdiction over persons, albeit
in relation to acts committed elsewhere” (ibid., pp. 74–75, para. 41).
359
Prosecutor-General of the Supreme Court v. Desiré Bouterse, Case No. LJN: AB1471,
Judgment of 18 September 2001, Supreme Court of the Netherlands, paras. 8.2–8.3.5.
360
Ibid., para. 8.5.
361
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (see footnote 302 above), Separate Opinion of President
Guillaume, pp. 39–40, para. 9. See also ibid., Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans
and Buergenthal, p. 75, para. 44 (finding that “a dispassionate analysis of State practice and
Court decisions suggests that no [universal jurisdiction without a territorial nexus] is pr esently
being exercised”); and ibid., p. 76, para. 45 (finding that “virtually all national legislation
envisages links of some sort to the forum State” and that “no case law exists in which pure
universal jurisdiction has formed the basis of jurisdiction” ).
362
See, for example, The AU-EU Expert Report on the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction
(footnote 357 above), para. 14 (“Positive international law recognises no hierarchy among the
various bases of jurisdiction that it permits”).
363
On extradition, see chapter VII on the future programme of work, below.
364
See, for example, Kumar Lama v. Regina, [2014] EWCA Crim.1729 (Court of Appeal)
(7 Aug. 2014), para. 71(3) (the High Court concluding that the “Convention against Torture
does not establish a hierarchy of possible jurisdictions or embody any principle of forum
conveniens. While it is correct that, in any given case, it may be more convenient or effective to
prosecute in one jurisdiction rather than another, for example because of the availability of
evidence, this is no more than a reflection of the circumstances of the particular case”).
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territory the alleged offender is present is well situated to proceed with a
prosecution if it is willing and able to do so. 365
116. Finally, treaties containing an obligation to establish jurisdiction whenever an
alleged offender is present invariably include a provision that provides an alternative
to the exercise of jurisdiction over any particular alleged offender. Most treaties
addressing crimes contemplate the alternative of the State extraditing the alleged
offender to another State party. Having pre-dated the establishment of contemporary
international criminal courts and tribunals, most of these treaties do not expressly
contemplate the alternative of surrendering the alleged offender to an international
court or tribunal. Recent treaties, however, do expressly recognize this possibility. For
example, the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance expresses this type of jurisdiction as follows in article 9, paragraph 2:
Each State party shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary to establish its
competence to exercise jurisdiction over the offence of enforced disappearance when the alleged
offender is present in any territory under its jurisdiction, unless it extradites or surrenders him or
her to another State in accordance with its international obligations or surrenders him or her to
an international criminal tribunal whose jurisdiction it has recognized . *

B.

Not excluding other national jurisdiction

117. As indicated above, article 5, paragraph 3, of the Convention against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment makes clear that,
while the Convention is obligating each State party to enact certain types of
jurisdiction, it is not excluding any other jurisdiction that is available under the
national law of that State party. 366 Indeed, to preserve the right of States parties to
establish national jurisdiction beyond the scope of the treaty, international treaties
typically leave open the possibility that a State party may have other jurisdictional
grounds upon which to hold an alleged offender accountable. 367 In their joint
separate opinion to the Arrest Warrant case, Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and
Buergenthal cited inter alia to article 5, paragraph 3, and stated:
We reject the suggestion that the battle against impunity is “made over” to international treaties
and tribunals, with national courts having no competence in such matters. Great car e has been
taken when formulating the relevant treaty provisions not to exclude other grounds of jurisdiction
that may be exercised on a voluntary basis. 368

118. Numerous international and regional instruments contain such a provision,
including the Convention on the suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft (art. 4);
the Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation
(art. 5, para. 3); the Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against
internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents (art. 3); the
International Convention against the taking of hostages (art. 5, para. 3); the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (art. 5, para. 3); the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish
Torture (art. 12); the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated
__________________
365

At least one writer has argued that “States must take account of a wish to exercise jurisdiction
by States which have a stronger claim to exercise jurisdiction” (Ingel se, p. 326).
366
For analysis, see Burgers and Danelius, p. 133.
367
Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of a Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime,
Revised draft United Nations Convention against Transnational Crime ( A/AC.254/4/Rev.4),
p. 20, footnote 102. See also Lambert.
368
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (see footnote 302 above), Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins,
Kooijmans and Buergenthal, pp. 78–79, para. 51.
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Personnel (art. 10, para. 5); the Inter-American Convention on the Forced
Disappearance of Persons (art. X); the International Convention for the Suppression of
Terrorist Bombings (art. 6, para. 5); the International Convention for the Suppression
of the Financing of Terrorism (art. 7, para. 6); the United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime (art. 15, para. 6); the International Convention for the
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (art. 9, para. 3); and the
ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism (art. VII, para. 4).
119. One concern in formulating a clause that preserves the ability of a State party
to establish or maintain other forms of national jurisdiction is to avoid any
implication that the treaty is authorizing such other national jurisdiction, or that
such jurisdiction need not conform with applicable rules of international law. For
that reason, for example, the International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism contains a clause in its article on jurisdiction that reads as
follows: “Without prejudice to the norms of general international law, this
Convention does not exclude the exercise of any criminal jurisdiction established by
a State party in accordance with its domestic law.” 369

C.

Draft article 6. Establishment of national jurisdiction

120. Bearing these considerations in mind, the Special Rapporteur proposes the
following draft article:

Draft article 6.

Establishment of national jurisdiction

1.
Each State shall take the necessary measures to establish its jurisdiction
over the offences referred to in draft article 5, paragraphs 1 and 2, when:
(a) the offence is committed in any territory under its jurisdiction or control
or on board a ship or aircraft registered in that State;
(b)

the alleged offender is one of its nationals; and

(c)

the victim is one of its nationals and the State considers it appropriate.

2.
Each State shall also take the necessary measures to establish its
jurisdiction over the offences referred to in draft article 5, paragraphs 1 and 2, when
the alleged offender is present in any territory under its jurisdiction or control,
unless it extradites or surrenders the person in accordance with draft article 9,
paragraph 1.
3.
Without prejudice to applicable rules of international law, this draft
article does not exclude the establishment of other criminal jurisdiction by a State in
accordance with its national law.

__________________
369
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Art. 7, para. 6. See also the United Nations Convention against Corruption, art. 42, para. 6
(“Without prejudice to norms of general international law, this Convention shall not exclude the
exercise of any criminal jurisdiction established by a State party in accordance with its
domestic law”).
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CHAPTER III

General investigation and cooperation for identifying
alleged offenders
121. When a situation arises where crimes against humanity may have occurred in
territory under the jurisdiction or control of a State, there is value in having that State
conduct a general investigation into whether such crimes have occurred or are
occurring. Such a general investigation into a possible situation of crime s against
humanity (addressed in this chapter) should be contrasted with more the specific
investigation into whether a particular person committed crimes against humanity
(addressed below in chapter IV). This more general investigation allows the State to
determine, as a general matter, whether crimes against humanity have been or are
occurring, which may allow the State to take immediate measures to prevent further
occurrence, as well as help to establish a general basis for more specific investigations
of alleged offenders by that State or States to which those alleged offenders may flee.
122. The idea of conducting an investigation of crimes against humanity where
they are committed, as a prelude to prosecution of alleged offenders, has featured in
various international instruments. For example, in 1973, the General Assembly of
the United Nations adopted the Principles of international co-operation in the
detection, arrest, extradition, and punishment of persons guilty of war crimes and
crimes against humanity, which provide that “crimes against humanity, wherever
they are committed, shall be subject to investigation and the persons against whom
there is evidence that they have committed such crimes shall be subject to tracing,
arrest, trial and, if found guilty, to punishment”. 370 Several earlier General Assembly
resolutions also recognized the importance of investigating crimes against humanity
and called on States to take necessary measures in this regard. 371
123. This expectation of a State investigating crimes that are thought to have
occurred within its territory has featured in numerous treaties, which obligate the
State party to investigate whenever there is a reasonable ground to believe that
offences covered by the treaty have been committed. 372 For example, article 12 of
__________________
370

General Assembly resolution 3074 (XXVIII) of 3 December 1973, para. 1.
See, for example, General Assembly resolution 2583 (XXIV) of 15 December 1969, preamble and
paragraph 1 (“Convinced that the thorough investigation of war crimes and crimes against humanity
... constitute[s] an important element in the prevention of such crimes, the protection of human
rights and fundamental freedoms, the encouragement of confidence, the furtherance of co-operation
among peoples and the promotion of international peace and security ... 1. Calls upon all the States
concerned to take the necessary measures for the thorough investigation of war crimes and crimes
against humanity”); General Assembly resolution 2712 (XXV) of 15 December 1970, preamble and
para. 5 (“Convinced that a thorough investigation of war crimes and crimes against humanity, as
well as the arrest, extradition and punishment of persons guilty of such crimes—wherever they may
have been committed— ... are important elements in the prevention of similar crimes now and in the
future ... 5. Once again requests the States concerned, if they have not already done so, to take the
necessary measures for the thorough investigation of war crimes and crimes against humanity”); and
General Assembly resolution 2840 (XXVI) of 18 December 1971, preamble (“Firmly convinced of
the need for international co-operation in the thorough investigation of war crimes and crimes
against humanity”).
372
The Geneva Conventions for the protection of war victims contain a variation on this idea of a
general investigation, albeit one focused more on identifying specific offenders. Those
Conventions oblige States generally to “search for persons alleged to have committed” gra ve
breaches of the Conventions. See the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition
of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, art. 49 (“Each High Contracting Party
371
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the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment provides that “[e]ach State party shall ensure that its competent
authorities proceed to a prompt and impartial investigation, wherever there is
reasonable ground to believe that an act of torture has been committed in any
territory under its jurisdiction”. That general obligation is different from the State ’s
obligation under article 6, paragraph 2, of the Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment to undertake a specific
inquiry or investigation of the facts concerning a particular alleged offender
(addressed in chapter IV of this report). Further, this general “obligation to
investigate is not triggered by the fact that a suspected [perpetrator] is on the
territory of a State party, but by the suspicion of the competent authorities of a State
party that [a relevant] act might have been committed in any territory under its
jurisdiction”. 373 Hence, this investigation differs because it “must take place
irrespective of whether the suspect is known or present”. 374
124. Comparable obligations to conduct a general investigation, formulated in
various ways, may be found in the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and
Punish Torture (“if there is an accusation or well-grounded reason to believe that an
act of torture has been committed within their jurisdiction, the States Parties shall
guarantee that their respective authorities will proceed properly and imm ediately to
conduct an investigation into the case and to initiate, whenever appropriate, the
corresponding criminal process” (art. 8)); the International Convention for the
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance ( “Where there are
reasonable grounds for believing that a person has been subjected to enforced
disappearance, the [competent authorities] shall undertake an investigation, even if
there has been no formal complaint” (art. 12, para. 2)); and the 2011 Council of
Europe convention on preventing and combating violence against women and
domestic violence (“Parties shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to
ensure that investigations and judicial proceedings in relation to all forms of
violence covered by the scope of this Convention are carried out without undue
delay while taking into consideration the rights of the victim during all stages of the
criminal proceedings”). 375
125. This obligation to conduct a general investigation is addressed only to the
State in which offences may have occurred; it is not addressed to other States. In the
context of crimes against humanity, the State with jurisdiction or control over the
territory in which the crime appears to have occurred is best situated to conduct
such an initial investigation, so as to determine whether a crime in fact has occurred
and, if so, whether governmental forces under its control committed the crime,
whether forces under the control of another State did so, or whether it was
__________________

shall be under the obligation to search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered
to be committed, such grave breaches”); the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, art. 50 (same);
the Geneva Convention Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 129
(same); and the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, art. 146 (same).
373
Nowak and McArthur, p. 414.
374
Ingelse, p. 335.
375
Art. 49, para. 1. See also article 55, paragraph 1 (“Parties shall ensure that investigations into or
prosecution of offences established in accordance with Articles 35, 36, 37, 38 and 39 of this
Convention shall not be wholly dependent upon a report or complaint filed by a victim if the
offence was committed in whole or in part on its territory, and that the proceedings may
continue even if the victim withdraws her or his statement or complaint ”).
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committed by a non-State organization. Such an investigation can lay the foundation
not only for pursuing alleged offenders, but also for helping to prevent recurrence of
such crimes by identifying their source.
126. Such an obligation typically requires that the investigation be carried out
whenever there is reason to believe or a reasonable ground to believe that the
offence has been committed. 376 Indeed, since it is likely that “the more systematic
the practice of torture becomes in a given country, the smaller the number of official
torture complaints”, a violation of article 12 of the Convention against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment is possible even if the
State has received no complaints from individuals. 377 Likewise, the Committee
against Torture maintains that State authorities must “proceed automatically” to an
investigation whenever there are reasonable grounds to believe that an act of torture
or ill-treatment has been committed, with “no special importance being attached to
the grounds for suspicion”. 378
127. The Committee against Torture has also found violations of article 12 if the
State’s investigation is not “prompt and impartial”.379 The requirement of promptness
means that as soon as there is suspicion of a crime having been committed,
investigations should be initiated immediately or without any delay. 380 In most cases
where the Committee found a lack of promptness, no investigation had been carried
out at all or had only been commenced after a long period of time had passed. For
example, the Committee considered “that a delay of 15 months before an investigation
of allegations of torture is initiated, is unreasonably long and not in compliance with
the requirement of article 12 of the Convention”.381 The rationales underlying the
promptness requirement are that physical traces that may prove torture can quickly
disappear, and that complaining victims may be in danger of further torture, which a
prompt investigation may be able to prevent. 382
128. The requirement of impartiality generally means that States must proceed
with their investigations in a serious, effective and unbiased manner. 383 This
requirement is essential, as “any investigation which proceeds from the assumption
that no such acts have occurred, or in which there is a desire to protect suspected
__________________
376

See Blanco Abad v. Spain, Communication No. 59/1996, Views of the Committee against
Torture (CAT/C/20/D/59/1996), para. 8.2. See also Dimitrijevic v. Serbia and Montenegro,
Communication No. 172/2000, Selected Decisions of the Committee against Torture, vol. I,
Eleventh to Thirty-Eighth Sessions (November 1993–May 2007), United Nations publication
(Sales No. E.08.XIV.8), pp. 89–92, at p. 92, para. 7.3.
377
Nowak, p. 246.
378
Dhaou Belgacem Thabti v. Tunisia, Communication No. 187/2001, Views of the Committee against
Torture (CAT/C/31/D/187/2001), para.10.4. See also Blanco Abad v. Spain (footnote 376 above),
paras. 8.2–8.6.
379
See, for example, Committee against Torture, Bairamov v. Kazakhstan, Communication
No. 497/2012, Views of the Committee against Torture (CAT/C/52/D/497/2012), paras. 8.7–8.8.
380
Nowak and McArthur, p. 434.
381
Committee against Torture, Halimi-Nedzibi v. Austria, Communication No. 8/1991, Selected
Decisions of the Committee against Torture, vol. I, Eleventh to Thirty -Eighth Sessions
(November 1993–May 2007), United Nations publication (Sales No. E.08.XIV.8), p. 15,
para. 13.5.
382
Blanco Abad v. Spain (see footnote 376 above), para. 8.2 (“The Committee observes that
promptness is essential both to ensure that the victim cannot continue to be subjected to such acts
and because in general, unless the methods employed have permanent or serious effects, the
physical traces of torture, and especially of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, soon disappear”).
See Burgers and Danelius, pp. 144–145.
383
Nowak and McArthur, p. 435.
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officials, cannot be considered effective”. 384 In some instances, the Committee
against Torture has recommended that investigation of offences be “under the direct
supervision of independent members of the judiciary”.385 In other instances, it has
stated that “[a]ll government bodies not authorized to conduct investigations into
criminal matters should be strictly prohibited from doing so ”. 386 The Committee has
stated that an impartial investigation gives equal weight to assertions that the
offence did or did not occur, and then pursues appropriate avenues of inquiry, such
as checking available government records, examining relevant government officials
or ordering exhumation of bodies. 387
129. Some treaties that do not expressly contain such an obligatio n to investigate
have nevertheless been read as implicitly containing one. For example, although the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights contains no such express
obligation, the Human Rights Committee has repeatedly asserted that States mu st
investigate, in good faith, violations to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. 388 Among other things, the Committee has said:
Administrative mechanisms are particularly required to give effect to the general obligation to
investigate allegations of violations promptly, thoroughly and effectively through independent and
impartial bodies. ... A failure by a State party to investigate allegations of violations could in and
of itself give rise to a separate breach of the Covenant. 389

130. Several regional bodies have also interpreted their legal instruments to
contain a duty to conduct a general investigation even when they do not explicitly
feature one. For the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights), this concept
arose in order to deal effectively with extraordinary circumstances in certain regions
of Turkey, involving cases of ill-treatment, disappearances and the destruction of a
village. 390 In these instances, “the Court has relied upon the evidence of a lack of
__________________
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Burgers and Danelius, p. 145.
Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under article 19 of the Convention –
Ecuador, Report of the Committee against Torture, Official Records of the General Assembly,
Forty-Ninth Session, Supplement No. 44 (A/49/44), p. 17, para. 105.
386
Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under article 19 of the Convention –
Guatemala, Report of the Committee against Torture, Official Records of the General Assembly,
Fifty-Sixth Session, Supplement No. 44 (A/56/44), p. 34, para. 76(d).
387
M’Barek v. Tunisia, Communication No. 60/1996, Views of the Committee against Torture
(CAT/C/23/D/60/1996), paras. 11.9–11.10. See also Nowak and McArthur, p. 435.
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See, for example, Shukurova v. Tajikistan, Communication No. 1044/2002, Views of the Human Rights
Committee (CCPR/C/86/D/1044/2002), para. 8.2; Kouidis v. Greece, Communication No. 1070/2002,
Views of the Human Rights Committee (CCPR/C/86/D/1070/2002), para. 9; Agabekova v. Uzbekistan,
Communication No. 1071/2002, Views of the Human Rights Committee (CCPR/C/89/D/1071/2002),
para. 7.2; and Karimov and Nursatov v. Tajikistan, Communications Nos. 1108/2002 and 1121/2002,
Views of the Human Rights Committee (CCPR/C/89/D/1108&1121/2002), para. 7.2.
389
Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31 on the nature of the general legal
obligation on States parties to the Covenant (CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13), para. 15.
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Crawford, p. 667 (citing the European Court of Human Rights cases of Aksoy v. Turkey,
Application no. 21987/93, Judgment on Merits and Just Satisfaction of 18 December 1996,
European Court of Human Rights; Timurtaş v. Turkey, Application no. 23531/94, Report of the
Commission adopted on 19 October 1998, European Commission of Human Rights; Kurt v.
Turkey, Application no. 24276/94, Judgment on Merits and Just Satisfaction of 25 May 1998,
European Court of Human Rights; Çakici v. Turkey, Application no. 23657/94, Judgment of
8 July 1999, European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber; Menteş and Others v. Turkey,
Application no. 23186/94, Judgment on Merits and Just Satisfaction of 28 November 1997,
European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber; Ergi v. Turkey, Application no. 23818/94,
Judgment on Merits and Just Satisfaction of 28 July 1998, European Court of Human Rights;
and Kaya v. Turkey, Application no. 22729/93, Judgment on Merits and Just Satisfaction of
19 February 1998, European Court of Human Rights.
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effective investigation, or of any investigation, by the authorities, as evidence of
violations of Article 2 (the right to life), Article 3 (prohibition on torture), Article 5
(the right to liberty and security of person), ... Article 8 (the right to home and
family life) ... [and] Article 13 (the right to an effective remedy)”. 391 For example, in
the case of Ergi v. Turkey, the Court found that the Convention implicitly imposes
such a duty so as to ensure that an “effective, independent investigation is
conducted” into any deaths alleged to be a result of use of force by agents of the
State. 392 The Court reasoned that this requirement is implicit in the “right to life”
provision of article 2 of the Convention, when read in conjunction with the general
duty under article 1 to “secure to everyone within [its] jurisdiction the rights and
freedoms defined in [the] Convention”. 393 In part because of “the lack of an
adequate and effective investigation”, the Court found a violation of article 2 of the
Convention. 394 The more recent case of Bati and Others v. Turkey confirmed that an
investigation must be undertaken if there are sufficiently clear indications that the
relevant crime has been committed, even if no complaint has been made. 395 The
Inter-American Court of Human Rights has applied a similar concept. 396

Draft article 7. General investigation and cooperation for identifying
alleged offenders
131. Bearing these considerations in mind, the Special Rapporteur proposes the
following draft article:

Draft article 7.

General investigation and cooperation for identifying
alleged offenders

1.
Each State shall ensure that its competent authorities proceed to a prompt
and impartial investigation whenever there is reason to believe that a crime against
humanity has been or is being committed in any territory under its jurisdiction or
control.
2.
If the State determines that a crime against humanity is or has been
committed, the State shall communicate, as appropriate, the general fi ndings of that
investigation to any other State whenever there is reason to believe that nationals of
the other State have been or are involved in the crime. Thereafter, that other State
shall promptly and impartially investigate the matter.
3.
All States shall cooperate, as appropriate, to establish the identity and
location of persons who may have committed an offence referred to in draft
article 5, paragraphs 1 or 2.

__________________
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CHAPTER IV

Exercise of national jurisdiction when an alleged offender
is present
132. Once a crime of international concern occurs and one or more States
generally investigate the matter, a State may then obtain or receive information that
an alleged offender is present in the State’s territory. When this happens, the State
usually will conduct a preliminary investigation for the purpose of determining
whether to submit the matter to prosecution or to extradite or surrender the alleged
offender to other competent authorities. Further, the State may take the alleged
offender into custody (or pursue other measures) to ensure the continued presence of
the alleged offender. Other States, or perhaps an international tribunal, interested in
prosecuting the alleged offender may request extradition or surrender.
133. Both the General Assembly and the Security Council of the United Nations
have recognized the importance of such measures in the context of crimes against
humanity. Thus, the General Assembly has called upon “all States concerned to take
the necessary measures for the thorough investigation of ... crimes against
humanity ... and for the detection, arrest, extradition and punishment of all
persons ... guilty of crimes against humanity who have not yet been brought to trial
or punished”. 397 Similarly, it has asserted that “refusal by States to co-operate in
arrest, extradition, trial and punishment of persons guilty of ... crimes against
humanity is contrary to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United
Nations and to generally recognized norms of international law”. 398 The Security
Council has emphasized “the responsibility of States to comply with their relevant
obligations to end impunity and to thoroughly investigate and prosecute persons
responsible for ... crimes against humanity or other serious violations of
international humanitarian law in order to prevent violations, avoid their recurrence
and seek sustainable peace, justice, truth and reconciliation”. 399
134. Treaties addressing crimes typically set forth rights and obligations relating
to the investigation and possible detention of an alleged offender when the person is
present in the territory of a State party. For example, article 10 of the International
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, which
is derived from the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment “with some simplifications”, 400 provides in
paragraphs 1 and 2 that, upon reviewing information made available to it concerning
an alleged offender, a State party shall conduct a preliminary investigation, shall
(if necessary) take the alleged offender into custody, and shall notify other relevant
States as to the measures it has taken and whether it intends to exercise its
jurisdiction in the matter. Reviewing such a provision in the context of the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or

__________________
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Punishment, 401 the ICJ has explained that their purpose is “to enable proceedings to
be brought against the suspect, in the absence of his extradition, and to achieve the
objective and purpose of the Convention, which is to make more effective the
struggle against torture by avoiding impunity for the perpetrators of such acts ”. 402

135. Such an approach when an alleged offender is present is viewed as
foundational to making any such treaty effective and has not been controversial
when treaties of this kind are drafted. 403 The following discussion focuses on the
three main elements of a treaty provision on this issue: the obligations to conduct
a preliminary investigation; to ensure continuing presence of the alleged offender;
and to notify other States with an interest in the alleged offender. A fourth
element sometimes present in such articles — a right for a non-national alleged
offender to communicate with his or her consular officer — is addressed in
chapter VI with respect to “fair treatment of an alleged offender.”
A.

Conducting a preliminary investigation

136. Once a State obtains or receives information that an alleged offender is present
in territory under the State’s jurisdiction or control, a common step is to conduct a
preliminary investigation of the matter. If the information is received from another
State or some other source, then the preliminary investigation may include confirming
the identity and location of the person. In any event, such a preliminary investigation
will allow the State to establish the facts relevant for deciding whether the matter is to
be submitted to prosecution within that State, or whether the alleged offender is to be
extradited or surrendered to other competent authorities.
137. This preliminary investigation should be contrasted with the more general
investigation addressed in chapter IV of this report. That investigation seeks to
determine, at a general level, whether a crime against humanity has occurred or is
occurring and, if so, who the offenders may be and where they may be located.
Here, in light of having determined where a particular alleged offender may be
located, the State where the alleged offender is present conducts a preliminary
investigation with respect to that specific person for the purpose of confirming his
or her identity, determining whether a prosecutable offence exists, and then deciding
whether to submit the matter to prosecution or to extradite or surrender. 404
Conducting a preliminary investigation also helps to ensure application of the
“fundamental principle of fairness and equality” to the accused by confirming that
there is a reasonable basis upon which to hold the accused for prosecution or
extradition or surrender. 405 At the same time, this preliminary investigation should
be contrasted with a full investigation that will occur as a part of an actual
__________________
401

Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal) (see
footnote 98 above), p. 450, para. 72 (“incorporating the appropriate legislation into domestic
law ... would allow the State in whose territory a suspect is present immediately to make a
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402
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prosecution, either in the State where the alleged offender is found, or in a State or
by a tribunal to whom the person is extradited or surrendered.
138. The national criminal laws of States typically provide for such preliminary
investigation to determine whether a prosecutable offence exists. Norway, for
example, provides that “[a] criminal investigation shall be carried out when as a
result of a report or other circumstances there are reasonable grounds to inquire
whether any criminal matter requiring prosecution by the public authorities
subsists”. 406 The purpose of this investigation is “to obtain the necessary
information ... for deciding whether an indictment should be preferred”, among
others. 407 Other States, such as the Russian Federation 408 and Ukraine, 409 similarly
require a preliminary investigation for all potential criminal matters.
139. While the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide and the Geneva Conventions for the protection of war victims contain no
obligation to conduct a preliminary investigation, contemporary treaties addressing
crimes typically do contain such an obligation. These treaties include the
Convention on the suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft (art. 6); the
Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation
(art. 6, para. 2); the International Convention against the taking of hostages (art. 6,
para. 1); the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (art. 6, para. 2); the Inter -American Convention to Prevent
and Punish Torture (art. 8); the International Convention for the Suppression of
Terrorist Bombings (art. 7, para. 1); the International Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (art. 9, para. 1); the OAU Convention on
the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, 1999 (art. 7, para. 1); the International
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (art. 10,
para. 2); and the ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism (art. VIII, para. 2).
140. The ICJ has emphasized the importance of such a preliminary investigation
in the context of article 6, paragraph 2, of the Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, finding that it is intended,
like any inquiry carried out by the competent authorities, to corroborate or not the
suspicions regarding the person in question. Those authorities who have the task of
drawing up a case file conduct the investigation and collect facts and evidence; “this
may consist of documents or witness statements relating to the events at issue and to
the suspect’s possible involvement in the matter concerned”.410 The Court has further
noted that “the choice of means for conducting the inquiry remains in the hands of the
States Parties”, but that “steps must be taken as soon as the suspect is identified in the
territory of the State, in order to conduct an investigation of that case”.411
__________________
406

Norway, the Criminal Procedure Act of 22 May 1981 No. 25, with subsequent amendments, the
latest made by Act of 30 June 2006 No. 53, section 224, available from www.legislationline.org/
documents/section/criminal-codes.
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Ibid., section 226.
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B.

Ensuring continuing presence

141. Taking an individual into custody who is alleged to have committed a serious
offence, pending an investigation to determine whether the matter should be
submitted to prosecution, is a common step in national criminal proceedings, in
particular to avoid further criminal acts and to avoid a risk of flight by the alleged
offender. For example, German law provides that “[r]emand detention may be
ordered against the accused if he is strongly suspected of the offence and if there is
a ground for arrest... A ground for arrest shall exist if on the basis of certain facts ...
considering the circumstances of the individual case, there is a risk that the accused
will evade the criminal proceedings (risk of flight) ”. 412 Comparable provisions exist
in many other jurisdictions, such as Norway, 413 the Russian Federation, 414
Switzerland, 415 Ukraine 416 and the United States of America. 417 Furthermore some
States, such as Germany, specifically allow for such detention when “an accused [is]
strongly suspected ... of having committed a criminal offence pursuant to ... the
Code of Crimes against International Law”. 418
142. Treaties addressing crimes typically include a provision setting forth an
obligation to ensure continuing presence of the alleged offender, if necessary by
taking him or her into custody. While the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide does not contain such a provision, the Geneva
Conventions for the protection of war victims indirectly address the matter by
obligating each State party to bring persons alleged to have committed grave
breaches “before its own courts”. 419 More contemporary treaties expressly oblige
States parties to take the alleged offender into custody or to take such other legal
measures as are necessary to ensure his or her presence. These treaties include the
Convention on the suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft (art. 6); the
Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation
(art. 6, para. 1); the Convention on the prevention and punish ment of crimes against
internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents (art. 6, para. 1); the
International Convention against the taking of hostages (art. 6, para. 1); the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Tre atment or
Punishment (art. 6, para. 1); the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and
Associated Personnel (art. 13, para. 1); the International Convention for the
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (art. 7, para. 2); the International Convention for
the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (art. 9, para. 2); the OAU Convention
on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, 1999 (art. 7, para. 2); the United
__________________
412
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Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (art. 16, para. 9); the
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance (art. 10, para. 1); and the ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism
(art. VIII, para. 3).
143. In treaties containing an obligation to ensure continuing presence, the overall
objective is to keep the alleged offender in the State party’s territory “for the time
necessary to enable extradition or criminal proceedings to commence ”. 420 The
primary option is usually “arrest and detention, i.e. police custody up to a few days
followed by pre-trial detention and/or detention pending deportation”. 421 Whether
detention is required for the entire pre-trial or deportation period will depend on the
facts of the case, including the likelihood of flight or destruction of evidence. 422 If
ongoing detention is deemed unnecessary by the State party, then some writers
maintain that the State party must take other “legal measures” to ensure the presence
of the suspect at trial. To fulfil their obligations under such treaties, “States parties
are expected to take the same measures as are provided for in their national law in
the case of any ordinary offence of a serious nature”, which may include “house
arrest, release on bail, the confiscation of travel documents, an obligation to report
regularly to the police and similar restrictions on freedom of movement”. 423
144. Of course any “action taken by a State in this regard ‘must be considered in
light of the requirement ... that there be grounds to believe that the alleged offender
has committed one or more of the crimes set forth’”. 424 While a State party has wide
latitude to assess whether taking an alleged offender into custody is necessary, it is
bound to act in good faith in the exercise of that discretion. 425 In so doing, States
should “examine ... the conditions laid down in [their] national law relating, in
particular, to the degree of suspicion required and to the existence of a danger of
flight”. 426 As long as they do not interfere with “the general obligation to extradite
or prosecute”, States parties may also consider national legal time limits relating to
detention to determine whether that detention should continue. 427 Ultimately, the
obligation is “on the State party in whose territory [the alleged offender] is found ...
to take the appropriate measures to prevent his escape pending that State’s decision
on whether he should be extradited or the case submitted to its competent authorities
for the purpose of prosecution”. 428
145. The Committee against Torture considered this obligation in the context of an
alleged offender, Ely Ould Dah, who was arrested and indicted in France in 1999, but
then released pending trial. Mr. Ould Dah fled France and was tried, convicted, and
sentenced in absentia. The Committee expressed regret “that the State party did not
take the necessary steps to keep Mr. Ould Dah in its territory and ensure his presence
__________________
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at his trial”, pursuant to its obligation under the Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. The recommendation was
“that, where the State party has established its jurisdiction over acts of torture in a
case in which the alleged perpetrator is present in any territory under its jurisdiction, it
should take the necessary steps to have the person concerned taken into custody or to
ensure his or her presence”.429

C.

Notifying other interested States

146. In the absence of a treaty relationship, there is little authority to support the
proposition that a State exercising its criminal jurisdiction is under an obligation to
notify other States that may have an interest in the proceedings (leaving aside the
consular notification obligation in chapter VI, section D, of this report). In treaties
relating to crimes, however, it is common to include a provision obligating a State
party that has taken an alleged offender into custody (or taken such other legal
measures as are necessary to ensure his or her presence) to notify other interested
States parties, meaning those States parties who also may exercise national
jurisdiction to prosecute the alleged offender (for example, based on “territorial”,
“nationality” or “passive personality” jurisdiction). Typically, such notification must
indicate the general findings of its preliminary investigation, the measures that have
been taken by the State party (such as detention of the alleged offender) and whether
the State party intends to exercise its jurisdiction to submit the matter to prosecution.
147. Although the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide and the Geneva Conventions for the protection of war victims do not
contain such a provision, more contemporary treaties do. Such treaties include the
Convention on the suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft (art. 6); the
Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation
(art. 6, para. 4); the Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against
internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents (art. 6, para. 1); the
International Convention against the taking of hostages (art. 6, paras. 2 and 6); the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (art. 6, para. 4); the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and
Associated Personnel (art 13, para. 2); the International Convention for the
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (art. 7, para. 6); the International Convention for
the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (art. 9, para. 6); the International
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (art. 10,
para. 2); and the ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism (art. VIII, para. 6).
148. Such an obligation “is of a general character” and should be “made even where
there is already a firm intention to prosecute the person concerned in the State where
he was arrested”.430 The obligation serves the important purpose of enabling other
“States to decide whether or not they wish to request extradition from the custodial
__________________
429
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State. In addition, the State whose national the alleged [perpetrator] is might be
enabled to take appropriate measures of diplomatic or consular protection”.431

D.

Draft article 8. Exercise of national jurisdiction when an alleged
offender is present

149. Bearing these considerations in mind, the Special Rapporteur proposes the
following draft article:

Draft article 8.

Exercise of national jurisdiction when an alleged offender
is present

1.
If a State obtains or receives information indicating that a person present
in territory under its jurisdiction or control may have committed an offence referred
to in draft article 5, paragraphs 1 or 2, the State shall immediately carry out a
preliminary investigation to establish the relevant facts with respect to that person.
2.
If the circumstances so warrant, the State shall take the person into
custody or take such other legal measures as are necessary to ensure his or her
presence during the investigation and at criminal, extradition or surrender
proceedings. The custody and other legal measures shall be as provided for in the
law of that State, but shall be in conformity with international law and maintained
only for such time as is reasonable.
3.
The State shall notify the States referred to in draft article 6, paragraph 1,
of the general findings of its preliminary investigation, of the circumstances
warranting any detention, and whether it intends to submit t he matter to its
competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution.

CHAPTER V

Aut dedere aut judicare
150. The “obligation to extradite or prosecute”, commonly referred to as the
principle of aut dedere aut judicare, is an obligation that calls upon a State in which
an alleged offender is present either to submit the alleged offender to prosecution
within the State’s own national system or to extradite him or her to another State
that is willing to do so within its national system. This obligation is con tained in
numerous multilateral treaties addressing crimes. 432

151. At times, the General Assembly of the United Nations has invoked the
aut dedere aut judicare principle when calling upon States to deny refuge to
offenders for different kinds of offences, often relating to terrorism. 433 Similarly,
__________________
431
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the Security Council of the United Nations has referred to the principle on many
occasions.434 In none of these instances has the subject been crimes against
humanity, although some of these resolutions have related to offences that in
certain circumstances may constitute crimes against humanity, such as enforced
disappearance or to the protection of civilians or United Nations personnel in
armed conflict. The ICJ has not addressed the customary international law status
of the principle of aut dedere aut judicare, but some of its judges have done so
in separate opinions.435
152. The Commission’s 1996 draft code of crimes against the peace and security
of mankind defined crimes against humanity in article 18 and further provided, in
article 9, that “[w]ithout prejudice to the jurisdiction of an international criminal
court, the State party in the territory of which an individual alleged to have
committed a crime set out in article 17, 18, 19 or 20 is found shall extradite or
prosecute that individual”. 436 The commentary to this provision stated in part:
(2)
Article 9 establishes the general principle that any State in whose territory an
individual alleged to have committed a crime set out in articles 17 to 20 of part two is bound to
extradite or prosecute the alleged offender. ... The fundamental purpose of this principle is to
ensure that individuals who are responsible for particularly serious crimes are brought to justice
by providing for the effective prosecution and punishment of such individuals by a competent
jurisdiction.
(3)
The obligation to prosecute or extradite is imposed on the custodial State in whose
territory an alleged offender is present. The custodial State has an obligation to take action to
ensure that such an individual is prosecuted either by the national authorities of that State or by
another State which indicates that it is willing to prosecute the case by r equesting extradition. The
custodial State is in a unique position to ensure the implementation of the Code by virtue of the
presence of the alleged offender in its territory. Therefore the custodial State has an obligation to
take the necessary and reasonable steps to apprehend an alleged offender and to ensure the
prosecution and trial of such an individual by a competent jurisdiction. The obligation to extradite
or prosecute applies to a State which has custody of “an individual alleged to have committed a
crime”. This phrase is used to refer to a person who is singled out, not on the basis of
unsubstantiated allegations, but on the basis of pertinent factual information.
(4)
The national laws of various States differ concerning the sufficiency of evidenc e
required to initiate a criminal prosecution or to grant a request for extradition. The custodial State
__________________

Secretary-General on measures to eliminate international terrorism: A/56/160 of 3 July 2001 and
A/60/228 of 12 August 2005.
434
See, for example, the following Security Council resolutions: 1267 (1999) of 15 October 1999;
1269 (1999) of 19 October 1999; 1333 (2000) of 19 December 2000; 1456 (2003) of 20 January
2003; 1502 (2003) of 26 August 2003; 1566 (2004) of 8 October 2004; 1624 (2005) of
14 September 2005; 1674 (2006) of 28 April 2006; and 1738 (2006) of 23 December 2006.
435
See Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from
the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom), Provisional
Measures, Order of 14 April 1992, I.C.J. Reports 1992, p. 3, at p. 24, para. 2 (Joint Declaration
of Judges Evensen, Tarassov, Guillaume and Aguilar Mawdsley: “in general international law
there is no obligation to prosecute in default of extradition”); p. 38, para. 12 (Dissenting
Opinion of Judge Bedjaoui: same); p. 69 (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weeramantry: “The
principle aut dedere aut judicare is an important facet of a State’s sovereignty over its nationals
and the well-established nature of this principle in customary international law is evident”) ; and
p. 82 (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Ajibola: same). For an analysis, see Bassiouni and Wise,
pp. 58–69. In the Arrest Warrant case, Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal
acknowledged the importance of the principle of aut dedere aut judicare, especially as it relates
to crimes against humanity, but did not address its status as customary international law
(Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (see footnote 302 above), Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins,
Kooijmans and Buergenthal), pp. 78–79, paras. 51–52).
436
Draft code of crimes against the peace and security of mankind (see footnote 134 above), p. 30.
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would have an obligation to prosecute an alleged offender in its territory when there was sufficient
evidence for doing so as a matter of national law unless it decided to grant a request received for
extradition. ...
(5)
Whereas the sufficiency of evidence required to institute national criminal
proceedings is governed by national law, the sufficiency of evidence required to grant an
extradition request is addressed in the various bilateral and multilateral treaties. ...
(6)
The custodial State has a choice between two alternative courses of action either of
which is intended to result in the prosecution of the alleged offender. The custodial State may
fulfil its obligation by granting a request for the extradition of an alleged offender made by any
other State or by prosecuting that individual in its national courts. Article 9 does not give priority
to either alternative course of action.
...
(8)
The introductory clause of article 9 recognizes a possible third alternative course of
action by the custodial State which would fulfil its obligation to ensure the prosecution of an
alleged offender who is found in its territory. The custodial State could transf er the alleged
offender to an international criminal court for prosecution. Article 9 does not address the cases in
which a custodial State would be permitted or required to take this course of action since this
would be determined by the statute of the future court. 437

153. In 2014, the Commission adopted the final report of its Working Group on the
obligation to extradite or prosecute (aut dedere aut judicare), which touched upon but
did not resolve whether there existed such an obligation in customary international
law, including with respect to crimes against humanity. The report stated:
(54) When the Commission adopted the draft code in 1996, the provision on the obligation
to extradite or prosecute thereunder represented progressive development of international law... .
Since the completion of the 1996 draft code, there may have been further developments in
international law that reflect State practice and opinio juris in this respect.
(55) The Commission notes that in 2012 the International Court of Justice in the case
concerning Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal) ruled
that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the claims of Belgium relating to the alleged breaches by
Senegal of obligations under customary international law because at the date of filing by Belgium of
the Application the dispute between Belgium and Senegal did not relate to breaches of obligations
under customary international law. Thus, an opportunity has yet to arise for the Court to det ermine
the customary international law status or otherwise of the obligation to extradite or prosecute . 438

154. At the same time, the Commission observed “that there are important gaps in
the present conventional regime governing the obligation to extradite or prosecute
which may need to be closed. Notably, there is a lack of international conventions
with this obligation in relation to most crimes against humanity”. 439
155. As noted at the outset of this chapter, an aut dedere aut judicare obligation is
contained in numerous multilateral treaties addressing crimes. Some of these treaties
impose an obligation upon a State party to submit the matter to prosecution only if
that State party refuses to surrender the alleged offender following a request for
extradition from another State party. 440 Other treaty provisions impose such an
__________________
437

Ibid. pp. 31–32.
Yearbook … 2014, vol. II (Part Two), para. 65 (citing the judgment in Questions relating to the
Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal) (see footnote 98 above), p. 461,
para. 120).
439
Ibid. See also Akhavan.
440
See, for example, the International Convention for the Suppression of Counterfeiting Currency,
article 9 (“The obligation to take proceedings is subject to the condition that extradition has been
requested and that the country to which application is made cannot hand over the person accused for
some reason which has no connection with the offence”). See also the Convention for the Suppression
of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs, arts. 7–8; the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment
of Terrorism, art. 9; the Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the
438

78/106

16-00720

A/CN.4/690

obligation whenever the alleged offender is present in the territory of the State party,
regardless of whether some other State party seeks extradition. 441 Under either
approach, the State party’s obligation can be satisfied by agreeing to extradition of
the alleged offender. 442
156. The latter approach is the most common in treaties and the dominant formula
for this approach derives from the (Hague) Convention on the sup pression of
unlawful seizure of aircraft, and therefore is commonly referred to as the “Hague
formula”. Article 7 of the Convention reads:
The Contracting State in the territory of which the alleged offender is found shall, if it does not
extradite him, be obliged, without exception whatsoever and whether or not the offence was
committed in its territory, to submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of
prosecution. Those authorities shall take their decision in the same manner as in the c ase of any
ordinary offence of a serious nature under the law of that State.

157. Although regularly termed the obligation to extradite or “to prosecute”, the
obligation imposed by the Convention on the suppression of unlawful seizure of
aircraft is to “to submit the case” to prosecution, meaning to submit the matter to
prosecutorial authorities who may or may not seek an indictment. If the competent
authorities determine that there is insufficient evidence of guilt, then the accused need
not be indicted, nor stand trial or face punishment. 443 The travaux préparatoires of the
Convention indicate that the formula established “the obligation of apprehension of
the alleged offender, a possibility of extradition, the obligation of reference to the
competent authority and the possibility of prosecution”.444
158. No reservations have been made to the 1970 Convention on the suppression
of unlawful seizure of aircraft that affect the provisions related to aut dedere aut
judicare. Moreover, the Hague formula is reflected in approximately three quarters
of the multilateral treaties drafted since 1970 that include an obligation to extradite
or submit to prosecution. 445 Many of these treaties replicate the Convention on the
__________________

Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, art. 9; the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961,
art. 36, para. 2(a)(iv); and the Convention on psychotropic substances, art. 22, para. 2(a)(iv).
441
See, for example, the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, art. 49; the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of
the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, art. 50; the
Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 129; and the Geneva
Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 146: “Each High
Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons alleged to have committed,
or to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless
of their nationality, before its own courts. It may also, if it prefers, and i n accordance with the
provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons over for trial to another High Contracting
Party concerned, provided such High Contracting Party has made out a prima facie case.”
Although no reservations have been made to the Geneva Conventions for the protection of war
victims concerning this aut dedere aut judicare provision, this particular formulation has received
little support in other treaties. The Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I) is the
only other multilateral convention to use this formula, which it does by renvoi (art. 85, paras. 1
and 3, and art. 88, para. 2). See the Study by the Secretariat (footnote 432 above), p. 22.
442
See ibid., para. 126. See also the judgment in Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute
or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal) (footnote 98 above), p. 422 (Separate Opinion of Judge Yusuf).
443
See the Study by the Secretariat (footnote 432 above), pp. 74–75, para. 147.
444
Statement of Chairman Gilbert Guillaume (delegate from France), ICAO [International Civil
Aviation Organization] Legal Committee, Minutes and Documents relating to the Subject of
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Doc. 8877-LC/161), para. 15, 13th meeting (3 Mar. 1970), 17th
Sess. (Montreal, 9 Feb.-11 Mar. 1970).
445
See the Study by the Secretariat (footnote 432 above), pp. 41–43, para. 108. These conventions
include (in chronological order): the Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the
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suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft verbatim or almost verbatim, with few or
modest substantive changes, while others are more loosely based on the Hague
formula. Examples include the Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts
against the safety of civil aviation; 446 the Convention on the prevention and
punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons, including
diplomatic agents; 447 the International Convention against the taking of hostages; 448
the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment; 449 the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated
Personnel; 450 the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
__________________

safety of civil aviation (1971), art. 7; the Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes
against internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents (1973), art. 7; the
International Convention against the taking of hostages (1979), art. 8; the Convention on the
physical protection of nuclear material (1979), art. 10; the Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984), art. 7; the Protocol for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation,
Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil
Aviation (1988), art. III; the Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of
maritime navigation, art. 10, para. 1; the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988), art. 6(9); the International Convention Against
the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries (1989), art. 13; the Convention on the
Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel (1994), art. 14; the Convention on combating
bribery of foreign public officials in international business transactions (1997), art. 10, para. 3;
the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (1997), art. 8; the Second
Protocol to the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict (1999), art. 1, para. 1; the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism (1999), art. 10, para. 1; the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the
Child on the Sale of Children, Child prostitution and Child Pornography (2000), art. 5(5); the United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2000), art. 16, para. 10; the United
Nations Convention against Corruption, art. 44, para. 11; the International Convention for the
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, art. 11; and the International Convention for the
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (2006), art. 11.
446
Art. 7 (“The Contracting State in the territory of which the alleged offender is found shall, if it
does not extradite him, be obliged, without exception whatsoever and whether or not the offence
was committed in its territory, to submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of
prosecution. Those authorities shall take their decision in the same manner as in the case of any
ordinary offence of a serious nature under the law of that State”).
447
Art. 7 (“The State Party in whose territory the alleged offender is present shall, if it does not
extradite him, submit, without exception whatsoever and without undue delay, the case to its
competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, through proceedings in accordance with
the laws of that State”).
448
Art. 8, para. 1 (“The State party in the territory of which the alleged offender is found shall, if it
does not extradite him, be obliged, without exception whatsoever and whether or not the offence
was committed in its territory, to submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of
prosecution, through proceedings in accordance with the laws of that State. Those authorities
shall take their decision in the same manner as in the case of any ordinary offence of a grave
nature under the law of that State”).
449
Art. 7 (“1. The State party in the territory under whose jurisdiction a person alleged to have
committed any offence referred to in article 4 is found shall in the cases contemplated in article 5,
if it does not extradite him, submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of
prosecution. 2. These authorities shall take their decision in the same manner as in the case of any
ordinary offence of a serious nature under the law of that State. In the cases referred to in
article 5, paragraph 2, the standards of evidence required for prosecution and conviction shall in
no way be less stringent than those which apply in the cases referred to in article 5,
paragraph 1”).
450
Art. 14 (“The State party in whose territory the alleged offender is present shall, if it does not
extradite that person, submit, without exception whatsoever and without undue delay, the case to
its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, through proceedings in accordance with
the law of that State. Those authorities shall take their decision in the sam e manner as in the
case of an ordinary offence of a grave nature under the law of that State”).
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Bombings; 451 the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism; 452 the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized
Crime; 453 the United Nations Convention against Corruption; 454 the International
Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism; 455 the International
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance; 456 and
the ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism. 457
__________________
451

Art. 8, para. 1 (“The State party in the territory of which the alleged offender is present shall, in
cases to which article 6 applies, if it does not extradite that person, be obliged, without exception
whatsoever and whether or not the offence was committed in its territory, to submit the case
without undue delay to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, through
proceedings in accordance with the laws of that State. Those authorities shall take their decision
in the same manner as in the case of any other offence of a grave nature under the law of that
State”).
452
Art. 10, para. 1 (“The State party in the territory of which the alleged offend er is present shall,
in cases to which article 7 applies, if it does not extradite that person, be obliged, without
exception whatsoever and whether or not the offence was committed in its territory, to submit
the case without undue delay to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, through
proceedings in accordance with the laws of that State. Those authorities shall take their decision
in the same manner as in the case of any other offence of a grave nature under the law of that
State”).
453
Art. 16, para. 10 (“A State party in whose territory an alleged offender is found, if it does not
extradite such person in respect of an offence to which this article applies solely on the ground
that he or she is one of its nationals, shall, at the request of the State party seeking extradition,
be obliged to submit the case without undue delay to its competent authorities for the purpose of
prosecution. Those authorities shall take their decision and conduct their proceedings in the
same manner as in the case of any other offence of a grave nature under the domestic law of that
State party. The States Parties concerned shall cooperate with each other, in particular on
procedural and evidentiary aspects, to ensure the efficiency of such prosecution”).
454
Art. 44, para. 11 (“A State party in whose territory an alleged offender is found, if it does not
extradite such person in respect of an offence to which this article applies solely on the ground
that he or she is one of its nationals, shall, at the request of the State party seeking extradition,
be obliged to submit the case without undue delay to its competent authorities for the purpose of
prosecution. Those authorities shall take their decision and conduct their proceedings in the
same manner as in the case of any other offence of a grave nature under the domestic law of that
State party. The States Parties concerned shall cooperate with each other, in particular on
procedural and evidentiary aspects, to ensure the efficiency of such prosecution”).
455
Art. 11, para. 1 (“The State party in the territory of which the alleged offender is present shall,
in cases to which [the article on jurisdiction] applies, if it does not extradite that person, be
obliged, without exception whatsoever and whether or not the of fence was committed in its
territory, to submit the case without undue delay to its competent authorities for the purpose of
prosecution, through proceedings in accordance with the laws of that State. Those authorities
shall take their decision in the same manner as in the case of any other offence of a grave nature
under the law of that State”).
456
Art. 11 (“1. The State party in the territory under whose jurisdiction a person alleged to have
committed an offence of enforced disappearance is found shall, if it does not extradite that
person or surrender him or her to another State in accordance with its international obligations
or surrender him or her to an international criminal tribunal whose jurisdiction it has recognized,
submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution. 2. These authorities
shall take their decision in the same manner as in the case of any ordinary offence of a serious
nature under the law of that State party. In the cases referred to in article 9, paragraph 2, the
standards of evidence required for prosecution and conviction shall in no way be less stringent
than those which apply in the cases referred to in article 9, paragraph 1”).
457
Art. XIII, para. 1 (“The Party in the territory of which the alleged offender is present shall, in
cases to which Article VII of this Convention applies, if it does not extradite that person, be
obliged, without exception whatsoever and whether or not the offence was committed in its
territory, to submit the case without undue delay to its competent authorities for the purpose of
prosecution, through proceedings in accordance with the domestic laws of that Party. Those
authorities shall take their decision in the same manner as in the case of any other offence of a
grave nature under the domestic laws of that Party”).
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159. The Hague formula also can be found in many regional conventions. 458 In fact,
the 1957 European Convention on Extradition (art. 6(1)(d)) served as a model for the
Convention on the suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft. 459 Fifty States have
ratified that Convention, including all member States of the Council of Europe, as
well as three non-European States (Israel, the Republic of Korea, and South Africa).
160. In Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v.
Senegal), the ICJ analysed the Hague formula in the context of article 7 of the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment:
90. As is apparent from the travaux préparatoires of the Convention, Article 7,
paragraph 1, is based on a similar provision contained in the [Convention on the suppress ion of
unlawful seizure of aircraft], signed at The Hague on 16 December 1970. The obligation to submit
the case to the competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution (hereinafter the “obligation to
prosecute”) was formulated in such a way as to leave it to those authorities to decide whether or
not to initiate proceedings, thus respecting the independence of States parties ’ judicial systems.
These two conventions emphasize, moreover, that the authorities shall take their decision in the
same manner as in the case of any ordinary offence of a serious nature under the law of the State
concerned (Article 7, paragraph 2, of the [Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment] and Article 7 of the [Convention on the suppression of
unlawful seizure of aircraft]). It follows that the competent authorities involved remain
responsible for deciding on whether to initiate a prosecution, in the light of the evidence before
them and the relevant rules of criminal procedure.
91. The obligation to prosecute provided for in Article 7, paragraph 1, is normally
implemented in the context of the [Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment] after the State has performed the other ob ligations provided
for in the preceding articles, which require it to adopt adequate legislation to enable it to
criminalize torture, give its courts universal jurisdiction in the matter and make an inquiry into the
facts. These obligations, taken as a whole, may be regarded as elements of a single conventional
mechanism aimed at preventing suspects from escaping the consequences of their criminal
responsibility, if proven...
...
__________________
458

See the Study by the Secretariat (footnote 432 above), pp. 41–43, para. 108. These conventions
include (in chronological order): the Convention to prevent and punish the acts of terrorism
taking the form of crimes against persons and related extortion that are of international
significance (1971), art. 5; the Organization of African Unity Convention for the elimination of
mercenarism in Africa (1977), arts. 8 and 9, paras. 2–3; the European Convention on the
suppression of terrorism (1988), art. 7; the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish
Torture (1985), art. 14; the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)
Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism (1987), art. 4; the Inter-American Convention
on the Forced Disappearance of Persons (1994), art. 6; the Inter-American Convention on
International Traffic in Minors (1994), art. 9; the Inter-American Convention against Corruption
(1996), art. XIII, para. 6; the Inter-American Convention against the illicit manufacturing of and
trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives and other related materials (1997), art. XIX,
para. 6; the Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (1998), art. 6; the Criminal Law
Convention on Corruption (1999), art. 27, para. 5; the Convention of the Organization of the
Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism (1999), art. 6; the Convention on
cybercrime (2001), art. 24, para. 6; the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating
Corruption (2003), art. 15, para. 6; the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of
Terrorism (2005), art. 18; the Council of Europe Convention on Action Against Trafficking in
Human Beings (2005), art. 31, para. 3; and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) Convention on Counter-Terrorism (2007), art. 13(1).
459
ICAO [International Civil Aviation Organization] Legal Committee, Minutes and Documents
relating to the Subject of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Document 8877 -LC/161), 13th meeting
(3 March 1970), 17th Session, Montreal, 9 February–11 March 1970), p. 69, para. 33; and
Guillaume, pp. 354 and 368.
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94. The Court considers that Article 7, paragraph 1, requires the State concerned to
submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, irrespective of the
existence of a prior request for the extradition of the suspect. That is why Article 6, paragraph 2,
obliges the State to make a preliminary inquiry immediately from the time that the suspect is
present in its territory. The obligation to submit the case to the competent authorities, under
Article 7, paragraph 1, may or may not result in the institution of proceedings, in the light of the
evidence before them, relating to the charges against the suspect.
95. However, if the State in whose territory the suspect is present has received a request
for extradition in any of the cases envisaged in the provisions of the Convention, it can relieve
itself of its obligation to prosecute by acceding to that request. It follows that the choice between
extradition or submission for prosecution, pursuant to the Convention, does not mean that the two
alternatives are to be given the same weight. Extradition is an option offered to the State by the
Convention, whereas prosecution is an international obligation under the Convention, the
violation of which is a wrongful act engaging the responsibility of the State.
...
114. While Article 7, paragraph 1, of the Convention does not contain any indication as to
the time frame for performance of the obligation for which it provides, it is necessarily implicit in
the text that it must be implemented within a reasonable time, in a manner compatible with the
object and purpose of the Convention.
115. The Court considers that the obligation on a State to prosecute, provided for in
Article 7, paragraph 1, of the Convention, is intended to allow the fulfilment of the Convention ’s
object and purpose, which is “to make more effective the struggle against torture” (Preamble to
the Convention). It is for that reason that proceedings should be undertaken without delay.
...
120. The purpose of these treaty provisions is to prevent alleged perpetrators of acts of
torture from going unpunished, by ensuring that they cannot find refuge in any State party. The
State in whose territory the suspect is present does indeed have the option of extraditing him to a
country which has made such a request, but on the condition that it is to a State which has
jurisdiction in some capacity, pursuant to Article 5 of the Convention, to prosecute and try him. 460

161. The Court also found that various factors could not justify a failure to
comply with these obligations: the financial difficulties of a State; 461 referral of the
matter to a regional organization; 462 or difficulties with implementation under the
State’s internal law. 463
162. The idea of satisfying the State party’s obligation by surrendering the alleged
offender to an international court or tribunal (sometime s referred to as a “third
alternative” or as part of the “triple alternative”) has also arisen in recent years,
especially in conjunction with the establishment of the International Criminal Court
and other international and special courts and tribunals. 464 For example, the
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance, in article 11, paragraph 1, provides:
The State party in the territory under whose jurisdiction a person alleged to have committed an
offence of enforced disappearance is found shall, if it does not extradite that person or surrender
him or her to another State in accordance with its international obligations or surrender him or her
to an international criminal tribunal whose jurisdiction it has recogni zed, submit the case to its
competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution.

__________________
460

Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal)
(see footnote 98 above), p. 454–461, paras. 90–91, 94–95, 114–115 and 120.
461
Ibid. at p. 460, para. 112.
462
Ibid.
463
Ibid. at p. 460, para. 113.
464
Yearbook … 2014, vol. II (Part One), document A/CN.4/680, para. 27.
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163. The phrase “international criminal tribunal” used in such a formulation is
intended to encompass not only the International Criminal Court, but also ad hoc
international criminal tribunals and special courts or tribunals that combine
international and national law. 465 The phrase “whose jurisdiction it has recognized”
would appear to be unnecessary, although it implicitly acknowledges that not all
States have accepted the jurisdiction of the same international criminal tribunals and
therefore that the capacity to surrender to such tribunals will vary by State.
164. Most treaties containing the Hague formula also include a clause to the effect
that the “authorities shall take their decision in the same manner as in the case of
any ordinary offence of a serious nature under the law of that State party”. 466 The
objective of such a clause is to help avoid any possibility of the situation being
exploited for political reasons, resulting in trials on the basis of spurious accusations
and fabricated evidence, and thereby leading to frictions between States. 467 Thus, in
these proceedings, “normal procedures relating to serious offences, both in the
extradition and criminal proceedings, and the normal standards of evidence shall
apply”. 468
165. The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment and the International Convention for the Protection of All
Persons from Enforced Disappearance add a further sentence which provides that, in
situations where the State party’s jurisdiction is based solely on the presence of the
alleged offender, the standards of evidence required for prosecution and conviction
shall be no less stringent than the standards which apply in other States that have
jurisdiction (for example, jurisdiction based on territoriality or nationality). This
sentence seeks to ensure that alleged offenders are not prosecuted by a third State on
the basis of insufficient or inadequate evidence. According to some writers, if the
evidence in the third State is insufficient, and the territorial or national State is not
able or willing to supply the necessary evidence, the third State should extradite the
alleged offender where possible to a jurisdiction where the evidence exists, or
should delay proceedings in order to negotiate a solution with the concerned
States. 469 A practical difficulty with such an obligation, however, is the assumption
that prosecutors and judges in a State party can readily ascertain and apply the
standards of evidence required for prosecution and conviction that apply in other
States parties having jurisdiction over the matter.

Draft article 9. Aut dedere aut judicare
166. As previously noted, in 2014 the Commission observed “that there are
important gaps in the present conventional regime governing the obligation to
extradite or prosecute which may need to be closed. Notably, there is a lack of
international conventions with this obligation in relation to most crimes against
humanity”. 470 In this context, the Commission also recalled that it had placed on its
programme of work the present topic, “which would include as one element of a
new treaty an obligation to extradite or prosecute for those crimes ”. 471 Moreover, the
__________________
465

See Yearbook … 2014, vol. II (Part Two), para. 35; and Scovazzi and Citroni, p. 303.
See footnotes 446 to 457 above.
467
Nowak and McArthur, p. 365.
468
Ibid., p. 366, citing Burgers and Danelius, p. 138.
469
Ibid., p. 366.
470
Yearbook … 2014, vol. II (Part Two), para. (14); see also ibid., para. (31).
471
Ibid.
466
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Commission recommended “that States consider the Hague formula in undertaking
to close any gaps in the existing conventional regime”.472 Finally, the Commission
characterized as one of the essential elements of a contemporary aut dedere aut
judicare formula, a provision for the “third alternative” (in other words, the notion
that the obligation may be satisfied by surrendering the alleged offender to a
competent international tribunal), noting in particular article 11, paragraph 1, of the
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance. 473
167. Bearing these considerations in mind, the Special Rapporteur proposes the
following draft article:

Draft article 9.

Aut dedere aut judicare

1.
If a person alleged to have committed an offence referred to in draft
article 5, paragraphs 1 and 2, is found in any territory under the jurisdiction or
control of a State, that State shall submit the matter to its competent authorities for
the purpose of prosecution, unless it extradites or surrenders the person to another
State or competent international criminal tribunal.
2.
If the State submits the matter to its competent authorities for the
purpose of prosecution, those authorities shall decide whether and how to prosecute
in the same manner as they would for any ordinary offence of a serious nature under
the law of that State.

CHAPTER VI

Fair treatment of an alleged offender
168. All States contain within their national law protections of one degree or
another for persons who they investigate, detain, try and punish for a criminal
offence. Such protections may be specified in a constitution, statute, administrative
rule or judicial precedent. Further, detailed rules may be codified or a broad
standard may be set referring to “fair treatment”, “due process”, “judicial
guarantees” or “equal protection”. Such protections are extremely important in
ensuring that the extraordinary power of the State’s criminal justice apparatus is not
improperly brought to bear upon a suspect, among other things preserving for that
individual the ability to contest fully the State’s allegations before an independent
court (hence, allowing for an “equality of arms”).
169. Such protections are now well recognized in international criminal law and
human rights law. 474 At the most general level, such protections are identified in the
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which provides in article 10 that
“[e]veryone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent
and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any
criminal charge against him”. 475 Further, article 11 provides that “[e]veryone
__________________
472

Ibid.
Ibid., paras. (34)-(36).
474
Doswald-Beck (“The right to a fair trial has, since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ...
become established as one of the fundamental pillars of international law to protect individuals
against arbitrary treatment.”).
475
General Assembly resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 1948. See also Lehtimaja and
Pellonpää.
473
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charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved
guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees
necessary for his defence” and that “[n]o one shall be held guilty of any penal
offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a penal offence,
under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a
heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the penal
offence was committed”. 476
170. The principal statement of a universal character with respect to such
guarantees appears in article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. Article 14 sets forth a series of rights, including that: (1) all persons shall be
equal before the courts and tribunal; (2) every person is entitled to a fair and public
hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law;
(3) the press and the public may be excluded from the trial only for specified
reasons; (4) any judgment rendered in a criminal case shall be made public except in
limited circumstances; (5) every person charged with a criminal offence shall be
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law; (6) every person is to be
informed promptly and in detail in a language which he or she understands of the
nature and cause of the charge; (7) every person must have adequate time and
facilities for the preparation of his or her defines and to communicate with counsel
of his own choosing; (8) every person shall be tried without undue delay; (9) every
person has a right to be tried in his or her presence, and to defend himself in person
or through legal assistance of his own choosing (and to be informed of this right and
provided legal assistance if justice so requires); (10) every person may examine, or
have examined, the witnesses against him or her; (11) every person may have the
free assistance of an interpreter if he or she cannot understand or speak the language
used in court; (12) every person may not be compelled to testify against himself or
herself, or to confess guilt; (13) juvenile persons shall be tried using procedures that
take account of their age and the desirability of promoting their rehabilitation;
(14) everyone convicted of a crime shall have the right to his conviction and
sentence being reviewed by a higher tribunal according to law; and (15) no one shall
be tried or punished again for an offence for which he has already been finally
convicted or acquitted (the principle of ne bis in idem (“not twice the same thing”)
or as protection from “double jeopardy”). The purpose of article 14 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, obviously, is to ensure the
proper administration of justice to an alleged offender. 477
171. As a general matter, instruments establishing or setting standards for an
international court or tribunal generally seek to replicate with some degree of
specificity the kinds of standards set forth in article 14 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, while instruments that address national laws typically
provide a broad standard that is intended to acknowledge and incorporate the
specific standards of article 14.
172. The Nürnberg Charter contained an article on a “fair trial for defendants”
which addressed elements such as the clarity of the indictment, the language of the
proceedings, the right to counsel and the right of the defines to access to evidence
(art. 16). The Commission’s 1954 draft code of offences against the peace and
__________________
476
477
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security of mankind 478 contained no article on protections for the alleged offender. In
the 1996 draft code of crimes against the peace and security of mankind, however,
article 11 lists several protections to be accorded to individuals charged with a crime
against the peace and security of mankind. 479 In its commentary to article 11, the
Commission distinguished the 1954 draft code, which “did not address the
procedures to be followed in the investigation and prosecution of alleged
perpetrators” because it was “envisaged as an instrument of substantive criminal law
to be applied by a national court or possibly an international criminal court in
accordance with the rules of procedure and evidence of the competent national or
international jurisdiction”. 480 In regards to the 1996 draft code of crimes against the
peace and security of mankind, however, the Commission:
considered that an instrument of a universal character, such as the Code, should require respect for
the international standard of due process and fair trial set forth in article 14 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The essential provisions of article 14 of the Covenant are
therefore reproduced in article 11 to provide for the application of these fundamental judicial
guarantees to persons who are tried by a national court or an international court for a crime
against the peace and security of mankind contained in the Code. 481

173. The instruments regulating the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, 482 the International Tribunal for Rwanda, 483 the Special Court for Sierra
Leone, 484 the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 485 the Special Panels for Serious Crimes

__________________
478

Yearbook … 1954, vol. II, pp. 151–152.
Specifically, article 11 provides:
“Judicial guarantees
“1. An individual charged with a crime against the peace and security of mankind shall be
presumed innocent until proved guilty and shall be entitled without discrimination to the minimum
guarantees due to all human beings with regard to the law and the facts and shall have the rights:
“(a) In the determination of any charge against him, to have a fair and public hearing by a
competent, independent and impartial tribunal duly established by law;
“(b) To be informed promptly and in detail in a language which he understands of the
nature and cause of the charge against him;
“(c) To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence and to
communicate with counsel of his own choosing;
“(d) To be tried without undue delay;
“(e) To be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or through legal assistance
of his own choosing; to be informed, if he does not have legal assistance, of this right; and to
have legal assistance assigned to him and without payment by him if he does not have sufficient
means to pay for it;
“(f) To examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance
and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him;
“(g) To have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the
language used in court;
“(h) Not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt.
“2. An individual convicted of a crime shall have the right to his conviction and sente nce
being reviewed according to law.” Draft code of crimes against the peace and security of
mankind (see footnote 134 above), pp. 33–36.
480
Ibid., p. 33, para. (1) of the commentary to draft article 11.
481
Ibid., p. 34, para. (6) of the commentary to draft article 11.
482
Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (see footnote 99
above), art. 21.
483
Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda (see footnote 100 above), art. 20.
484
Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (see footnote 101 above), art. 17.
485
Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (see footnote 170 above), art. 16.
479
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in East Timor, 486 the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, 487 the Iraqi
Supreme Criminal Tribunal488 and the Extraordinary African Chambers within the
Senegalese Judicial System 489 contain various provisions addressing protections for
defendants. With respect to the International Criminal Court, the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court contains articles devoted to nullem crimen sine lege
(art. 22), nulla poena sine lege (art. 23), exclusion of jurisdiction over persons under
eighteen (art. 26), rights of persons during an investigation (art. 55), trial in the
presence of the accused (art. 63), presumption of innocence (art. 66) and rights of the
accused (art. 67). The last of these articles catalogues in considerable detail
protections for the defendant, akin to those contained in article 14 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 490
174. By contrast, most treaties addressing crimes or specific types of human
rights violations within a national legal system, such as torture, do not repeat these
myriad protections for an alleged offender. Instead, such treaties contain a prov ision
that expresses general obligations of protection for the alleged offender, which
essentially cross-reference to the more detailed protections contained in other
instruments or in customary international law. A good example of such a provision
may be found in the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated
Personnel, which provides in article 17 (Fair treatment):
1.
Any person regarding whom investigations or proceedings are being carried out in
connection with any of the crimes set out in article 9 shall be guaranteed fair treatment, a fair trial
and full protection of his or her rights at all stages of the investigations or proceedings.
2.

Any alleged offender shall be entitled:

(a)
To communicate without delay with the nearest appropriate representative of the
State or States of which such person is a national or which is otherwise entitled to protect that
person’s rights or, if such person is a stateless person, of the State which, at that person ’s request,
is willing to protect that person’s rights; and
(b)

To be visited by a representative of that State or those States.

175. The following subsections address these elements of fair treatment, fair trial,
human rights protections generally, and the right to communicate with one ’s State of
nationality or other relevant State.

A.

Fair treatment

176. As noted above, most treaties addressing crimes or specific types of human
rights violations within a national legal system do not repeat the myriad human rights
protections for an alleged offender, but instead contain a provision that expresses
general obligations of protection. Often this takes the form of obligating the State to
accord “fair treatment” to the alleged offender at all stages of the proceeding.
177. Examples of such a “fair treatment” provision may be found in the
Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally
__________________
486

UNTAET/REG/2000/15 (see footnote 102 above), sects. 12– 13.
Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the
Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea (see footnote 103
above), arts. 33 new–35 new.
488
Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal (see footnote 104 above), art. 20.
489
Statute of the Extraordinary African Chambers within the courts of Senegal created to prosecute
international crimes committed in Chad between 7 June 1982 and 1 December 1990 (see
footnote 105 above), art. 21.
490
See, for example, Zappalà, p. 1325; and Schabas, “Article 67”, pp. 845–868.
487
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protected persons, including diplomatic agents; 491 the International Convention
against the taking of hostages; 492 the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; 493 the Convention for the
suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of maritime navigation; 494 the
Convention on the rights of the child; 495 International Convention Against the
Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries; 496 the International
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings; 497 the Second Protocol to the
Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict; 498 the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism; 499 the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized
Crime; 500 the United Nations Convention against Corruption; 501 the International

__________________
491

Art. 9 (“Any person regarding whom proceedings are being carried out in connection with any of
the crimes set forth in article 2 shall be guaranteed fair treatment at all stages of the proceedings”).
492
Art. 8, para. 2 (“Any person regarding whom proceedings are being carried out in connexion
with any of the offences set forth in article 1 shall be guaranteed fair treatment at all stages of
the proceedings, including enjoyment of all the rights and guarantees provided by the law of the
State in the territory of which he is present”).
493
Art. 7, para. 3 (“Any person regarding whom proceedings are brought in connection with any of the
offences referred to in article 4 shall be guaranteed fair treatment at all stages of the proceedings”).
494
Art. 10, para. 2 (“Any person regarding whom proceedings are being carried out in connection
with any of the offences set forth in article 3 shall be guaranteed fair treatment at all stages of
the proceedings, including enjoyment of all the rights and guarantees provided for such
proceedings by the law of the State in the territory of which he is present”).
495
Art. 40, para. 2(b) (“Every child alleged as or accused of having infringed the penal law has at
least the following guarantees: ... (iii): “To have the matter determined without delay by a
competent, independent and impartial authority or judicial body in a fair hearing according to
law, in the presence of legal or other appropriate assistance and, unless it is considered not to be
in the best interest of the child, in particular, taking into account his or her age or situation, his
or her parents or legal guardians”).
496
Art. 11 (“Any person regarding whom proceedings are being carried out in connection with any
of the offences set forth in the present Convention shall be guaranteed at all stages of the
proceedings fair treatment and all the rights and guarantees provided for in the law of the State
in question. Applicable norms of international law should be taken into account”).
497
Art. 14 (“Any person who is taken into custody or regarding whom any other measures are taken
or proceedings are carried out pursuant to this Convention shall be guaranteed fair treatment,
including enjoyment of all rights and guarantees in conformity wit h the law of the State in the
territory of which that person is present and applicable provisions of international law, including
international law of human rights”).
498
Art. 17, para. 2 (“Without prejudice to, if applicable, the relevant rules of internati onal law, any
person regarding whom proceedings are being carried out in connection with the Convention or
this Protocol shall be guaranteed fair treatment and a fair trial in accordance with domestic law
and international law at all stages of the proceedings, and in no cases shall be provided
guarantees less favorable to such person than those provided by international law”).
499
Art. 17 (“Any person who is taken into custody or regarding whom any other measures are taken
or proceedings are carried out pursuant to this Convention shall be guaranteed fair treatment,
including enjoyment of all rights and guarantees in conformity with the law of the State in the
territory of which that person is present and applicable provisions of international law, including
international human rights law”).
500
Art. 16, para. 13 (“Any person regarding whom proceedings are being carried out in connection
with any of the offences to which this article applies shall be guaranteed fair treatment at all
stages of the proceedings, including enjoyment of all the rights and guarantees provided by the
domestic law of the State party in the territory of which that person is present”).
501
Art. 44, para. 14 (“Any person regarding whom proceedings are being carried out in connection
with any of the offences to which this article applies shall be guaranteed fair treatment at all
stages of the proceedings, including enjoyment of all the rights and guarantees provided by the
domestic law of the State Party in the territory of which that person is present”).
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Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism; 502 the International
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance; 503 and
the ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism. 504
178. These conventions do not define the term “fair treatment”, 505 but the term is
viewed as incorporating the specific rights possessed by an alleged offender, such as
those under article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Thus, when crafting article 8 of the draft articles on the prevention and punishment
of crimes against diplomatic agents and other internationally protected persons, the
Commission asserted that the formulation of “fair treatment at all stages of the
proceedings” was “intended to incorporate all the guarantees generally recognized
to a detained or accused person”, and that “[a]n example of such guarantees is found
in article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ”. 506 Further,
the Commission noted that the “expression ‘fair treatment’ was preferred, because
of its generality, to more usual expressions such as ‘due process’, ‘fair hearing’ or
‘fair trial’ which might be interpreted in a narrow technical sense”. 507 Finally, the
Commission also explained that the formulation of “all stages of the proceedings” is
“intended to safeguard the rights of the alleged offender from the moment he is
found and measures are taken to ensure his presence until a final decision is taken
on the case”. 508
179. A broad reference to “fair treatment” rather than to specific rights also avoids
having to repeat the range of rights to which any individual is entitled under
international human rights law and, as such, avoids inadvertent limitation of those
rights. For example, the travaux préparatoires of the Convention against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment indicate that for
this reason the drafters rejected the proposal by the Netherlands to provide to
alleged torturers the narrower “guarantees of a fair and equitable trial” in favour of
the broader “fair treatment at all stages of the proceedings” language of Sweden. 509
__________________
502

Art. 12 (“Any person who is taken into custody or regarding whom any other measures are taken
or proceedings are carried out pursuant to this Convention shall be guaranteed fair treatment,
including enjoyment of all rights and guarantees in conformity with the law of the State in the
territory of which that person is present and applicable provisions of international law, including
international law of human rights”).
503
Art. 11, para. 3 (“Any person against whom proceedings are brought in conne ction with an
offence of enforced disappearance shall be guaranteed fair treatment at all stages of the
proceedings. Any person tried for an offence of enforced disappearance shall benefit from a fair
trial before a competent, independent and impartial court or tribunal established by law”).
504
Art. VIII, para. 1 (“Any person who is taken into custody or regarding whom any other
measures are taken or proceedings are carried out pursuant to this Convention shall be
guaranteed fair treatment, including enjoyment of all rights and guarantees in conformity with
the laws of the Party in the territory of which that person is present and applicable provisions of
international law, including international human rights law”).
505
Lambert, p. 204.
506
Draft articles on the prevention and punishment of crimes against diplomatic agents and other
internationally protected persons, Yearbook … 1972, vol. II, p. 320, draft article 8 and the
commentary thereto. See also Costello, p. 492 (“if there has been any breach of the rights
referred to in Article 14 of the International Covenant [on Civil and Political Rights], in respect
to a person charged with an offense under the [Convention on the prevention and punishment of
crimes against internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents], it would be open
to a Contracting State to allege that there has been a breach of a State’s obligations under
Article 9 of that Convention”).
507
Yearbook … 1972, vol. II, p. 320.
508
Ibid.
509
Nowak and McArthur, pp. 366–367.
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According to the travaux préparatoires, this broader formulation encompassed all of
the fair trial obligations articulated in article 14 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights and ensured protection to the alleged offender at both pre trial and trial stages of the proceedings. 510 Likewise, the drafters of the International
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance used the
“fair treatment” construction as the template for its article addressing defendant ’s
rights, also in order not to limit the range of rights. 511

B.

Fair trial

180. The concept of “fair treatment” is generally regarded as including within it a
right to a fair trial. As discussed below, however, the right to a fair trial is
considered so important that some treaties addressing crimes have made a point of
identifying both a right to “fair treatment” and to a “fair trial.”
181. Among the protections accorded by States under their national laws to
persons being tried for a criminal offence is the right to a fair trial. 512 Such a right is
identified in article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which
provides that “[e]veryone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by
an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and
obligations and of any criminal charge against him”. 513 Similar provisions exist in
regional human rights declarations, such as the American Declaration of the Rights
and Duties of Man, 514 the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam 515 and the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 516
__________________
510

Ibid., p. 367 (“the suspected torturer must enjoy all guarantees of a fair trial as stipulated in
Article 14” of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights).
511
See, for example, Commission on Human Rights, Report of the intersessional open-ended
working group to elaborate a draft legally binding normative instrument for the protection of all
persons from enforced disappearance (E/CN.4/2004/59), para. 91.
512
See, generally, Weissbrodt and Wolfrum. See also ICRC, Customary IHL Database,
“Practice relating to Rule 100. Fair trial guarantees”, available from www.icrc.org/customaryihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule100 (providing national legislation for Afghanistan, Argentina,
Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Botswana, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cambodia, Canada, China, Colombia, Congo, Cook Islands,
Croatia, Cyprus, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland,
France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, India, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Jordan, Kenya, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritius, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua,
Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Poland, the Republic of Korea, the Republic
of Moldova, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Singapore, Slovenia, Somalia,
South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Uganda, the United Kingdom, the
United States of America, Uruguay, Vanuatu, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Yugoslavia
and Zimbabwe).
513
General Assembly resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 1948.
514
Adopted at the Ninth International Conference of American States, held in Bogota in 1948,
International Conferences of American States, Second Supplement, 1942–1954, Washington, D.C.,
Pan American Union, 1958, p. 262, art. XVIII (“Right to a fair trial: Every person may resort to the
courts to ensure respect for his legal rights. There should likewise be available to him a simple, brief
procedure whereby the courts will protect him from acts of authority that, to his prejudice, violate
any fundamental constitutional rights) and art. XXVI (“Right to due process of law: Every accused
person is presumed to be innocent until proved guilty. Every person accused of an offense has the
right to be given an impartial and public hearing, and to be tried by courts previously established in
accordance with pre-existing laws, and not to receive cruel, infamous or unusual punishment”).
515
Adopted at the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers held in Cairo from 31 July to 5 August
1990. An English translation is available in Status of preparation of publication, studies and
documents for the World Conference on Human Rights, note by the Secretariat, addendum:
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182. Article 14, paragraph 1, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights also identified this specific right stating, inter alia, that “everyone shall be
entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial
tribunal established by law” (art. 14, para. 1). Likewise, regional human rights treaties
also provide for such a right, such as the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; 517 the American Convention on Human
Rights: “Pact of San José, Costa Rica” (art. 8); the African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights (art. 7); and the Arab Charter on Human Rights. 518
183. The Human Rights Committee found this right to a fair trial to be “a key
element of human rights protection” and a “procedural means to safeguard the rule of
law”. 519 Among other things, the Committee stated in 2007 in its General Comment
No. 32:
18. The notion of a “tribunal” in article 14, paragraph 1 designates a body, regardless of
its denomination, that is established by law, is independent of the executive and legislative
branches of government or enjoys in specific cases judicial independence in deciding legal matters
in proceedings that are judicial in nature. Article 14, paragraph 1, second sentence, guarantees
access to such tribunals to all who have criminal charges brought against them. This right cannot
be limited, and any criminal conviction by a body not constituting a tribunal is incompatible with
this provision. ...
19.
The requirement of competence, independence and impartiality of a tribunal in the
sense of article 14, paragraph 1, is an absolute right that is not subject to any exception. The
requirement of independence refers, in particular, to the procedure and qualifications for the
appointment of judges, and guarantees relating to their security of tenure until a mandatory
retirement age or the expiry of their term of office, where such exist, the conditions governing
promotion, transfer, suspension and cessation of their functions, and the actual independence of the
judiciary from political interference by the executive branch and legislature. States should take
specific measures guaranteeing the independence of the judiciary, protecting judges from any form
of political influence in their decision-making through the constitution or adoption of laws
establishing clear procedures and objective criteria for the appointment, remuneration, tenure,
promotion, suspension and dismissal of the members of the judiciary and disciplinary sanctions taken
against them. ...
...
21.
The requirement of impartiality has two aspects. First, judges must not allow their
judgement to be influenced by personal bias or prejudice, nor harbour preconceptions about the
particular case before them, nor act in ways that improperly promote the interests of one of the
parties to the detriment of the other. Second, the tribunal must also appear to a reasonable observer
__________________

Contribution of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (A/CONF.157/PC/62/Add.18).
Article 19(e) reads: “A defendant is innocent until his guilt is proven in a fair trial in which he
shall be given all the guarantees of defence”).
516
Art. 47 (“Right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial: Everyone whose rights and freedoms
guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a
tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in this Arti cle. Everyone is entitled to a
fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal
previously established by law”).
517
Art. 6 (Right to a fair trial). For analysis of the Convention’s right to a fair trial, see Golder v.
United Kingdom, Application no. 4451/70, Judgment of 21 February 1975, European Court of
Human Rights, Judgments and Decisions: Series A, vol. 18, para. 28.
518
Adopted at Tunis in May 2004, at the 16th Summit of the League of Arab States (for the English
version, see Boston University International Law Journal, vol. 24, No. 2 (2006), p. 147).
Article 13, paragraph 1, provides that “[e]verybody has the right to a fair trial in which
sufficient guarantees are ensured, conducted by a competent, independent a nd impartial tribunal
established by law, in judging the grounds of criminal charges brought against him or in
determining his rights and obligations”).
519
Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 32 (CCPR/C/GC/32), para. 2. See also Bair,
p. 56.
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to be impartial. For instance, a trial substantially affected by the participation of a judge who, under
domestic statutes, should have been disqualified cannot normally be considered to be impartial.
...
25. The notion of fair trial includes the guarantee of a fair and public hearing. Fairness
of proceedings entails the absence of any direct or indirect influence, pressure or intimidation or
intrusion from whatever side and for whatever motive. A hearing is not fair if, for instance, the
defendant in criminal proceedings is faced with the expression of a hostile attitude from the public
or support for one party in the courtroom that is tolerate d by the court, thereby impinging on the
right to defence, or is exposed to other manifestations of hostility with similar effects.
...
28.
All trials in criminal matters or related to a suit at law must in principle be conducted
orally and publicly. The publicity of hearings ensures the transparency of proceedings and thus
provides an important safeguard for the interest of the individual and of society at large. 520

184. The right of the defendant to a fair trial is also expressly recognized in the
statutes of many international criminal tribunals. Thus, the Nürnberg Charter
included such a right (art. 16), which was acknowledged in the Commission ’s
Principles of International Law recognized in the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal
and in the Judgment of the Tribunal. 521 Similarly, the right to a fair trial appears in
the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 522 the Statute of
the International Tribunal for Rwanda 523 and the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court (art. 67, para. 1). The same is true for the instruments regulating the
Special Court for Sierra Leone, 524 the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 525 the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, 526 the Iraqi Supreme Criminal
Tribunal 527 and the Extraordinary African Chambers within the Senegalese Judicial
System. 528
185. Notably, article 3, paragraph 1(d) common to the Geneva Conventions for
the protection of war victims prohibits “the passing of sentences ... without previous
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples ”, and the
Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (art. 130), the
Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
(art. 147) and the Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (art. 85,
para. 4(e)) consider depriving a protected person of a fair trial in inter national
__________________
520

Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 32 (CCPR/C/GC/32), paras. 18–19, 21, 25
and 28. Various decisions by the Committee with respect to petitions also shed light on the
Committee’s view as to the meaning of article 14, paragraph 1. See, for example, Gridin v.
Russian Federation, Communication No. 770/1997, Views of the Human Rights Committee
(CCPR/C/69/D/770/1997 (2000)), para. 8.2. For an academic commentary, see Bossuyt, p. 284.
521
Yearbook … 1950, vol. II, p. 375 (principle V provides that “[a]ny person charged with a crime
under international law has the right to a fair trial on the facts and law”).
522
Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (see footnote 99
above), art. 21, para. 2.
523
Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda (see footnote 100 above), art. 20, para. 2.
524
Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (see footnote 101 above), art. 17, para. 2
525
Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (see footnote 170 above), art. 16, para. 2.
526
Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the
Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea (see footnote 103
above), art. 33 new.
527
Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal (see footnote 104 above), art. 20.
528
Statute of the Extraordinary African Chambers within the courts of Senegal created to prosecute
international crimes committed in Chad between 7 June 1982 and 1 December 1990 (see
footnote 105 above), art. 21, para. 2.
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armed conflict to be a grave breach. It is also listed as a war crime in the Statute of
the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 529 the Statute of the
International Tribunal for Rwanda 530 and the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court (art. 8, paras. 2(a)(vi) and (c)(iv)).
186. As previously noted, most treaties addressing crimes or specific types of
human rights violations within a national legal system, such as torture, do not repeat
the myriad protections for an alleged offender, but instead contain a broad
obligation that the States parties accord “fair treatment” to the alleged offender at all
stages of the proceeding. That obligation is understood as including a guarantee that
the alleged offender will receive a fair trial. Yet, in some treaties the relevant
provision also independently highlights the right to a fair trial before a competent,
independent, and impartial court or tribunal.
187. Thus, the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated
Personnel refers to both “fair treatment” and a “fair trial” (art. 17). Similarly, the
Second Protocol to the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in
the Event of Armed Conflict indicates that “any person regarding whom proceedings
are being carried out in connection with the Convention or this Protocol shall be
guaranteed fair treatment and a fair trial * in accordance with domestic law and
international law at all stages of the proceedings, and in no cases shall be provided
guarantees less favourable to such person than those provided by international law ”
(art. 17, para. 2). Likewise, the International Convention for the Protection of All
Persons from Enforced Disappearance supplements the general guarantee of
“fair treatment” with a further sentence, which states, in article 11, paragraph 3:
“Any person tried for an offence of enforced disappearance shall benefit from a fair
trial before a competent, independent and impartial court or tribunal established by
law.” Although some delegations to the negotiations of this convention found this
second sentence unnecessary, several others viewed it as important to acknowledge
this specific right. 531
188. The Human Rights Committee in Comment No. 32 also addressed the issue
of whether a fair trial could include trial by the use of military courts. It stated at
paragraph 22:
The provisions of article 14 apply to all courts and tribunals within the scope of that article whether
ordinary or specialized, civilian or military. The Committee notes the existence, in many countries,
of military or special courts which try civilians. While the Covenant does not prohibit the trial of
civilians in military or special courts, it requires that such trials are in full conformity with the
requirements of article 14 and that its guarantees cannot be limited or modified because of the
military or special character of the court concerned. The Committee also notes that the trial of
civilians in military or special courts may raise serious problems as far as the equitable, impartial and
independent administration of justice is concerned. Therefore, it is important to take all necessary
measures to ensure that such trials take place under conditions which genuinely afford the full
guarantees stipulated in article 14. Trials of civilians by military or special courts should be
exceptional, i.e. limited to cases where the State party can show that resorting to such trials is

__________________
529

Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (see footnote 99
above), art. 2(f).
530
Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda (see footnote 100 above), art. 4(g).
531
Commission on Human Rights, Report of the intersessional open-ended working group to
elaborate a draft legally binding normative instrument for the protection of all persons from
enforced disappearance (E/CN.4/2004/59), para. 95.
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necessary and justified by objective and serious reasons, and where with regard to the specific class
of individuals and offences at issue the regular civilian courts are unable to undertake the trials. 532

189. Like the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, virtually all
treaties addressing crimes or specific types of human rights violations within a
national legal system do not prohibit the use of military courts to try alleged
offenders. The one exception is the Inter-American Convention on the Forced
Disappearance of Persons, which contains such a prohibition. 533 An explanation for
that prohibition may relate to the specific offence of forced disappearance, which
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights said in 2009 “can never be considered as
a legitimate and acceptable means for compliance with a military mission ”. 534 The
1992 Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance,
which influenced the 1994 Inter-American Convention, provided that alleged
offenders “shall be tried only by the competent ordinary courts in each State, and
not by any other special tribunal, in particular military courts”. 535 Even so, such a
prohibition was not included in the International Convention for the Protection of
All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, nor has it appeared in any other global
treaty, including the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 536 As such, a 2004 report of the International
Commission of Jurists found that: “With the exception of the Declaration on the
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearanc e and the Inter-American
Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons, there are no specific norms, of
either a treaty-based or declaratory nature, within international human rights law
relating to military offences, military jurisdiction or military ‘justice’.” 537
190. Further, the report of the International Commission of Jurists — as a part of
a survey of national laws worldwide 538 — noted that “[m]ilitary jurisdiction and
‘military justice’ exist as institutions in many countries. It also remains common
practice in many parts of the world for military personnel who have committed
human rights violations to be tried in military courts”. 539 At the same time, the
International Commission of Jurists found “trends” within national legal systems
toward either the abolition or at least reform of military courts, such as by
strengthening the role of civilian judges in military courts, bringing their procedures
into line with the rules of procedure used in ordinary courts, or precluding the use of
military courts to try civilians. 540 Along those lines, the United Nations Commission
__________________
532

Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 32 (CCPR/C/GC/32), para. 22.
Art. IX. As of September 2015, 15 States are parties to this convention.
534
Radilla-Pacheco v. Mexico, Case No. 777/01, Judgment of 23 November 2009, Inter-American
Court of Human Rights, Series C, No. 209, para. 227.
535
Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, General Assembly
resolution 47/133 of 18 December 1992, art. 16, para. 2.
536
Separately, the report of the Independent Expert to update the Set of principles to combat
impunity, containing the 2005 Updated Set of principles for the protection and promotion of
human rights through action to combat impunity (E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1), included in
principle 29 a restriction on the jurisdiction of military tribunals “solely to specifically military
offences committed by military personnel, to the exclusion of human rights violations”, but that
set of principles was not adopted by the Commission on Human Rights.
537
International Commission of Jurists, p. 17.
538
Ibid., pp. 169–378 (surveying the laws of 30 States).
539
Ibid., p. 158.
540
Ibid., pp. 158–164. For examples in Latin America of constitutional restrictions on the use of
military courts, limiting their jurisdiction solely to offences of a military nature (and excluding
international crimes), see the Plurinational State of Bolivia: Nueva Constitución Política del
Estado (2009), article 180, paragraph III (“La jurisdicción ordinaria no reconocerá fueros,
privilegios ni tribunales de excepción. La jurisdicción militar juzgará los delitos de naturaleza
militar regulados por la ley”); Constitución de la República del Ecuador 2008, article 160
533
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on Human Rights in 2006 reviewed and affirmed the draft principles governing the
administration of justice through military tribunals (“Decaux principles”), 541 which
set forth various means for reforming military courts. Among other things, the
Decaux principles provide that “[m]ilitary courts should, in principle, have no
jurisdiction to try civilians” 542 and that “[i]n all circumstances, the jurisdiction of
military courts should be set aside in favour of the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts
to conduct inquiries into serious human rights violations such as extrajudicial
executions, enforced disappearances and torture, and to prosecute and try persons
accused of such crimes”. 543 Similarly, notwithstanding the lack of a prohibition on
the use of military courts in the International Convention for the Protection of All
Persons from Enforced Disappearance, the Committee on Enforced Disa ppearances
asserted in 2015: “Taking into account the provisions of the Convention and the
progressive development of international law in order to assure the consistency in
the implementation of international standards, the Committee reaffirms that milita ry
jurisdiction ought to be excluded in cases of gross human rights violations,
including enforced disappearance”. 544
191. Some national laws that specifically address crimes against humanity
preclude the use of military courts for the prosecution of alleged offenders. 545
Concerns regarding the use of military courts tend to focus on the propriety of
prosecuting gross human rights violations in such courts (such as for forced
disappearances in the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons
from Enforced Disappearance), 546 on the rights and protections afforded to persons
brought to trial before military courts, on the use of such courts to prosecute persons
other than military personnel of the State, 547 or on problems associated with the
__________________

(“Los miembros de las Fuerzas Armadas y de la Policía Nacional serán juzgados por los órganos
de la Función Judicial; en el caso de delitos cometidos dentro de su misión específica, serán
juzgados por salas especializadas en materia militar y policial, pertenecientes a la misma
Función Judicial. Las infracciones disciplinarias serán juzgadas por los órganos competentes
establecidos en la ley”); Constitución de la República de El Salvador (1983) (as amended),
article 216(3) (“Gozan del fuero militar los miembros de la Fuerza Armada en servicio activo
por delitos y faltas puramente militares”); Constitución Nacional [Paraguay], 1992, article 174
(“Los tribunales militares solo juzgarán delitos o faltas de carácter militar, calificados como
tales por la ley, y cometidos por militares en servicio activo. Sus fallos podrán ser recurridos
ante la justicia ordinaria”). See also International Commission of Jurists, pp. 164–168.
541
Report submitted by the Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights, Emmanuel Decaux, to the Commission on Human Rights
(E/CN.4/2006/58).
542
Ibid., principle 5.
543
Ibid., principle 9.
544
Report of the Committee on Enforced Disappearances on its eighth session (A/70/56), Annex III, para. 10.
545
See, for example, Uruguay, Law No. 18.026 of 25 September 2006, article 11 (“Los crímenes y
delitos tipificados en la presente ley no podrán considerar como cometidos en el ejercicio de
funciones militares, no serán considerados delitos militares y quedará excluida la jurisdicción
militar para su juzgamiento”).
546
See, for example, Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under article 19 of the
Convention, concluding observations of the Committee against Torture, Colombia
(CAT/C/COL/CO/4), para. 16 (“The State party should put an immediate stop to these crimes
and comply fully with its obligation to ensure that gross human rights violations are investigated
impartially under the ordinary court system, and that the perpetrators are punished. The gravity
and nature of the crimes clearly show that they fall outside military jurisdiction”); and Amnest y
International, p. 218 (calling for the use of military courts only to try military personnel for
breaches of military discipline, not for any crime under international law, including war crimes
and crimes against humanity).
547
See, for example, Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under article 40 of the
Covenant, Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee, Chile
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military justice system of particular States. At the same time, such reforms normally
leave in place the ability of military personnel to be prosecuted before military
courts for “military crimes”, especially when committed in time of armed conflict.
192. While such developments at the national and international levels remain
ongoing, they may suggest an emerging view that the guarantee of a “fair trial”
means that a military court, tribunal, or commission should not be used to try
persons alleged to have committed crimes against humanity, unless the alleged
offender is a member of the military forces and the offence was committed in
connection with an armed conflict.

C.

Full protection of human rights

193. In addition to according to an alleged offender fair treatment in the course of
any proceedings or measures taken against him or her, and in particular according to
him or her a fair trial, an alleged offender is also entitled to the broader protections
that always exist with respect to his or her human rights. Such rights are set forth in
the wide range of provisions contained in global human rights treaties, such as the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and in the various regional
human rights treaties, 548 and are addressed as well in other instruments. 549
194. Given the possibility that an alleged offender may be taken into custody and
may be interrogated, particular mention is merited as to the obligations of States under
the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment. That Convention, among other things, provides that “[e]ach State party
shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent
acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction” (art. 2, para. 1). The Convention
further provides that “[e]ach State party shall undertake to prevent in any territory
under its jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment which do not amount to torture ... when such acts are committed by or at
the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other
person acting in an official capacity” (art. 16, para. 1).
195. No doubt for this reason, treaties addressing crimes have often included in
the “fair treatment” provision some additional reference to “full protection of his or
her rights”, 550 “enjoyment of all the rights and guarantees provided by the law of the
State in the territory of which he is present”, 551 “enjoyment of all rights and
guarantees in conformity with the law of the State in the territory of which that
__________________

(CCPR/C/79/Add.104), para. 9 (recommending that Chilean law “be amended so as to restrict
the jurisdiction of the military courts to trial only of military personnel charged with offences of
an exclusively military nature”); Durand and Ugarte v. Peru, Judgment of 16 August 2000,
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Series C, No. 68, para. 117; Mapiripán Massacre v.
Colombia, Judgment of 15 September 2005, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Series C,
No. 122, para. 202; and Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic,
social and cultural rights, including the right to development, Report of the Working Group on
Arbitrary Detention, Addendum–Mission to Equatorial Guinea (A/HRC/7/4/Add.3 ),
para. 100(f).
548
See footnotes 517–518 above, the American Convention on Human Rights: “Pact of San José,
Costa Rica” (art. 8) and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (art. 7).
549
See, for example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, General Assembly resolution
217 A (III) of 10 December 1948; American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man
(see footnote 514 above); the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam (see footnote 515
above); and the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
550
Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, art. 17.
551
International Convention against the taking of hostages, art. 8, para. 2.
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person is present and applicable provisions of international law, including
international law of human rights” 552 or similar formulations.

D.

Communication with the State of nationality or other relevant State

196. If a State takes into custody an alleged offender who is not of that State ’s
nationality, the alleged offender may wish to contact a representative of his or her
State, in particular consular officials who may assist on various issues, including
retention of counsel and translation. The 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations provides in article 36, paragraph 1(b), that:
if he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall, without delay, inform the
consular post of the sending State if, within its consular district, a national of that State is arrested
or committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any other manner. Any
communication addressed to the consular post by the person arrested, in prison, custody or
detention shall be forwarded by the said authorities without delay. The said authorities shall
inform the person concerned without delay of his rights under this subparagraph.

197. Further, article 36, paragraph 1(c), provides in part that “consular officers
shall have the right to visit a national of the sending State who is in prison, custody
or detention, to converse and correspond with him and to arrange for his legal
representation”. 553
198. When the Commission developed the draft article that ultimately contained
these provisions, it did so based on existing consular practice operating under
bilateral agreements and under customary international law. As of 2015, 177 States
are party to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. Further, many States
incorporate comparable provisions in their bilateral agreements. 554 Even in the
absence of a treaty, “[t]he practice of states shows that the right of a diplomatic
agent or a consular officer to interview an imprisoned national is usually
conceded”. 555 This is the case because “it is abundantly clear” that any denial of this
consultative right “would be in violation of the principles of international law and as
such wrongful”. 556
199. Notwithstanding the widespread adherence to the Vienna Convention o n
Consular Relations and the existence of comparable provisions in other treaties and in
customary international law, treaties addressing crimes typically reiterate that the
alleged offender is entitled to communicate with, and be visited by, his or her St ate of
nationality (or, if a stateless person, with the State where he or she usually resides or
that is otherwise willing to protect that person’s rights). While the Convention on the
__________________
552

International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, art. 14.
See also Lambert, pp. 180–181.
554
See, for example, Consular Convention between the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the
People’s Republic of China, signed at Beijing on 19 October 1998, S.S. No. 5 TO Gazette
No. 37/2001, art. 39, available from www.doj.gov.hk/lawdoc/bilateral/cavietnam_e.pdf. For
39 bilateral agreements between the United Kingdom and other States, see Police and Criminal
Evidence Act 1984, Code C: Code of Practice for the detention, treatment and questioning of
persons by police officers, Annex F—Countries with which bilateral consular conventions or
agreements requiring notification of the arrest and detention of their nationals are in force as at
1 April 2003, available from www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/117588/pace-code-c.pdf. For 59 bilateral agreements between the United States and
other States, see Department of Homeland Security, Bureau of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, 8 CFR Part 236.1(e), Federal Register, vol. 72, No. 10 (17 January 2007).
555
Sen, p. 372.
556
Ibid.; see also Schwarzenberger, p. 194.
553
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Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and the Geneva Conve ntions for
the protection of war victims did not contain a provision of this type, many
contemporary treaties do, such as the Convention on the suppression of unlawful
seizure of aircraft (art. 6); the Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts agains t
the safety of civil aviation (art. 6, para. 3); the Convention on the prevention and
punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons, including diplomatic
agents (art. 6, para. 2); the International Convention against the taking of hostage s
(art. 6, para. 3); the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (art. 6, para. 3); the Convention on the Safety of
United Nations and Associated Personnel (art. 17, para. 2); the International
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (art. 7, para. 3); the
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (art. 9,
para. 3); the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, 1999
(art. 7, para. 3); the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearance (art. 10, para. 3); and the ASEAN Convention on Counter
Terrorism (art. VIII, para. 4).
200. The Commission has noted that the obligation to permit a person in custody
to communicate with his or her State is “designed to safeguard the rights of the
alleged offender”. 557 Furthermore, writers have explained that the right to
communicate with a consular representative serves as protection against the
potential for State abuse, allowing for a determination “of whether a prisoner is
receiving humane treatment and enjoying other procedural rights guaranteed by
international law”. 558

E.

Draft article 10. Fair treatment of the alleged offender

201. Bearing these considerations in mind, the Special Rapporteur proposes the
following draft article:

Draft article 10.

Fair treatment of the alleged offender

1.
Any person against whom legal measures are being taken in connection
with an offence referred to in draft article 5, paragraphs 1 and 2, shall be provided at
all stages of the proceedings fair treatment, including a fair trial, and full protection
of his or her rights under applicable national and international law, including human
rights law.
2.
Any such person taken into custody by a State that is not of his or her
nationality shall be:
(a) permitted to communicate without delay with the nearest appropriate
representative of the State or States of which such person is a national or which is
otherwise entitled to protect that person’s rights or, if such person is a stateless person,
of the State which, at that person’s request, is willing to protect that person’s rights;
(b)

permitted to be visited by a representative of that State or those States; and

(c)

informed without delay of his or her rights under this subparagraph.

__________________
557
558

16-00720

See Lambert, p. 177 (citing Yearbook … 1972, vol. II, p. 318).
Ibid.

99/106

A/CN.4/690

CHAPTER VII

Future programme of work
202. The subsequent programme of work on the topic will be for the members of
the Commission elected for the quinquennium 2017 -2021. A possible timetable
would be for a third report to be submitted in 2017, which could address issues such
as rights and obligations applicable to the extradition of the alleged offender; rights
and obligations applicable to mutual legal assistance in connection with criminal
proceedings; the obligation of non-refoulement in certain circumstances; dispute
settlement and monitoring mechanisms; and conflict avoidance with treaties such as
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
203. A fourth report, to be submitted in 2018, could address all further matters, as
well as a draft preamble and draft concluding articles to a convention.
204. If such a timetable is maintained, it is anticipated that a first reading of the
entire set of draft articles could be completed by 2018 and a second reading could
be completed by 2020.
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Annex I
Draft articles provisionally adopted by the Commission at its
sixty-seventh session 1
Article 1.

Scope

The present draft articles apply to the prevention and punishment of crimes
against humanity.

Article 2.

General obligation

Crimes against humanity, whether or not committed in time of armed conflict,
are crimes under international law, which States undertake to prevent and punish.

Article 3.

Definition of crimes against humanity

1.
For the purpose of the present draft articles, “crime against humanity”
means any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or
systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the
attack:
(a)

murder;

(b)

extermination;

(c)

enslavement;

(d)

deportation or forcible transfer of population;

(e) imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation
of fundamental rules of international law;
(f)

torture;

(g) rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced
sterilization or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity;
(h) persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political,
racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other
grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in
connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or in connection with the crime
of genocide or war crimes;
(i)

enforced disappearance of persons;

(j)

the crime of apartheid;

(k) other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great
suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.
2.

For the purpose of paragraph 1:

(a) “attack directed against any civilian population” means a course of
conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 against
__________________
1
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any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational
policy to commit such attack;
(b) “extermination” includes the intentional infliction of conditions of life,
inter alia the deprivation of access to food and medicine, calculated to bring about
the destruction of part of a population;
(c) “enslavement” means the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to
the right of ownership over a person and includes the exercise of such power in the
course of trafficking in persons, in particular women and children;
(d) “deportation or forcible transfer of population ” means forced
displacement of the persons concerned by expulsion or other coercive acts from the
area in which they are lawfully present, without grounds permitted under
international law;
(e) “torture” means the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering,
whether physical or mental, upon a person in the custody or under the control of the
accused, except that torture shall not include pain or suffering arising only from,
inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions;
(f) “forced pregnancy” means the unlawful confinement of a woman
forcibly made pregnant, with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of any
population or carrying out other grave violations of international law. This
definition shall not in any way be interpreted as affecting national la ws relating to
pregnancy;
(g) “persecution” means the intentional and severe deprivation of
fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the identity of the
group or collectivity;
(h) “the crime of apartheid” means inhumane acts of a character similar to
those referred to in paragraph 1, committed in the context of an institutionalized
regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial group over any other
racial group or groups and committed with the intention of maintaining th at regime;
(i) “enforced disappearance of persons” means the arrest, detention or
abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a
State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge that
deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or wher eabouts of those
persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a
prolonged period of time.
3.
For the purpose of the present draft articles, it is understood that the term
“gender” refers to the two sexes, male and female, within the context of society. The
term “gender” does not indicate any meaning different from the above.
4.
This draft article is without prejudice to any broader definition provided
for in any international instrument or national law.
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Article 4.

Obligation of prevention

1.
Each State undertakes to prevent crimes against humanity, in conformity
with international law, including through:
(a) effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other preventive measures
in any territory under its jurisdiction or control; and
(b) cooperation with other States, relevant intergovernmental organizations,
and, as appropriate, other organizations.
2.
No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, such as armed conflict,
internal political instability or other public emergency, may be invoked as a
justification of crimes against humanity. 2

__________________
2

16-00720

The placement of this paragraph will be addressed at a further stage.

103/106

A/CN.4/690

Annex II
Draft articles proposed in the second report
Draft article 5.

Criminalization under national law

1.
Each State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the following
acts are offences under its criminal law: committing a crime against humanity;
attempting to commit such a crime; and ordering, soliciting, inducing, aiding,
abetting or otherwise assisting in or contributing to the commission or attempted
commission of such a crime.
2.
Each State also shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the
following are offences under its criminal law:
(a) A military commander or person effectively acting as a military
commander shall be criminally responsible for crimes against humanity committed
by forces under his or her effective command and control, or effective authority and
control as the case may be, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control
properly over such forces, where:
(i) that military commander or person either knew or, owing to the
circumstances at the time, should have known that the forces were committing
or about to commit such crimes; and
(ii) that military commander or person failed to take all necessary and
reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their
commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for
investigation and prosecution.
(b) With respect to superior and subordinate relationships not described in
paragraph (a), a superior shall be criminally responsible for crimes against humanity
committed by subordinates under his or her effective authority and control, as a
result of his or her failure to exercise control properly over such subordinates,
where:
(i) the superior either knew, or consciously disregarded information which
clearly indicated, that the subordinates were committing or about to commit
such crimes;
(ii) the crimes concerned activities that
responsibility and control of the superior; and

were

within

the

effective

(iii) the superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within
his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter
to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.
3.

Each State also shall take the necessary measures to ensure that:

(a) the fact that an offence referred to in this draft article was committed
pursuant to an order of a superior, whether military or civilian, is not a ground for
excluding criminal responsibility of a subordinate;
(b) an offence referred to in this draft article shall not be subject to any
statute of limitations; and
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(c) an offence referred to in this draft article shall be punishable by
appropriate penalties that take into account their grave nature.

Draft article 6.

Establishment of national jurisdiction

1.
Each State shall take the necessary measures to establish its jurisdiction
over the offences referred to in draft article 5, paragraphs 1 and 2, when:
(a) the offence is committed in any territory under its juris diction or control
or on board a ship or aircraft registered in that State;
(b)

the alleged offender is one of its nationals; and

(c)

the victim is one of its nationals and the State considers it appropriate.

2.
Each State shall also take the necessary measures to establish its
jurisdiction over the offences referred to in draft article 5, paragraphs 1 and 2, when
the alleged offender is present in any territory under its jurisdiction or control,
unless it extradites or surrenders the person in accordanc e with draft article 9,
paragraph 1.
3.
Without prejudice to applicable rules of international law, this draft
article does not exclude the establishment of other criminal jurisdiction by a State in
accordance with its national law.

Draft article 7.

General investigation and cooperation for identifying
alleged offenders

1.
Each State shall ensure that its competent authorities proceed to a prompt
and impartial investigation whenever there is reason to believe that a crime against
humanity has been or is being committed in any territory under its jurisdiction or
control.
2.
If the State determines that a crime against humanity is or has been
committed, the State shall communicate, as appropriate, the general findings of that
investigation to any other State whenever there is reason to believe that nationals of
the other State have been or are involved in the crime. Thereafter, that other State
shall promptly and impartially investigate the matter.
3.
All States shall cooperate, as appropriate, to establish the identity and
location of persons who may have committed an offence referred to in draft
article 5, paragraphs 1 or 2.

Draft article 8.

Exercise of national jurisdiction when an alleged offender
is present

1.
If a State obtains or receives information indicating that a person present
in territory under its jurisdiction or control may have committed an offence referred
to in draft article 5, paragraphs 1 or 2, the State shall immediately carry out a
preliminary investigation to establish the relevant facts with respect to that person.
2.
If the circumstances so warrant, the State shall take the person into
custody or take such other legal measures as are necessary to ensure his or her
presence during the investigation and at criminal, extraditio n or surrender
proceedings. The custody and other legal measures shall be as provided for in the
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law of that State, but shall be in conformity with international law and maintained
only for such time as is reasonable.
3.
The State shall notify the States referred to in draft article 6, paragraph 1,
of the general findings of its preliminary investigation, of the circumstances
warranting any detention, and whether it intends to submit the matter to its
competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution.

Draft article 9.

Aut dedere aut judicare

1.
If a person alleged to have committed an offence referred to in draft
article 5, paragraphs 1 and 2, is found in any territory under the jurisdiction or
control of a State, that State shall submit the matter to its competent authorities for
the purpose of prosecution, unless it extradites or surrenders the person to another
State or competent international criminal tribunal.
2.
If the State submits the matter to its competent authorities for the
purpose of prosecution, those authorities shall decide whether and how to prosecute
in the same manner as they would for any ordinary offence of a serious nature under
the law of that State.

Draft article 10.

Fair treatment of the alleged offender

1.
Any person against whom legal measures are being taken in connection
with an offence referred to in draft article 5, paragraphs 1 and 2, shall be provided at
all stages of the proceedings fair treatment, including a fair trial, and full protection
of his or her rights under applicable national and international law, including human
rights law.
2.
Any such person taken into custody by a State that is not of his or her
nationality shall be:
(a) permitted to communicate without delay with the nearest appropriate
representative of the State or States of which such person is a national or which is
otherwise entitled to protect that person’s rights or, if such person is a stateless
person, of the State which, at that person’s request, is willing to protect that person’s
rights;
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(b)

permitted to be visited by a representative of that State or those States; and

(c)

informed without delay of his or her rights under this subparagraph.

16-00720

